In-House Counsel to the Mob? Court Denies Government's Motion to Disqualify Attorney Joseph Corozzo, Jr.

As reported by the New York Law Journal, Michael Scarpaci is current charged as an alleged associate of the Gambino crime organization in the Southern District of New York in an indictment charging racketeering violations, including murder, witness tampering, murder of a witness, extortion, narcotics and sex trafficking a minor. In a twist, however, Scarpaci's lawyer, Joseph R. Corozzo, Jr., is also alleged to have connections to the Gambino family, and the prosecution sought to disqualify Corozzo from the case for alleged conflicts of interest. Specifically, Corozzo's father, Joseph Corozzo Sr., is a consigliere of the Gambino family. His uncle, Nicholas Corozzo, is a capo. And Corozzo himself is alleged to serve as the organization's "in house counsel."

Prosecutors moved to disqualify Corozzo from representing Scarpaci, citing Corozzo's disqualification in April from representing Gaetano Napoli, Sr., on the ground that Corozzo had been present at two meetings with his client in 2009 in which they discussed what to do if Napoli was ever approached by law enforcement. Corozzo had advised Napoli to say nothing and give investigators the number for his attorney. Sound advice from a criminal defense attorney--which the government of course alleged constituted obstruction of justice.

Prosecutors also cited a 2006 recorded conversation in which Scarpaci's co-defendant, Daniel Marino, and an alleged Gambino associate, Lewis Kasman, discussed the possibility of Corozzo being arrested and disbarred, arguing that the conversation implicated Corozzo in the racketeering conspiracy charged in the indictment. Finally, the government contended that Corozzo had previously represented a witness for the government in the case.

District Judge Lewis Kaplan denied the government's motion, holding that the government had not identified any actual conflict from Corozzo's representation of Scarpaci, and noted that Scarpaci could make a knowing and intelligent waiver of any potential conflicts. The Judge found that the alleged conflict in the Napoli case was not related to the case against Scarpaci, and that the Court in that case never made any finding that Corozzo's alleged conduct obstructed justice. Judge Kaplan also observed that the conversation between Marino and Kasman did not suggest that Corozzo had engaged in any criminal conduct. The Court further noted that the subject matter of Corozzo's representation of the government witness, and was only "tangentially related" to the subject matter of the case. Finally, regarding Corozzo's family connections with the Gambino family, the Court held that there was no evidence that Corozzo's father or uncle had had in any way supervised any of the RICO acts allegedly committed by Scarpaci.

Pfizer Hit With 140 Million RICO Verdict Over Alleged Promotion of Off-Label Uses for Epilepsy Drug Neurontin

As reported in the National Law Journal, a federal jury in Massachusetts last week returned a $47 million verdict against pharmaceutical giant Pfizer for allegedly promoting Neurontin, an epilepsy drug manufactured by Pfizer, for off-label uses in alleged violation of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. Since the RICO statute provides for treble (triple) damages, the amount of the verdict is actually $141 million.

The plaintiffs, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, alleged that Pfizer allegedly deceived the organizations into believing that Neurotin could be used to effectively treat conditions such as migraines and bipolar disorder. Neurontin has been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration since 1993 to treat epilepsy.

Pfizer officials have issued a statement stating that the company will appeal the verdict. Pfizer officials allege that Kaiser misled the jury during trial and that it continues to recommend Neurontin to its patients for the off-label uses. Officials claimed that Neurontin is safe and effective.

 

Georgia Court of Appeals Reverses Trial Court's Dismissal of RICO Indictment Against Pastor, Bank Officer

As reported by the Macon Telegraph, on Friday the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a ruling of the Superior Court of Bibb County, Georgia, dismissing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) charges against Jimmy Collins, the former pastor of God's Worship Center (GWC), near Macon, Georgia, and Steven Pittman, a former employee of BB&T Bank. Collins and Pittman were alleged to have fraudulently induced church members into taking out more than $600,000 worth of loans.

Superior Court Judge S. Phillip Brown had dismissed the indictment against Collins and Pittman last July, finding that the State's indictment was not specific enough in alleging the RICO violations. However, the Court of Appeals held that the indictment contained sufficient detail, including a list of specific loan transactions.

Collins and Pittman are alleged to have used Pittman's position as a bank officer to obtain loans and lines of credit for approximately 10 members of Collins' church between 2002 and 2008. Collins allegedly requested that the church members "assist" the church by taking out personal loans, allegedly telling them that they would have no personal risk because the church would be responsible for repaying the loans. Collins is alleged to have targeted church members lacking in "sophistication," allegedly telling them that it was their "Christian duty." Collins and Pittman also allegedly forged documents, provided false financial information regarding the members and falsely represented the intended use of the loan funds. One couple incurred more than $350,000 worth of debt, and claimed that Collins and Pittman executed at least two loans without their knowledge.

Church members filed five civil suits against Collins, Pittman and BB&T. BB&T reached a confidential settlement with the plaintiffs and the claims against it were dismissed.

 

Representative William Jefferson Convicted on 11 of 16 Counts

We did not weigh in yesterday, but the biggest federal criminal defense news was clearly the conviction of U.S. Representative William Jefferson of Louisiana in his criminal trial in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, as reported by the New Orleans Times-Picayune. The jury of eight women and four men returned a verdict of guilty against Jefferson on 11 of 16 counts, including 2 counts of conspiracy to solicit bribes to a public official in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 2 counts of soliciting bribes, 3 counts of honest services fraud, 3 counts of money laundering, and one count of racketeer influenced and corrupt organization (RICO) violations. As a testament to Jefferson's defense, the jury did not find Jefferson guilty on three of the honest services charges as well as a charge for obstruction of justice and a count for violation of the FCPA.

Jefferson, who is 62, faced a maximum of 235 years in prison if convicted on all counts. He has been allowed to remain released pending his sentencing on October 30. A forfeiture hearing will be held regarding his assets.

Jefferson was the first African-American congressman from Louisiana since Reconstruction.

Jury Begins Deliberating Rep. William Jefferson's Fate Following Over 2 & 1/2 Hours of Jury Instructions

As reported by the New Orleans Times-Picayune, Judge T.S. Ellis, III, of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia read instructions to the jury yesterday which lasted over 2 & 1/2 hours, and the jury retired for its deliberations in the case against former U.S. Representative William Jefferson. The jury deliberated for about four hours and will re-convene to continue deliberations this morning.

The jury weighing the evidence in the six week long trial of Jefferson on 16 criminal counts, including racketeering, honest services fraud and violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, consists of two white males, six white females, two black males and two black females. Jefferson's case is the first time the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has been applied to a public official. The Court sent three alternate jurors home yesterday, instructing them to remain "pristine" with regard to their exposure to information regarding the case.Jefferson's lead attorney, Robert Trout, told reporters that Jefferson intends to be present at Court each morning when the jury arrives.

Closing arguments were heard earlier in the week, with numerous media outlets and journalists from Louisiana in attendance.

Indictment in the Sir Robert Allen Stanford Case/Stanford to Be Arraigned in Houston Today

Sir Robert Allen Stanford is scheduled to be arraigned today on conspiracy, mail and wire fraud, money laundering and obstruction charges in Houston in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Stanford is represented by attorneys Dick DeGuerin and Sean Ryan Buckley, of the Houston firm of DeGuerin and Dickson.

According to the docket for the case, the Government obtained its 21-count indictment, which can be viewed here, last Thursday and promptly moved to seal (i.e. prevent public access to) it, and then unsealed it on Friday shortly before Stanford’s arrest.

The Court will likely revisit the issue of whether Stanford is entitled to release before trial. On Friday, the Court ordered co-defendants Mark Kuhrt and Gilberto Lopez released on a $100,000 unsecured bond. However, given Stanford’s considerable wealth and ties abroad, any amount of bond imposed in his case will undoubtedly be far higher, if Stanford is granted pre-trial release at all, that is. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia determined that Stanford posed a high risk of flight, and denied bond.

The case will be tried before U.S. District Judge David Hitter, a brief description of whom can be found here.

Sir Robert Allen Stanford Indicted in Alleged Second Largest Ponzi Scheme in U.S. History

The writers of Federal Criminal Defense Blog have been busy writing on other matter and apologize for the brief hiatus. Much has happened in the sphere of white collar crime even during our short absence, most notably developments in the two largest Ponzi schemes in U.S. history, and we have some catching up to do.

We’ll start with the second largest—an indictment indictment against billionaire Texas financier Sir Robert Allen Stanford, 59, was unsealed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on Friday according to the Associated Press  and the BBC. The 50-page indictment alleges that Stanford and six other defendants with allegedly perpetrated a $7 billion Ponzi-style fraud. It charges Stanford and the other defendants with 21 counts, including 7 counts of wire fraud, 10 counts of mail fraud, conspiracy to obstruct an investigation for the Securities and Exchange Commission, obstruction of an investigation by the SEC and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Defendants Laura Pendergest-Holt, Gilberto Lopez and Mark Kuhrt are executives of Stanford Financial Group. Defendant Leroy King, a former bank regulator for the Caribbean island nation of Antigua and Barbuda, allegedly accepted more than $100,000 in bribes from the other defendants in order to allow the alleged scheme to continue.

The indictment alleges that the defendants sold certificates of deposit issued by Stanford International Bank, based in Antigua, to investors, promising large returns. The defendants allegedly made false claims to investors regarding the growth of Stanford Financial Group’s assets.

The scheme had approximately 30,000 investors. Stanford is alleged to have diverted more than $1.6 billion in investment funds in personal loans to himself. More than $1 billion in investment money is allegedly unaccounted for. Stanford is also charged in the indictment with allegedly conspiring to obstruct an SEC proceeding. Stanford Financial Group’s finance chief, James M. Davis, is cooperating with investigators. Davis has been charged with fraud and obstruction in a separate indictment.

Stanford was the owner of a newspaper, two restaurants, and a development company in Antigua, and was a cricket enthusiast and owner of the Stanford cricket grounds in Antigua. In 2008, Stanford staged a $20 million, winner-takes-all, match between a West Indian XI and England at the grounds. In 2006, Stanford became the first American to be knighted by Antigua and Barbuda.

Stanford is represented by attorney Dick DeGuerin, who has issued a statement to the press that Stanford is innocent of the charges. Stanford has made repeated statements as to his innocence and has alleged that no money was lost.

Stanford surrendered to the FBI on Thursday and had his initial appearance on Friday. U.S. Magistrate Judge Hannah Lauck determined that Stanford posed a flight risk and ordered him to remain in custody pending a future detention hearing in Houston. Several governments have frozen his assets. Stanford faces as much as 250 years in prison if convicted.

Syed Haris Ahmed Trial: Allegations

 

By way of background, the Government originally charged Syed Haris Ahmed in a sealed indictment filed on March 23, 2006. The Government obtained a Superseding Indictment on July 19, 2006. It has charged Ahmed and his co-defendant, Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, with one count of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, in violation of Title 18 United States Code Sections 956 and 2332b; one count of providing and attempting to provide material support to terrorists, in violation of Title 18, Sections 956, 2332b and 2339A; one count of conspiracy to provide material support to a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, in violation of Title 18, Section 2339B; and one count of attempting to provide material support to a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, in violation of Title 18, Section 2339B.

The Government’s Superseding Indictment contains the following facts and allegations:

Ahmed was born in Pakistan in 1984 and became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Sadequee, who is allegedly nicknamed “Shifa,” was born in Virginia in 1986, and is of Bangladeshi descent.

In or around late 2004, Ahmed and Sadequee and another person engaged in alleged paramilitary training, including with paintball guns, in Northwest Georgia.

On or about February 26, 2005, Ahmed and Sadequee traveled to Toronto, Canada, by bus. While in Toronto, Ahmed and Sadequee allegedly met in person with “supporters of violent jihad” and “discussed strategic locations in the United States that were suitable for terrorist attack, including military bases and oil storage facilities and refineries.” Ahmed, Sadequee and the others allegedly also “explored how they might disrupt the world-wide Global Positioning System (GPS)” and “a plan for members of the group to travel to Pakistan to seek and receive paramilitary training that they would then use to engage in violent jihad.”

After returning to Atlanta, in or about March or April 2005, Ahmed and Sadequee further discussed these plans, and also the possibility of attacking Dobbins Air Reserve Base in Marietta, Georgia.

At or around this time, Sadequee was allegedly in communication with Younis Tsouli, an unindicted co-conspirator in the United Kingdom.

On or about April 10 and 11, 2005, Ahmed and Sadequee traveled to Washington, D.C., in Ahmed’s pickup truck. On April 11, Ahmed and Sadequee allegedly “made short digital video recordings… of symbolic and infrastructure targets of potential terrorist attacks in the Washington, D.C., area, including the United States Capitol; the headquarters building of the World Bank…; the Masonic Temple in Alexandria, Virginia; and a group of large fuel storage tanks near I-95 in northern Virginia.”

On returning to Atlanta, Ahmed allegedly gave the video clips to Sadequee so that he could send the clips to supporters of violent jihad abroad. Sadequee allegedly sent the video clips to Tsouli in the United Kingdom and Tsouli stored the clips on his computer along with other materials relating to violent jihad.

Between March and July 2005, Sadequee allegedly provided Ahmed with the contact information for Abu Umar, an unindicted co-conspirator, and told Ahmed that Abu Umar could assist Ahmed with obtaining paramilitary training in Pakistan. On or about July 17, 2005, Ahmed traveled from Atlanta to Pakistan for the alleged purpose of studying in a madrassa and then obtaining paramilitary training to engage in violent jihad in Kashmir or other locations, including the U.S. Ahmed is alleged to have intended to join Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (“Army of the Righteous”). Ahmed was allegedly unsuccessful in his attempts to enter a madrassa or to obtain paramilitary training, and returned to Atlanta.

On or about August 18, 2005, Sadequee traveled from Atlanta to Bangladesh to allegedly get married and to pursue violent jihad. Sadequee was stopped as he traveled through John F. Kennedy Airport in New York and was discovered to allegedly have two compact discs concealed in the lining of his suitcase which contained a Fairfax County, Virginia, Visitor’s Center map of the Washington area, including the sites of four potential terrorist targets which Sadequee and Ahmed had videotaped in April 2005. Sadequee was interviewed by federal agents and allegedly falsely stated that he had traveled to Toronto alone.

On or about August 19, 2005, Ahmed returned to Atlanta from Pakistan and was interviewed by federal agents at Hartsfield International Airport in Atlanta. Ahmed allegedly made false and misleading statements about his travel to Canada and Pakistan, allegedly stating that he had made the trips to visit friends and family and to attend a religious school.

In the Fall of 2005, Ahmed allegedly researched shaped explosive charges and methods to defeat surveillance by government authorities. He also allegedly cautioned an individual to avoid discussing certain topics over the telephone.

On or about November 27, 2005, Ahmed allegedly told a supporter of violent jihad of his intent to go abroad again to train for, and engage in, violent jihad, and told the individual to read the indictment against Jose Padilla. At or around this time, Ahmed allegedly reviewed a periodical for gun enthusiasts.

In early 2006, Ahmed allegedly engaged in efforts to detect and evade suspected government surveillance. In March of 2006, agents from the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force engaged in a series of interviews with Ahmed, in which Ahmed allegedly attempted to conceal the true nature of his, Sadequee’s and their alleged co-conspirators’ discussions, activities and plans. After the interviews began, Ahmed communicated with Sadequee in Bangladesh and warned him about the FBI’s interest in their activities.

 

Syed Haris Ahmed Trial: Day 1

 

The trial of Syed Haris Ahmed is Georgia’s most significant terrorism case and we will collect for readers daily information on the trial and additional information. Today’s information on the Ahmed/Sadequee Trial comes from the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, WSBTV and CNN.

Ahmed is 24, an Atlanta area native and a former student at Georgia Tech. Ahmed waived his right to jury trial, and his case is being tried before District Court Judge William S. Duffey in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia without a jury. Jack Martin, of Martin Brothers, P.C., is representing Ahmed. Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert McBurney is representing the United States. Ahmed’s co-defendant, Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, will be tried in August. Stephanie Kearns of the Federal Defender Program is representing Sadequee.

On Monday, Mr. Martin gave his opening statements to the Court, describing Ahmed as a confused, frustrated and immature young man who “fell prey” to websites espousing extremist views. Mr. Martin characterized the alleged plans for terrorist acts as “passing random thoughts, momentary ideas, childish fantasies, unformed, inchoate notions.” Mr. Martin argued that Ahmed had the ability to commit the alleged acts but said “No.” He stated that Ahmed’s idea of paramilitary training was shooting paintball guns with a friend in the North Georgia woods.

Mr. McBurney argued that Ahmed “one step removed from the bomb throwers” and intended to wage violent jihad. Mr. McBurney argued that Ahmed was a would-be terrorist who went to Pakistan to join the Taliban. He said that the videos made by Ahmed while allegedly “casing” locations in Washington, D.C., including the Capitol and the Pentagon, were intended to prove to terrorists overseas that Ahmed had access to Washington’s “backyard” and could get in close to targets. McBurney said the government’s case is about supporting terrorism and not actually “pulling the trigger or dropping the bomb.”

FBI Special Agent Mark Richards testified for the government. During Agent Richard’s testimony, the government showed some of the videos. In one video of the World Bank Building, Ahmed bobbed up and down so much that Mr. Martin asked Special Agent Richards “If a terrorist was attacking on a pogo stick, this might be useful, right?” However, another video shows Ahmed and Sadequee driving past the Pentagon with Sadequee stating “This is where our brothers attacked.”

 

Constructive Amendments to the Indictment in the Eleventh Circuit

 

The government’s case in many instances will evolve or shift to some extent over the course of a criminal prosecution. It may be a long time between indictment and trial, and the prosecution may come into possession of new evidence before trial, or may not have thoroughly reviewed the evidence which it does possess until after the return of the indictment. In addition, the prosecution may adjust its arguments or evidence in reaction to the defense. Whatever the reason, the prosecution in many criminal cases may determine to argue or present evidence at trial regarding a theory of criminality which differs to some degree from the crimes alleged in its original indictment. A thorough prosecutor will sometimes seek to provide for such a shifting theory by obtaining a superseding indictment from the grand jury, but in other cases the prosecution may not notice any need to do so or may simply neglect to do so. In any event, attorneys should carefully evaluate the prosecution’s arguments and proof at trial, as well as the trial court’s instructions to the jury, in order to determine whether a variance or amendment of the indictment has occurred. Following is a brief survey of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ current position on amendments to or variances with the indictment.

“A constructive amendment occurs when the essential elements of the offense as alleged in the indictment are altered to broaden the potential bases for conviction beyond what the indictment contains.” United States v. Tampas, 493 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Narog, 372 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Keller, 916 F.2d 628, 634 (11th Cir. 1990)); see also United States v. Ward, 486 F.3d 1212, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007). A constructive amendment of the indictment constitutes per se reversible error because it violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to be tried on charges presented to the grand jury. See United States v. Tampas, 493 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111, 1114 (11th Cir. 1990)). Under the Fifth Amendment, “a defendant can only be convicted for a crime charged in the indictment. It would be fundamentally unfair to convict a defendant on charges of which he had no notice.” Ward, at 1227 (citing Keller, at 632-33). The mere presentation of evidence not referenced in the indictment, such as pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), does not constitute an amendment or variance. See United States v. Lavigne, 282 Fed.Appx. 790, 793 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).

In contrast, “a variance occurs when the facts proved at trial deviate from the facts contained in the indictment but the essential elements of the offense are the same.” Ward, 486 F.3d at 1227 (citing Keller, at 634; United States v. Flynt, 15 F.3d 1002, 1005-06 (11th Cir. 1994)). A variance only requires reversal where the defendant can establish that his or her rights were substantially prejudiced. Id. (citing Keller, at 633).

The Court has found no constructive amendment where an indictment charged the defendant with distributing crack cocaine and the trial court instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty if he had distributed either cocaine or crack cocaine, based upon the fact that the type of drug is not an element under the controlled substance statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841, United States v. Porter, 293 Fed.Appx. 700, 703, 04 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished); where the government argued in its closing arguments that it need not prove that all of the defendants named in the indictment were members of the scheme, but the indictment charged the defendant with conspiring with two named co-defendants as well as “other persons” United States v. Nunnally, 249 Fed.Appx. 776, 778 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); where the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it had to find that the defendant embezzled a specific amount, but the indictment alleged that the defendant embezzled property having a value in excess of $5,000, Tampas, at 1291; where the trial court instructed the jury that it could still convict the defendant on the substantive mail and wire fraud counts of the indictment if it was unable to reach agreement on the conspiracy charge did, despite the fact that the government had referenced the conspiracy in the substantive counts of the indictment, Ward, at 1227, 28; where, despite the fact that the indictment alleged that the defendant possessed “more than 20 kilograms of cocaine,” the trial court instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty if it found that he possessed “a measurable amount” of a controlled substance, United States v. Knight, 213 Fed.Appx. 835, 838, 39 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); where the government alleged in its indictment that the defendant committed an act “on or about” a particular date, but the proof at trial showed that the act was committed on a different date, United States v. Strevell, 185 Fed.Appx. 841 (11th Cir. 2006) (unpublished); where the indictment charged the defendant with an offense involving cocaine, but the proof at trial and the trial court’s jury instructions referred to crack cocaine, United States v. Rutherford, 175 F.3d 899, 906 (11th Cir. 1999); where the government’s indictment alleged that a certain person was the victim of the defendant’s extortion, but the proof at trial demonstrated that the person had no connection with the money obtained, United States v. Flynt, 15 F.3d 1002, 1006 (11th Cir. 1994); where the district court deviated in its instructions to the jury from the allegations in the indictment concerning a non-essential element of the crime, United States v. Lignarolo, 770 F.2d 971, 981 (11th Cir. 1985); where the government proved events of a conspiracy at trial which were not listed in the overt acts section of the indictment, United States v. Gold, No. 83-3231, 83-3230, 83-3267, 83-3239, 1984 WL 48339 (11th Cir. 1984); and where the government dropped two alleged co-conspirators from its conspiracy allegations at trial, United States v. Davis, 679 F.2d 845, (11th Cir. 1982).

However the Eleventh Circuit has found constructive amendments of indictments and improper broadening of the potential bases for conviction where the indictment charged the defendants with knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, but the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendants if it found that they knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the pseudoephedrine would be used to make “any controlled substance,” Narog, at 1249; where the government charged that the defendant knowingly and “willfully” committed money laundering, but the court redacted the term “willful” from its charge on the definition of “intentional,” United States v. Cancelliere, 69 F.3d 1116, 1121 (11th Cir. 1995); where the indictment alleged that the defendant conspired with a particular person and the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant if it found he conspired with “any” person, Keller, at 636; where the RICO charges in the indictment charged that the “enterprise” was a particular organized crime family but the court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendants if it found a different enterprise, United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 1990); and where the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant if it found the elements of an offense which had not been charged in the indictment, United States v. Peel, 837 F.2d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 1988).

 

Supreme Court Overrules Michigan v. Jackson and Presumption that Waivers of Right to Counsel After the Right to Counsel Has Been Invoked Are Invalid

In an opinion issued on Tuesday, Montejo v. Louisiana, --- S.Ct. ----, 2009 WL 1443049 (2009), the Supreme Court removed a layer of protection of criminal defendants against coercive and badgering police interrogations by overruling, Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404 (1986), in which the Court had held that “if police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.”

The petitioner in Montejo was arrested in connection with a robbery and murder and waived his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), while being interrogated by police detectives. A preliminary hearing was then held in which the court ordered an indigent defender to represent the petitioner. After the hearing, two detectives visited the petitioner and requested that the petitioner lead them to the murder weapon. The detectives read the petitioner his Miranda rights, and the petitioner proceeded to go along with the detectives, writing an inculpatory letter of apology to the widow of the victim in the process. Only following this excursion did the petitioner meet his court-appointed attorney and consult with him. The State admitted the petitioner's letter of apology against him at trial, and the petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death.

The petitioner appealed, arguing that the State's admission of the letter was error pursuant to Jackson. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that Jackson is not triggered unless and until a defendant has actually requested a lawyer or has otherwise asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. It held that because the court had appointed the petitioner counsel while the petitioner stood mute, the petitioner had not sufficiently asserted his right to counsel. The Courtaffirmed his conviction and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that some States require an indigent defendant to affirmatively request counsel before an appointment is made, while other States automatically appoint counsel upon a finding of indigency. Justice Scalia recognized the problem that "Defendants in States that automatically appoint counsel would have no opportunity to invoke their rights and trigger Jackson, while those in other States, effectively instructed by the court to request counsel, would be lucky winners." The majority rejected the petitioner's position that, once a defendant is represented by counsel, police may not initiate any further interrogation.

The majority proceeded to overrule Jackson and its holding that waivers of a defendant's right to counsel after the right to counsel is asserted are presumed invalid. The Court noted that it had created the presumption in Jackson by making an analogy to a similar prophylactic rule which the Court had established in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981), for the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation under Miranda. The majority held that where a defendant does not invoke his right to counsel, such as where a court appoints counsel in the absence of any request by the defendant,there is no initial election "that must be preserved through a prophylactic rule against later waivers." It noted that the benefits of the prophylactic rule of Jackson were outweighed by its costs in "hindering “society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law." The majority observed that, even without the rule of Jackson, defendants are still entitled to the protections of Miranda, Edwards and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990). It held that "Jackson not only 'operates to invalidate a confession given by the free choice of suspects who have received proper advice of their Miranda rights but waived them nonetheless,' ... but also deters law enforcement officers from even trying to obtain voluntary confessions."

Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer all dissented.

 

The Rise and Fall of Marc Dreier: A Guide

 

We have tried to sum up for readers the labyrinthine facts and developments in the shocking and fascinating case of Marc Dreier, drawing upon excellent and thorough articles on the subject by Roger Parloff in Fortune Magazine and by Robert Kolker in New York Magazine.

I. The Rise

Marc Stuart Dreier grew up on the South Shore of Long Island, the son of a Polish refugee who built a chain of movie theaters. He graduated from Lawrence High School in the Five Towns.

Dreier attended Yale and then Harvard Law School. On graduation, he became an associate with Rosenman & Colin in New York, and later became a partner.

In 1987, Dreier married Elisa Peters, an associate at Rosenman & Colin. The couple had a son, Spencer, in 1989, and a daughter, Jackie, in 1992. He moved to Houston-based Fulbright & Jaworski’s New York litigation office in 1989. In 1995, Dreier left Fulbright & Jaworski and briefly worked at Duker & Barrett.

In 1996, Dreier started his own firm, Dreier & Baritz, with securities lawyer Neil Baritz. He developed a business practice whereby he entered into agreements with other lawyers and law firms, promising to handle the collection of their gross revenue and payment of their office expenses in exchange for paying guaranteed salaries and incentive bonuses.

II. Sheldon Solow and Kosta Kovachev

It is rumored that Dreier received money to start the firm from New York real estate developer Sheldon Solow, owner of Solow Realty, a billionaire son of a bricklayer turned developer.

               Dreier represented Solow in several matters. One such matter was a dispute over a mansion in East Hampton with Peter Morton, founder of the Hard Rock Cafe, with each man staking a claim to the same multimillion-dollar East Hampton beach house. Another case involved a dispute between Solow and Peter Kalikow, another real estate developer and former owner of the New York Post, over $7 million loaned by Solow to Kalikow while Kalikow’s company was in bankruptcy. Dreier, at the request of Solow, took out full page ads in the Post and the New York Times which looked like legal notices, inviting creditors of Kalikow to call a company called Evergence Capital Advisors.

Evergence Capital Advisors was actually the name of a dissolved Florida corporation formerly owned by a friend of Dreier’s, Kosta Kovachev. Kovachev was a Serbian who attended Columbia University and Harvard Business School and became a banker and securities broker. He was sued by the Securities and Exchange Commission for his involvement in a Ponzi scheme selling time-shares in Florida which defrauded approximately 600 investors in 30 states out of $28 million. Dreier represented Kovachev in the proceeding.

The telephone numbers in the newspaper ads led to Dreier’s offices. More than 50 creditors called the numbers, but never received a response. The U.S. bankruptcy judge sanctioned Solow and Dreier $335,000 over the ads. Solow and Dreier are still appealing the sanctions.

Acquaintances describe Dreier as incredibly charming, but a ruthless litigator. In 2002, Dreier’s wife sued him for divorce. That same year, Baritz severed his ties with Dreier, and in 2003 the firm became Dreier LLP, with about 60 attorneys.

III. The Scheme

Beginning in November 2004, Dreier began to sell promissory notes to hedge funds. Dreier claimed that the notes were issued by Solow Realty, and represented to the funds that he was marketing agent for Solow. In reality, Solow and Solow Realty had no knowledge of the notes, and the notes were forged by Dreier along with fraudulent audit reports on the letterhead of one of Solow Realty’s accounting and firms, Berdon LLP. Dreier would tell fund representatives that Solow was trying to raise $500 million to purchase properties, and that Solow did not want to borrow money from banks for reasons of secrecy and because Solow did not want to be accountable to anyone. He claimed that the notes would return 11% interest a year.

Dreier and his co-conspirators, including Kovachev and a man named Armando Ruiz, would host meetings and conference calls with fund representatives. They would give fund representatives telephone numbers purportedly for Solow Realty’s CEO or Controller, but which actually went to Dreier and his accomplices. Dreier created fake e-mail addresses and obtained no-contract cell phones for the scheme.

The phony notes were purchased by nearly 40 investment funds, including Fortress Investment Group, GSO Capital Partners LP, Elliott Associates, Eton Park, Westford Global Asset Management, Perella Weinberg Partners, Verition and Blackstone Group.

In order to come up with the funds to make quarterly interest payments on the phony notes, Dreier expanded Dreier LLP. The firm eventually employed approximately 260 attorneys and approximately 300 staff and had offices in New York City, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, Santa Monica, Stamford and Albany, New York. The firm’s New York City office leased 11 floors in a building designed by architect I.M. Pei at 499 Park Avenue.

Dreier lured new attorneys to the firm by guaranteeing them $1 million in salary before bonuses. He financed the expansion by factoring receivables. Although the firm had “partners,” Dreier remained the sole equity partner, which limited oversight.

Dreier amassed a large quantity of luxury property, including a $10 million condominium in Manhattan; two mansions in the Hamptons; properties in the Caribbean; an art collection worth $40 million, including works by Henri Matisse, AndyWarhol and David Hockney; and a 120-foot yacht. Dreier threw lavish parties with private performances by Diana Ross, Bon Jovi or Alicia Keys, and hosted a celebrity golf tournament.

 

IV. The Fall

By 2008, however, Dreier had a total of $180 million in debt to hedge funds, as well as annual interest payments of $20 million. He began selling a new form of phony note, allegedly issued by the Ontario Teachers Pension Plan (OTPP) and backed by BCE, the parent company of Bell Canada.

In September of 2008, Dreier failed to meet his obligations to one of the funds, likely GSO Capital Partners LP, and the fund demanded to meet with representatives of Solow Realty at Solow Realty’s offices. On October 15, 2008, Dreier, Kovachev and the fund representatives arrived at Solow Realty’s offices, and Dreier, without Solow’s knowledge, proceeded to hold a meeting in Solow Realty’s conference room in which Kovachev pretended to be Solow Realty’s Controller.

 

Finally, in late October 2008, a prospective buyer of the phony notes finally contacted the Solow Realty’s audit firm, Berdon LLP, whose name had been forged on the notes, and discovered the scheme. Berdon notified Solow, and Tom Manisero, a lawyer for Berdon, telephoned Dreier.

 

Dreier lied to Manisero, stating that he had only attempted to sell the notes once. He had several other telephone calls with Manisero, which were recorded by the U.S. Attorney’s Office. During the calls, Dreier admitted that the audit reports were fake, and that he was ashamed. On the final call, Dreier attempted to offer Manisero a “settlement.” Meanwhile, the Verition hedge fund discovered the irregularities with the phony notes.

 

On December 1, a bankruptcy attorney with the firm Norman Kinel sent Dreier an e-mail asking for $38.5 million out of the firm’s escrow account for one of the firm’s clients to pay its creditors. However, less than half of the money remained in the escrow account.

 

While Dreier was under investigation, he offered Fortress Investment Group $33 million of the phony OTPP notes. A Fortress representative, Howard Steinberg, asked to meet with the OTPP representative in person, and Dreier arranged for a meeting with OTPP’s general counsel in Toronto. On December 2, Dreier flew to Toronto met with the general counsel, Michael Padfield, himself to discuss alleged business opportunities and got his business card. He then proceeded to meet with Steinberg at OTTP’s offices, posing as the general counsel. Steinberg became suspicious and asked the receptionist if Dreier was actually the general counsel, and was told he was not. The police were contacted, and Dreier was arrested for criminal impersonation.

 

            Prosecutors allege that, after the initial call from Manisero, Dreier attempted to move funds to a personal account Dreier used for his Caribbean properties. On December 3, Dreier’s 19-year-old son, Spencer, attempted to deliver a message from Dreier to about 40 partners of Dreier LLP, but was shouted out of the conference room. Furthermore, at around this time, Dreier succeeded in having the firm’s bank transfer $10 million in escrow monies to one of his personal accounts. At this time also, Kovachev also went to the firm’s offices and took two paintings.

 

            Dreier posted bail in Canada, and arrived back on New York on December 7, where he was arrested upon arrival. Kovachev was also arrested. Authorities have also subpoenaed all documents from Dreier LLP relating to Armando Ruiz.

On January 29, Dreier was charged with seven counts wire fraud, securities fraud, and money-laundering. He initially pled not guilty, but filed affidavits admitting large portions of the allegations against him. Drier was placed under house arrest in his condominium in Manhattan. He is represented by attorney Gerald Shargel, who has formerly represented members of the Mafia. Dreier’s friend, Erinch Ozada, a Turkish hedge fund manager, is reported to be cooperating with the government.

In the meantime, Dreier LLP has ceased to exist. Attorneys and employees of Dreier LLP have unpaid salaries and unreimbursed expenses.

In all, Dreier is alleged to have committed $700 million in fraud against 13 hedge funds and three individuals, resulting in $400 million in losses, and to have taken $40 million from his clients’ escrow accounts. On Monday, May 11, 2009, Dreier pled guilty to all charges before U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. He faces a potential 20 years on some counts.

Over 200 creditors have already filed more than $450 million in claims against Dreier LLP. Investigators report that any monies are mostly gone. The government has seized Dreier’s luxury property in order to forfeit the property or distribute it among creditors. There has been some interest in the movie or book rights to Dreier’s saga, however New York’s Son of Sam laws prevent such exploitation.

 

Justice Souter on Criminal Law, Part II

 

Our summary retrospective of Justice Souter’s contributions to the Supreme Court’s criminal law jurisprudence continues. In addition to writing for the majority in many important criminal decisions, Justice Souter has authored concurring decisions in many cases, including criminal cases. While the Justice’s concurrences in criminal cases have typically been brief, Justice Souter has frequently raised important alternative views on issues on which he disagrees with the majority, or raises issues which the majority has overlooked.

Most recently, in Gall v. U.S., 128 S.Ct. 586 (2007) Justice Souter authored a concurring opinion in which he expressed his view that the best resolution of the tension between the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and consistency in sentencing was for Congress to enact a new statutory system of mandatory sentencing guidelines which provide for jury findings on all facts necessary to set the upper range of sentencing discretion. Justice Souter also concurred with the majority in U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), in which the majority held that no more than reasonable suspicion was required to support a warrantless search of a probationer’s apartment, reserving the question of whether the Court’s holding in Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996) that the subjective intentions of investigating officers play no role in searches based upon probable cause should also extend to searches based upon reasonable suspicion. In Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001), the majority of the Court held that police officers preventing the petitioner from entering his home unaccompanied by an officer for about two hours while the officers obtained a warrant to search the home constituted a reasonable seizure of the premises pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. Justice Souter joined the majority in a concurring opinion in which the Justice observed that the exigent circumstances created by the risk that the defendant would have destroyed the illegal drugs stashed on the property would have justified a warrantless search of the premises by the police. In his concurrence in Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999), which involved the warrantless seizure of an automobile from a public place by police as contraband under Florida’s contraband forfeiture law, Justice Souter took issue with the majority’s holdings to the extent that they endorsed the warrantless seizure of anything alleged to be “contraband,” holding that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not concede any talismanic significance to use of the term ‘contraband’ whenever a legislature may resort to a novel forfeiture sanction in the interest of law enforcement, as legislatures are evincing increasing ingenuity in doing…” (citing Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443-446, 458 (1996); U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 81-82 & n. 1 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). And in Carlisle v. U.S., 517 U.S. 416 (1996), Justice Souter disagreed with the majority opinion that a district court possesses inherent authority to grant a motion for a judgment of acquittal, observing that Congress might possess the power to abrogate courts’ inherent authority legislatively, citing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c).

 

Justice Souter on Criminal Law

 

            Supreme Court Justice David Hackett Souter has announced his intention to retire at the end of the Court’s term in June. In his 19 years on the Court, Justice Souter has been a key vote in many cases and has written over 150 majority, plurality, concurring and dissenting opinions, including in many criminal cases. In the area of criminal law, Justice Souter has issued numerous opinions fairly consistently advancing the rights of defendants at all stages of criminal proceedings. Federal Criminal Defense Blog salutes Justice Souter and his highly distinguished tenure on the Court by listing some of his significant opinions in the criminal arena, beginning today with majority and plurality opinions.

            Criminal defense attorneys everywhere will be familiar with Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) in which the Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Souter, reversed the defendant’s conviction and held that a state prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police, and has a duty to turn over all exculpatory evidence to the defense, pursuant to  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). And in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), Justice Souter authored a majority opinion holding that warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) given to a defendant in the middle of an interrogation are ineffective and any statements given during the interrogation are inadmissible. And in Corley v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 1558 (2009) discussed on this Blog, Justice Souter delivered the majority’s opinion that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 does not alter the rule that confessions made during periods of detention which violate the prompt presentment requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) are inadmissible pursuant to the rule of McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).

            Justice Souter had Georgia on his mind early in his career on the Court when he delivered the unanimous opinion for the Court in Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991), in which the majority held that the Georgia Supreme Court erred in concluding that the petitioner’s claim pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which prohibits racially-based exercise of peremptory challenges by the prosecution, was untimely pursuant to State v. Sparks, 257 Ga. 97, 98, 355 S.E.2d 658, 659 (1987), in which the Georgia Supreme Court held that a Batson objection must be made within the period of the jurors’ selection and the administration of their oaths, because the Sparks rule was not “firmly established and regularly followed” at the time of the petitioner’s trial. In Wade v. U.S., 504 U.S. 181 (1992), Justice Souter, again writing for a unanimous Court, held that federal district courts have the authority to review the government’s refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion and to grant a remedy if they find that the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive. Justice Souter authored the majority opinion in Old Chief v. U.S., 519 U.S. 172 (1997), in which the Court reversed the petitioner’s conviction for  possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), holding that a district court abuses its discretion where it refuses a defendant’s offer to concede a prior judgment under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and admits the full judgment over the defendant’s objection. In Shepard v. U.S., 544 U.S. 13 (2005) he wrote a majority opinion holding that in applying the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e), a sentencing courtcannot look to police reports or complaint applications to determine whether an earlier guilty plea necessarily admits, and supports a conviction for, generic burglary. Justice Souter wrote the majority’s holding in Watson v. U.S., 128 S.Ct. 579 (2007) that a person who trades drugs for a gun does not receive the gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which provides for a mandatory minimum sentence where a defendant uses a firearm during a drug trafficking crime.

            Less pro-defense, Justice Souter authored the majority opinion in U.S. v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997) which held that material of falsehood was not an element of making false statements to a federally insured bank under 18 U.S.C. § 1014. And he rejected the petitioner’s arguments that 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), which proscribes bribery of State and local officials of entities, was unconstitutional because of a lack of any jurisdictional requirement of a connection to federal money in Sabri v. U.S., 541 U.S. 600 (2004), holding that the statute was an instance of necessary and proper legislation.

 

Spam-a-Lot! Brothers Indicted for Spamming Conspiracy Affecting 2,000 Colleges and Universities

Spam e-mail is nearly universally despised. However, recipients of spam may not fully appreciate the inventiveness and intricateness of some spammers' methods, however dubious or illegal, before considering the charges against Missouri residents Amir Ahmad Shah, age 28, and Osmaan Ahmad Shah, age 25, who operated a company I2O. As reported by IDG News Service, the brothers, along with Paul Zucker of New Jersey and Liu Guang Ming, a citizen of China, were indicted today by a federal grand jury for an e-mail spamming scheme which targeted more than 2,000 U.S. colleges and universities and sold more than $4.1 million worth of products to students. The scheme involved e-mail extracting programs which illegally harvested more than 8 million student e-mail addresses. The defendants then sent targeted spam e-mails to students in at least 31 campaign selling a variety of products and services, including digital cameras, MP3 players, teeth whiteners, pepper spray, magazine subscriptions and spring break travel offers. They developed programs to falsify header information and rotate URLs, subject lines, content, reply addresses and other information to avoid spam filters. The defendants would include false and misleading information in the e-mails suggesting an association with the college or university, using fictitious names, claiming to be "campus representatives," and that the businesses selling the products were "alumni owned." They also created dozens of identical websites for each e-mail campaign to conceal the source of the e-mails and to keep the e-mails from being blocked by spam filters, and initially set up the hosting for the websites in China. The defendants made money through referral fees for sending spam for products and services sold by others, and by buying products in bulk and reselling them. They also offered "offshore hosting" services for other spammers.

Federal investigators began investigating the Shah brothers in 2005, after University of Missouri officials identified them as the source of the spamming. The brothers proceeded to remove all Missouri students' e-mails from their lists, but continued to spam other colleges and universities. The defendants are charged in the indictment with 26 counts of aiding and abetting each other to access a protected computer without authorization and transmit commercial e-mails with the intent to deceive or mislead the recipients about the origin of the messages, and the indictment seeks $4.1 million in forfeiture and other property. Colleges and universities have spent large amounts repairing the damage from the hacking and spamming and in implementing protective measures.

Spamming is regulated by the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, codified at 15 U.S.C. s 7704, which prohibits false, misleading or deceptive information in spam, as well as for sexually explicit spam without sufficient warnings, and carries a maximum sentence of 5 years imprisonment. Some sources estimate that spam now comprises 95% of the e-mails in the world.

Commentary on the Fifth Circuit Questions In Minor

In follow up to the post earlier today on the Fifth Circuit's letter to counsel in the Minor case, it seems that the Fifth Circuit is obviously troubled by the proof, if any, between the agency receiving federal funds, the Administrative Office of the Mississippi Courts, and the allegedly corrupt activity of Minor and the judges (Whitfield and Teel) that he sought to influence. First, the limiting cases on 666 violations have generally interpreted that statute very broadly, but a reasonable reading of the Court’s questions indicates a concern for the level of proof of the “nexus” between the Administrative Office of the Mississippi Courts and any agent, or activity of a particular matter before the judges.

Secondly, if such a nexus is required, it seems the Court is concerned whether the issue has been properly preserved both at trial and on appeal.

Thirdly, and most surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit, obviously knows what effect a reversal of those counts would have on the other counts of conviction, “even if the convictions on those other counts were not to be reversed?” The posing of that question by the Fifth Circuit seems almost gratuitous. Counts of conviction are routinely reversed that either don’t effect the sentence imposed, or that require re-sentencing consistent with the Court’s opinion. One has to look no further that Governor Siegelman’s recent case in front of the Eleventh Circuit. Quite frankly, re-sentencings happen all of the time after the reversal of some counts of conviction. Just odd that the Fifth Circuit would pose that question publicly.

As for Paul Minor’s quest for vindication before the Fifth Circuit, sadly, the court's letter indicates that they are going to affirm the other counts of conviction.

Fifth Circuit Requests Additional Briefing in Minor

Yesterday, the Fifth Circuit in a letter to counsel, requested additional briefing regarding Counts 11, 12, 13, and 14, which allege a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (what I've always referred to as the devil statute). In Minor the government charged that the agency receiving government funds was the administrative office of the courts of Mississippi. Generally you see a Section 666 violation when someone has stolen monies from say, a local transit authority, which receives in excess of $5,000 in a given year (thereby conferring federal jurisdiction). And, we all know that almost any program receives that amount from the federal government now.

The Fifth Circuit requested additional briefing on the following questions:

1) What evidence shows that the Mississippi judges were influenced or rewarded in connection with matters related to the Administrative Office of the Courts of Mississippi?

2) Describe the nexus that the “in connection with” clause of 666 requires between the Administrative Office of the Courts of Mississippi and the particular matters in front of the judges supposedly influenced by Minor’s actions.

3) What was the proof of that nexus?

4) Did the appellants adequately preserve the issue in the district court and did they adequately raise the issue on appeal?

5) If the Fifth Circuit reverses any of the Counts 11-14, what effect would that have on any of the other counts of conviction, “even if the convictions on those other counts were not to be reversed?”

The Court gave the parties until May 15 to file briefs of less than 15 pages.

More commentary on this later.
 

Swiss Seek End to Disclosure of UBS Client Names

As previously reported here, the Department of Justice and UBS entered into a deferred prosecution agreement wherein UBS is to pay a fine and disclose to DOJ the names of its some 52,000 clients that have used UBS to park income in violation of U.S. tax laws. The New York Times reports today that the President of Switzerland has asked Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner, to drop what the Times inexactly reports to be a lawsuit to disclose the names of the UBS clients. In fact, under the deferred prosecution agreement, UBS has to cooperate with DOJ by providing the client’s names. My guess, Mr. Geithner, who had his own tax issues, isn’t going to touch this one. DOJ has already prosecuted two folks whose names UBS disclosed and, inevitably, many more such prosecutions will follow.

Reasonable Suspicion Justifies Search of Probationer's Home

Today the Eleventh Circuit held in United States v. Carter, No. 08-14460, that a search of the home of a probationer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, if supported by reasonable suspicion. Carter was on probation in 2007, however, his probation did not contain a Fourth Amendment waiver provision. His probation officer though, was suspicious that his lifestyle could not be supported by the unskilled labor he performed and he, along with other probation officers, searched Carter’s town home, which lead to him being charged with possession with intent to distribute crack and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Carter moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the warrantless search. Relying on the balancing test set forth in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), Judge Carnes writing for the Court, noted that the Knights case first addressed the probationer’s individual privacy interests - in short - not much. Then Judge Carnes addresses the “governmental interests at stake” - in short - for a guy like Carter - prior violent crime and drug conviction - “the government’s interest in monitoring the probationer is particularly high.” This may be a common sense conclusion, but Judge Carnes draws this conclusion virtually out of thin air, citing only U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a)(providing enhanced penalties for criminals with a history of drug felonies or crimes of violence). However, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 says nothing about probationers, or the government’s interest in monitoring them more closely. 

Judge Carnes ultimately holds that “the search in this case need only be supported by reasonable suspicion to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment” and that the search of Carter’s home was permissible.

Guilty Plea in Bank Fraud Case

In a case of remarkable chutzpah, Mark Anthony McBride, plead guilty in Atlanta on Friday to a two count information charging him with one count of conspiring to obtain million of dollars in fraudulent mortgages and other loans and one count of bankruptcy fraud.

McBride plead to a scheme he started in 2001 after being released from prison and continued until he reported back to prison in 2002. As soon as he was released from prison in 2006 he was back at making a living in the only, apparent. fashion he knew, being a con artist by completing fraudulent mortgage loans, car loans, lines of credit and continued his scheme until his arrest in September of 2008 for violating his federal probation.

Showing exceptional criminal ingenuity, McBride was able to retain the proceeds of his fraud by filing 8 bankruptcies in Georgia, Alabama and South Carolina.

Methinks McBride's schemes have come to an end. He faces up to 35 years in prison at his sentencing, which is scheduled for July 9, 2009.

More Charges in Fulton County Jail Case

U.S. Attorney David Nahmias said on Thursday that more charges are expected in the continuing investigation of inmate abuse at the Fulton County Jail. On Thursday, two lieutenants, Lt. Earl Glenn and Lt. Robert Hill, pleaded innocent to federal charges of using excessive force and lying to FBI agents investigating the case.

Nahmias has taken an unusual interest in this case, announcing last month the initial arrest of Curtis Jerome Brown, on civil rights, obstruction and false statement charges.

Last week Nahmias said that more charges were expected in the investigation of inmate abuse.

Judge Shoob has monitored conditions at the jail following a lawsuit filed on behalf of inmates accusing the jail of overcrowding and dangerous conditions.

Blagojevich, Defrocked Governor of Illinois, Indicted

Rod Blagojevich, the defrocked governor of Illinois, was finally indicted on Thursday, April 2, on 16 counts in a 19 count, 75 page Superseding Indictment. Blagojevich, you will recall was arrested on December 9, 2008. The government at the end of December was granted a 90 day extension within which to bring an indictment. That time frame was set to expire on April 7. As expected Blagojevich becomes the second consecutive Illinois Governor indicted for racketeering conspiracy, among other charges, including mail fraud, wire fraud and honest services mail fraud. Five others were also indicted, including Blagojevich’s brother, Robert, a top fundraiser.

The criminal RICO enterprise is alleged to be the Office of the Governor of Illinois and the principal campaign fundraising vehicle for Blagojevich, “Friends of Blagojevich.”

Simply put, the indictment alleges what is generally called a “pay to play” scheme that included Blagojevich using his ability to fill President Obama’s vacant Senate seat, state jobs and other appointments in exchange for contributions, jobs and monies.  The indictment also alleges that Blagojevich made false statements to the FBI in the presence of counsel in a 2005 interview with the FBI. Although Blagojevich’s wife is mentioned on several occasions in the indictment, she has not been charged.

Feds Reportedly Looking to RICO for additional Scruggs Charges

As reported in this Clarion Ledger story, the Department of Justice is reportedly looking at bringing RICO charges against Dicky Scruggs related to the bribery of Judge Bobby DeLaughter in the Wilson v. Scruggs case. As previously noted here, Joey Langston has already plead guilty to offering Judge DeLaughter a bribe in the form of a United States District Court judgeship.

What is particularly interesting in the context of a federal investigation and subsequent guilty plea,  is that Scruggs’ plea offers him no protection in the ongoing investigation in the Wilson case.

Scruggs and his co-defendants, including his son, Zach, are all pending sentencing. I expect that the presentence reports for Scruggs and the others will be forthcoming any day now. That will, no doubt produce a number of filings. The docket in this case has been exceedingly silent for almost 2 months, but I expect we will shortly see a number of sentencing memoranda. I’m particularly interested to see if Zach Scruggs, for instance, will receive a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility given his post plea statements that he really didn’t do anything wrong.

If the government is, in fact, pursuing RICO charges against Scruggs and others, we can expect that that case will not be brought for many months.

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