Posted on April 14, 2010 by Anthony Lake

Justice John Paul Stevens on Criminal Law

Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, who notified President Barack Obama last week that he will be stepping down from the Court when its current term is over in June or July, has written nearly 400 opinions over his nearly 35 year tenure on the Court. Justice Stevens has weighed in on many occasions on criminal law issues over the past three and a half decades. Contrary to the label commonly applied to Justice Stevens as a "liberal," like all Supreme Court Justices, he has sided with the government in criminal cases more often than not. However, Justice Stevens has been the originator of many opinions which have upheld and furthered the rights of the individual in criminal cases, some of the more notable of which are outlined below.

On sentencing issues, Justice Stevens authored the opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the forerunner of the Court's landmark decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 295 (2004) andUnited States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), in which the Court first famously held, in regard to New Jersey's "hate crimes" statute, that "[t]he Constitution requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."

Justice Stevens also issued the Court's opinion in Gall v. U.S., 552 U.S. 38 (2007), which sets forth the definitive current process for federal criminal sentencing. The Court in Gall held that district courts cannot consider the ranges recommended by the  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as presumptively reasonable, must consider the extent of any departure or variance from the sentencing range recommended by the Guidelines, and must explain the appropriateness of any unusual variance, and that appellate courts review all sentences imposed by a district court under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, reviewing for any significant procedural errors and for substantive reasonableness of the sentence. To calculate a defendant's sentence, a district court must first correctly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, then should consider all of the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and if the court determines to sentence the defendant outside the advisory Guidelines range, it must consider the extent of the deviation and adequately explain the sentence.
 
In regard to searches under the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stevens held that a search of a vehicle incident to a defendant's arrest could not be justified under circumstances where the defendant no longer had access to the vehicle in In Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009). And while he upheld the police search in Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (1987), Justice Stevens wrote legal dicta which has formed the basis for many challenges to the scope of a search of areas which are not specified in a search warrant. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Court affirmed that a man's home is truly his castle, and that the police may not make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to effectuate an arrest.

Justice Stevens has been an ardent opponent of capital punishment throughout most of his term on the Court and has been the author of numerous opinions limiting the application of the death penalty. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Court held that execution of "mentally retarded" offenders constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), ruled that juveniles under the age of 16 cannot possess the requisite culpability for imposition of the death penalty. And in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) the court mandated that, in capital cases, the jury must be instructed on, and permitted to consider, a verdict of guilt on a lesser included offense.

 In other cases, Justice Steven held in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), that a State could not impose the burden on a defendant claiming a racially discriminatory striking of a juror pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, to show that the striking was "more likely than not" the product of purposeful discrimination. He also held, in Hubbard v. U.S., 514 U.S. 695 (1995), that a federal court is not a department or agency of the United States for the purposes of making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

 The Blog wishes Justice Stevens a happy retirement and looks forward to the appointment of his successor.

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Posted on April 9, 2008 by Anthony Lake

Supreme Court Reversal on Batson Grounds

   Jeffrey Brooks was a student at Southern University in New Orleans. Allen Snyder was a Louisiana man on trial in a Louisiana court for the first degree murder of his wife, Mary. And Mr. Brooks was a member of Synder’s jury panel.

   The prosecution and defense winnowed the 85 prospective jurors of the panel down to 36 through challenges for cause. Five of the remaining 36 prospective jurors were African-Americans, including Mr. Brooks. The prosecutor proceeded to eliminate the remaining African-American jurors through the use of peremptory strikes. In the case of Mr. Brooks, the prosecutor offered the alleged race-neutral reasons that Mr. Brooks allegedly looked “very nervous” during questioning, and that he was a student teacher and therefore allegedly might be more inclined to render a guilty verdict on a lesser charge so that he could return to his teaching duties.

The defense made an objection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986), which the trial court overruled. Snyder was convicted of first-degree murder and appealed alleging Batson error, however the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The United States Supreme Court then granted cert in Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (March 19, 2008).

The majority, led by Justice Alito, reiterated the test in Batson for adjudicating a claim that a peremptory strike on a juror was based on race:

“First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race[;] [s]econd, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question[;] [and] [t]hird, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.”

Id. at 1207 (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 277, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328-329, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (2003)). The majority found that the trial court did not make any specific findings regarding Mr. Brooks’ alleged demeanor on the record, and rejected his alleged nervousness as a possible ground for upholding the strike. Id. at 1209. Furthermore, the Court found that Mr. Brooks’ student teaching obligations were a suspicious ground on which to uphold the strike, noting that no less than 50 members of the panel expressed concerns that jury service would interfere with work, school, family, or other obligations; that the dean of the university had told the Court that Mr. Brooks could make up his missed work; that, after hearing the dean’s statements, Mr. Brooks no longer seemed concerned about serving on the jury; and that even the prosecution anticipated that trial would be relatively brief. Id. at 1209-1211. It further noted that the prosecution had accepted white jurors with conflicting obligations at least as, or more, important as Mr. Brooks’, and cited several examples. Id. at 1210.

      The majority held that the prosecution’s pretextual explanations supported an inference that the strike was motivated in substantial part by a discriminatory intent pursuant to Batson, and that the state had produced no evidence that the factor was not determinative in the strike. Id. at 1212. It then reversed the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court and remanded Snyder’s case. Id.
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