The SEC's Case Against Sir Robert Allen Stanford -- A Case Study in Investigative and Enforcement Failure
Since last year, we've followed the government's investigation and prosecution of Texan and Antiguan financier Sir Robert Allen Stanford for allegedly defrauding investors of billions in a Ponzi scheme. Well, as set forth in a 150 page Report of Investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Office of the Inspector General (OIG), the SEC has been following Stanford and his companies for much, much longer. OIG made the Report public yesterday. The Report reveals a stunning pattern of lack of diligence in SEC enforcement.
Stanford's investment advisor registered with the SEC in 1995. By 1997, the SEC's Fort Worth Office Examination Group had conducted an examination and concluded that the CDs Stanford and his companies were marketing were most likely a Ponzi scheme and that Stanford was allegedly engaging in fraud. However, despite the fact that the 1997 examination concluded that Stanford was likely engaging in a Ponzi scheme and referred the matter to the Fort Worth Office Enforcement Office, Enforcement staff did not open an investigation, or "matter under inquiry" (MUI), until May 1998. Enforcement sent Stanford Group Company (SGC) a voluntary request for documents. SGC refused to provide many of the requested documents, and the MUI was closed in August 1998.
The Examination Group conducted another examination of Stanford in 1998, and again concluded that the investments being offered by Stanford were highly suspicious. However, Enforcement staff did not listen to the Examination Group or review its report in deciding to close the investigation of Stanford and his companies.
A third examination of SGC was conducted in 2002 and once again concluded that the consistent above-market returns claimed by SGC were highly unlikely to be legitimate investments. The SEC again did not follow up on the examination, despite receiving conflicting representations from SGC regarding its due diligence and a growing number of complaints from outside entities confirming their suspicions.
In October of 2003, the SEC received a letter from the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) stating that Stanford's companies were engaged in an alleged massive Ponzi scheme. The Examination Group was asked to conduct a fourth investigation, which it did in October 2004. The investigation concluded that the CDs were part of "a very large Ponzi scheme." However, in March of 2005, senior Enforcement officials in Fort Worth learned of the Examination Group's fourth examination of Stanford and told them that "[Stanford] was not something they were interested in.”
Shortly thereafter, the head of Enforcement for the Fort Worth Office stepped down. The former head later sought to represent Stanford himself in proceedings by the SEC, despite the fact that he was involved in quashing the investigation of Stanford and his companies.
Enforcement sent Stanford International Bank (SIB) a second voluntary request for documents in August 2005. SIB refused to produce the requested documents. In November of 2005, Enforcement again closed its investigation of Stanford and his companies.
After the exposure of the Ponzi scheme of Bernard Madoff in December 2008, the SEC began to receive complaints regarding the fact that it had allowed Stanford and his companies to continue to engage in a Ponzi scheme. The SEC finally shut down Stanford's companies and froze their assets in February 2009. In October of 2009, Senator David Vitter and Senator Richard Shelby wrote a letter to the SEC asking it to conduct a comprehensive inquiry into its investigation and handling of the Stanford matter.
The OIG Report found that Enforcement staff were reluctant to pursue cases which were novel or complex, preferring to focus on cases which were "quick hits" or "slam dunks." The Report notes that, in the 12 years between the time that the SEC first gained knowledge that Stanford and his companies might be engaging in a Ponzi scheme and the time that the SEC took action to freeze their assets, investments in Stanford's CDs grew from $250 million to $1.5 billion. A survey was taken of investors in Stanford's scheme with 95% responding that knowledge of an inquiry by the SEC would have affected their decision to invest.
