Chairman of Nation's Largest Mortgage Company Indicted for Bank Fraud and TARP Fraud in Relation to Scheme Against Colonial Bank, SEC Charges Filed

The U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission have brought criminal charges and civil claims against Lee B. Farkas, former Chairman of Taylor, Bean and Whitaker Mortgage Corp. (“Taylor Bean”) for allegedly selling at least $1.5 billion in fictitious and impaired residential mortgage loans to Colonial Bank and its parent company, The Colonial BancGroup, Inc. (“CBG”), according to press releases by the Department of Justice and the SEC, and the SEC’s complaint. Mr. Farkas, a resident of Ocala, Florida, is also charged with attempting to defraud the U.S. Department of Treasury through its Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) by allegedly representing to CBG and the public that Taylor Bean had secured a $300 million equity investment in CBG which would allow CBG and Colonial Bank to qualify for $550 million in TARP funds. The government contends that the investment and prospective TARP grant was a sham.

Taylor Bean was the largest non-depository mortgage lender in the United States by 2008, originating more than $30 billion in mortgage loans. Taylor Bean engaged in the the origination, acquisition, sale and servicing of residential mortgages through a network of local banks and mortgage brokers. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in August of 2009. 
 

Colonial Bank, one of the fifty largest banks in the U.S., has had its own problems. In August of last year, the Alabama State Banking Department seized the bank and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. as receiver. CBG subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and a financial holding company purchased Colonial Bank’s assets and assumed its deposits.

Taylor Bean had a financing arrangement with Colonial Bank to fund the mortgage loans which it originated. Under the agreement, Taylor Bean would represent that the loans were of a certain quality and that there was a commitment from a third-party investor to ultimately purchase the loan. When the investor purchased the loan, Colonial Bank would receive the proceeds to reimburse it for advancing the loan funds.

Colonial Bank and Taylor Bean also had another financing agreement, called an assignment of trade agreement, under which Colonial Bank would purchase a 99 percent interest in a bundled group of mortgage loans, or mortgage-backed securities, which Taylor Bean would issue, market and sell to third parties. Under the agreement, Taylor Bean was required to provide evidence of a binding commitment from a third party investor to purchase the securities.

The government alleges that Taylor Bean began experiencing liquidity problems in 2002. It alleges that Farkas and an unnamed officer of Colonial devised a pattern of “kiting” in which certain debits to Taylor Bean’s warehouse line of credit were not entered until after credits for the following day were entered. As a result of this kiting, Taylor Bean was supposedly overdrawing its accounts with Colonial Bank by approximately $150 million a day.

Farkas and the bank officer, in order to conceal the kiting activity, allegedly devised a scheme in which Taylor Bean would create and submit fictitious loan information to Colonial Bank. In December of 2003, Farkas allegedly directed Taylor Bean to submit approximately $150 million in non-existent loans, which Farkas allegedly referred to as “Plan B,” and impaired loans, which Farkas is alleged to have referred to as the “Crap,” to Colonial Bank for funding.

In 2004, as the loans began to age, in order to conceal them, Farkas and the officer allegedly bundled the loans in fictitious trades to Colonial Bank. Following the trades, Colonial Bank was unable to identify individual loans, or the age of the loans, within the trade. Farkas and the officer then caused information to be submitted to Colonial Bank which would reset the commitment dates on the loans and make the loans appear as if they had only recently been purchased. Farkas also caused Ocala Funding, L.L.C., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Taylor Bean, to divert funds which it received from Freddie Mac and other third parties for purchases of mortgages to Taylor Bean in order to pay down Taylor Bean’s debt to Colonial Bank.

By the close of 2007, Colonial Bank allegedly held $1 billion in impaired loans and $500 million in wholly fictitious, unsecured loans, as a result of Farkas’ and the officer’s conduct. The impaired and fictitious loans caused Colonial Bank to misstate its assets to the SEC and investors.

Finally, in November of 2008, Colonial Bank applied for TARP funds from the U.S. Treasury. The Department of Treasury approved Colonial Bank to receive $550 million in TARP funds on the condition that Colonial Bank increase its equity by $300 million. In 2009, Farkas allegedly approached Colonial Bank to raise the $300 million captial infusion through an investment group. Farkas falsely represented to Colonial Bank that it had found investors to participate in the capital infusion, and created a false stock purchase agreement. Farkas diverted $50 million in funds from an Ocala Investors Account to an escrow account in a move which he allegedly referred to as “Project Squirrel” in order to convince Colonial Bank that Taylor Bean had obtained investors. Colonial Bank entered the stock purchase agreement with Taylor Bean, however both companies subsequently terminated the agreement.

The indictment against Farkas in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia charges him with one count of conspiracy to commit bank, wire and securities fraud; six counts of bank fraud; six counts of wire fraud; and three counts of securities fraud. The SEC complaint alleges violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.
 

New York Defendant Indicted for $50 Million in Fraud from ATM, Armored Car and Other Businesses

As reflected in an FBI press release, an indictment was unsealed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against Robert Egan, President of Mount Vernon Money Center (MVMC) on Wednesday charging Egan with one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and wire fraud and six counts of bank fraud for allegedly defrauding banks and other financial institutions of approximately $50 million.

MVMC operated various cash management businesses, including replenishing cash for over 5,300 automated teller machines (ATMs), payroll services for businesses, and an armored car service, Armored Money Services (AMS). MVMC's clients included banks and financial institutions, businesses and universities. MVMC also had several cash vaults to store and process cash from its businesses.

The government alleges that, from 2005 through 2010, Egan and MVMC's Chief Operating Officer, Barnard McGarry, allegedly collected hundreds of millions of dollars from MVMC clients based on false representations that they would not commingle clients' funds or use the funds for purposes other than those specified in MVMC's agreements with the clients. However, Egan and McGarry are alleged to have engaged in a practice known as "playing the float," in which they misappropriated funds from the substantial cash flow into MVMC to their own uses, to pay prior client obligations or to cover operating expenses of MVMC's businesses. Egan and McGarry are also alleged to have commingled its clients' monies in its accounts and cash vaults, and instructed employees to use whatever monies were available to replenish ATM machines. McGarry is alleged to have transferred clients' monies among MVMC's accounts. In addition, both defendants are alleged to have made false representations in reports to ATM clients regarding the amount of funds MVMC allegedly held in its vaults for the clients. MVMC was entrusted with approximately $70 to $75 million by its clients, but allegedly only kept approximately $20 to $25 million in its accounts and vaults.

Egan was arrested last month. A receiver has been appointed to administer MVMC. The press release stated that the case was brought in coordination with the White House's Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. Among the officials who addressed the media in conjunction with the press release was the Special Inspector General of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) Neil Barofsky.

Sentencing Considerations for Corporations and Organizations

            We received an excellent reader question regarding what factors do Federal courts consider in imposing punishment on corporations or organizations in criminal proceedings. Corporations of course, don’t “go to jail.” The Government does collect its $200 however, since the organization sentencing provisions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines are primarily fine-driven. And while there is a massive body of law concerning factors which must be considered in imposing sentence on individuals, caselaw relating to considerations in imposing punishment on corporations is relatively sparse.

However, areas which courts consider in sentencing corporations or organizations, and conversely areas which corporate criminal counsel may emphasize in order to attempt to mitigate the consequences to their corporate clients, may be discerned from the Guidelines themselves. In many cases, such as relating to acceptance of responsibility and role in the offense, these considerations closely parallel those for individual defendant. The questions facing a corporation at sentencing will boil down to how much will the corporation be made to pay in the form of fines and restitution, and what conditions will be imposed on the corporation.

The relevant portion of the Guidelines is Chapter Eight. Imposing a sentence on a corporation or organization in a Federal criminal case involves a complex determination by the sentencing court. In brief, the court must:

1. Determine whether any restitution, remedial orders or community service should be ordered;

2. Determine the amount of the fine, including determining the corporation’s or organization’s “culpability score”;

3. Determine whether any departures or probation is appropriate.

The Introductory Commentary to Chapter Eight states that it is designed “designed so that the sanctions imposed upon organizations and their agents, taken together, will provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G., Ch. 8, Pt. A, Introductory Commentary. The sentencing provisions of Chapter Eight are intended to reflect the general principles that:

First, the court must, whenever practicable, order the organization to remedy any harm caused by the offense. The resources expended to remedy the harm should not be viewed as punishment, but rather as a means of making victims whole for the harm caused.

Second, if the organization operated primarily for a criminal purpose or primarily by criminal means, the fine should be set sufficiently high to divest the organization of all its assets.

Third, the fine range for any other organization should be based on the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the organization. The seriousness of the offense generally will be reflected by the greatest of the pecuniary gain, the pecuniary loss, or the amount in a guideline offense level fine table. Culpability generally will be determined by six factors that the sentencing court must consider. The four factors that increase the ultimate punishment of an organization are: (i) the involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity; (ii) the prior history of the organization; (iii) the violation of an order; and (iv) the obstruction of justice. The two factors that mitigate the ultimate punishment of an organization are: (i) the existence of an effective compliance and ethics program; and (ii) self-reporting, cooperation, or acceptance of responsibility.

Fourth, probation is an appropriate sentence for an organizational defendant when needed to ensure that another sanction will be fully implemented, or to ensure that steps will be taken within the organization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct.

U.S.S.G., Ch. 8, Pt. A, Introductory Commentary. The provisions are designed to offer “incentives” to corporations or other organizations to police and eliminate criminal conduct through compliance and ethics programs. U.S.S.G., Ch. 8, Pt. A, Introductory Commentary.

The Introductory Commentary to Part B of Chapter Eight states:

As a general principle, the court should require that the organization take all appropriate steps to provide compensation to victims and otherwise remedy the harm caused or threatened by the offense. A restitution order or an order of probation requiring restitution can be used to compensate identifiable victims of the offense. A remedial order or an order of probation requiring community service can be used to reduce or eliminate the harm threatened, or to repair the harm caused by the offense, when that harm or threatened harm would otherwise not be remedied.

U.S.S.G., Ch. 8, Pt. B. Guideline Section 8B1.1 requires a court to enter a restitution order for the full amount of a victim’s loss if such an order is authorized. Section 8B1.3 authorizes a court to order community service as a condition of probation “where such community service is reasonably designed to repair the harm caused by the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 8B1.3. The commentary on Section 8B1.3 notes that the community service should be “related to the purposes of sentencing.” U.S.S.G. § 8B1.3, Cmt.

            Guidelines Section 8B2.1 describes an “effective compliance and ethics program.” It states that, in order to have an effective compliance and ethics program, a corporation or organization must:

1. Exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct and establish standards and procedures to prevent and

detect criminal conduct;

2. “[P]romote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law”;

3. Ensure that the corporation’s or organization’s governing authority is knowledgeable about the compliance and ethics program and that specific individuals have day-to-day responsibility for the program; and

4. Take reasonable steps to ensure that the compliance and ethics program is followed, enforced and evaluated.

            A critical provision is Guidelines Section 8C2.5, which governs determination of a corporation’s “culpability score.” That section provides for a base score of 5 points with increases or decreases to the level for:

1. Condoning, tolerating or “willful ignorance” of criminal activity by corporate governing authorities or high-level personnel;

2. Any prior history of misconduct;

3. Any violation of orders or obstruction of justice; and/or

4. Self-reporting, cooperation and acceptance of responsibility.

With regard to a decrease in culpability level for cooperation, the Application Notes state that:

[C]ooperation must be both timely and thorough. To be timely, the cooperation must begin essentially at the same time as the organization is officially notified of a criminal investigation. To be thorough, the cooperation should include the disclosure of all pertinent information known by the organization. A prime test of whether the organization has disclosed all pertinent information is whether the information is sufficient for law enforcement personnel to identify the nature and extent of the offense and the individual(s) responsible for the criminal conduct.

U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5, Note 12.

            Another vital provision is Guideline Section 8C2.8—the corporate equivalent of Code Section 3553(a) which courts must consider in sentencing individuals. Section 8C2.8 provides:

(a) In determining the amount of the fine within the applicable guideline range, the court should consider:

(1) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public from further crimes of the organization;

(2) the organization’s role in the offense;

(3) any collateral consequences of conviction, including civil obligations arising from the organization’s conduct;

(4) any nonpecuniary loss caused or threatened by the offense;

(5) whether the offense involved a vulnerable victim;

(6) any prior criminal record of an individual within high-level personnel of the organization or high-level personnel of a unit of the organization who participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the criminal conduct;

(7) any prior civil or criminal misconduct by the organization other than that counted under §8C2.5(c);

(8) any culpability score under §8C2.5 (Culpability Score) higher than 10 or lower than 0;

(9) partial but incomplete satisfaction of the conditions for one or more of the mitigating or aggravating factors set forth in §8C2.5 (Culpability Score);

(10) any factor listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a); and

(11) whether the organization failed to have, at the time of the instant offense, an effective compliance and ethics program within the meaning of §8B2.1 (Effective Compliance and Ethics Program).

(b) In addition, the court may consider the relative importance of any factor used to determine the range, including the pecuniary loss caused by the offense, the pecuniary gain from the offense, any specific offense characteristic used to determine the offense level, and any aggravating or mitigating factor used to determine the culpability score.

U.S.S.G. § 8C2.8. The Application Notes to Section 8C2.8 further state, in relevant part, “[i]f punitive collateral sanctions have been or will be imposed on the organization, this may provide a basis for a lower fine within the guideline fine range.” U.S.S.G. § 8C2.8, Note 2.

            Finally, Part C of Chapter Eight provides for departures from a sentence/fine if a court finds “that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.” U.S.S.G., Ch. 8, Pt. C, Introductory Commentary. The relevant potential grounds for upward or downward departures are:

1. Substantial assistance to authorities under Section 8C4.1;

2. Risk of death or bodily injury under Section 8C4.2;

3. Threat to the environment under Section 8C4.4;

4. Threat to a market under Section 8C4.5;

5. Public entity (ground for downward departure) under Section 8C4.7;

6. If members or beneficiaries of the corporation or organization are also victims (ground for downward departure) under Section 8C4.8;

7. Whether the remedial costs exceed the gain from the offense under Section 8C4.9; and

8. Mandatory programs to detect and prevent violations of the law under Section 8C4.10.

            From this maze of Guidelines, the following potential points can be derived for corporate criminal counsel to potentially argue in favor of a low or lesser punishment or fine, departure or for mitigation generally:

  1. Any compliance and ethics programs instituted or proposed by the corporation either before or following the alleged conduct;
  2. Any actions the corporation has taken to remedy any harm from the alleged conduct, including:
    1. Restitution to any victims;
    2. Institution or proposal of a compliance and ethics program;
    3. Any other efforts the corporation has made to detect or prevent criminal activity, or to detect or prevent any recurrence of the alleged conduct;
  3. The corporation’s service to the community before or following the alleged conduct;
  4. Whether the corporation reported the alleged conduct to law enforcement;
  5. Whether the corporation cooperated and/or rendered substantial assistance to the Government, and the degree of such cooperation and/or assistance;
  6. Whether the alleged conduct constituted a distinct, isolated instance, as opposed to demonstrating that the corporation had an alleged criminal purpose;
  7. The relative position of the individuals involved in, or having knowledge of, the alleged conduct—i.e. whether governing or high level officers or lower level personnel;
  8. Whether the corporation has any history of similar conducts;
  9. The seriousness of the alleged conduct, including whether it resulted in any physical harm, threat to any market, third party, etc.;
  10. The corporation’s role in the alleged conduct, including whether the corporation or its officers, members or employees were also victims of the alleged conduct;
  11. The lack of likelihood of recurrence of the alleged conduct;
  12. The corporation’s efforts to investigate the alleged conduct and actions against culpable individuals;
  13. Whether the alleged conduct resulted in collateral consequences to the corporation, including costs from investigation, civil lawsuits relating to the alleged conduct, etc.; and
  14. Whether the gains from the alleged conduct were outweighed by the costs incurred by the corporation in responding to and remedying the alleged conduct.

These points may also furnish useful guidelines or tips for corporate officers or members and counsel in attempting to devise appropriate responses in the event of notice of alleged wrongdoing and/or a criminal investigation.

Criminal Enforcement of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP): Criminal Investigations and First Prosecution Already in Progress

The Federal Government is spending billions on bailouts and stimulus in order to resuscitate the economy. This money, however, does not come without strings, both in the non-criminal and the criminal sphere. Following is a survey of the potential criminal consequences of misuse of monies issued by the Government under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) , 12 U.S.C. § 5201 et seq., part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008.

  

President Georgia W. Bush signed the EESA and TARP into law on October 3, 2008. As of the end of March, the Treasury Department has disbursed $303.4 billion out of $700 billion in TARP funds, according to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) status report . Most of the monies—$198 billion—have gone to TARP’s Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the preferred stock and warrant purchase program. About $40 billion has been given to failing institutions, and approximately the same amount has been used for targeted investment programs. $24.5 billion has been given to the auto industry.

  

The central TARP provision, 12 U.S.C. § 5211, governing purchases of troubled assets, authorizes the Secretary of the of Treasury “to purchase, and to make and fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by the Secretary…” 12 U.S.C. § 5211(a)(1). Section 5211 further directs the Secretary to prevent unjust enrichment of financial institutions in making purchases. 12 U.S.C. § 5211(e).

  

The Comptroller General is responsible for oversight of TARP. 12 U.S.C. § 5226(a). The Comptroller General, through the GAO, is also charged with auditing programs, activities, receipts, expenditures and financial transactions under TARP. 12 U.S.C. § 5226(b).

  

12 U.S.C. § 5234 provides that “Any Federal financial regulatory agency shall cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies investigating fraud, misrepresentation, and malfeasance with respect to development, advertising, and sale of financial products.” 12 U.S.C. § 5234.

  

As related by an article at NewGeography.com, TARP creates three monitoring entities, one of which has the authority to prosecute crimes relating to TARP, the Special Inspector General (SIGTARP). SIGTARP is headed by Special Inspector General in charge, Neil Barofsky, dubbed the "TARP Cop." SIGTARP has set up a hotline for citizens to report fraud or “evidence of violations of criminal and civil laws in connection with TARP” and had received 200 tips and launched 20 criminal investigations by the end of April. SIGTARP has released a 250-page report on TARP to educate the public http://sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/April2009_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf.  

 

In February, SIGTARP began issuing all financial insititutions receiving TARP funds audit letters requesting, within 30 days:

 

 

  1. A narrative of (a) the recipient's anticipated use of TARPfunds; (b) whether the TARP funds were segregated from other institutionalfunds; (c) the recipient's actual use of TARP funds to date; and (d) the recipient's expected use of unspent TARP funds.
  2. The recipient’s specific plans for addressing executive compensation, and the status of implementation of any plans.

 

The audit letters further request supporting documentation and requires that the response be:

[B]e signed by a duly authorized senior executive officer of your company, including a statement certifying the accuracy of all statements, representations, and supporting information provided, subject to the requirements and penalties set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001 [the Federal false statement criminal provision].

 SIGTARP subsequently issued a Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) sheet to TARP fund recipients. Earlier this year Barofsky testified before the Senate Finance Committee that the massive amounts of TARP money "will inevitably attract those seeking to profit criminally" and that SIGTARP was "looking at the potential exposure of hundreds of billions of dollars in taxpayer money lost to fraud." Among SIGTARP's current investigations is insurance giant AIG.

 On March 11, 2009, FBI Director Robert Muller stated before the the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies:

  

With the passage of recent legislation that includes billions of dollars being infused into the U.S. economy, including the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA), the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), and other asset relief programs, we anticipate an increase in fraud. In addition to the agents that are currently on board, the FBI’s 2010 budget includes 143 new positions (50 special agents and 93 professional staff) and $25.5 million to assist the FBI in combating mortgage and corporate fraud.

  

http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress09/mueller060409.htm.

  

Only one investigation has resulted in charges relating to abuse of TARP funds so far. In April, a felony information was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, charging Gordon B. Grigg, a financial advisor in Franklin, Tennessee, with four counts of mail fraud and four counts of wire fraud. Grigg is charged with having allegedly embezzled more than $10,922,000 in client investment funds in a Ponzi-type scheme. He is alleged to have conducted a scheme since 1996 to defraud investors by inducing them to invest in pooled-client purchases of fixed-term certificates of deposit, private placements, corporate notes and debentures in the name of Grigg’s company, ProTrust. Grigg allegedly falsely told investors that he personally managed the accounts, that he had negotiated partnerships and special business relationships with several of the nation’s most successful investment firms, and that the investments were safe and would generate and sustain high rates of annualized returns. He is also charged with allegedly falsely representing that he had already committed more than $5,000,000 in Pro Trust pooled client funds towards purchase of TARP guaranteed debt as part of private placement partnership. The Government alleges that Grigg never invested the investors’ monies, but instead used the monies to disburse false “earnings” and “returns of deposit” to clients who cashed out their ProTrust investment accounts, and for his own personal benefit and expenses.

  

In order to conceal the scheme, Grigg fabricated documents, including correspondence, invoices and account statements, and used counterfeit corporate letterhead and the forged signatures of national investment firm executives. From 1990 to 2009, Grigg solicited approximately sixty investors to invest approximately $10,922,661, of which, approximately $6.6 million was returned to investors who either cashed out or closed their Pro Trust investment accounts. 

 

Special Inspector General Barofsky announced in the press release by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Tennessee on the charges against Grigg:

 

“The filing of charges today against Gordon Grigg, the first criminal charges brought in connection with a SIGTARP investigation, marks a significant milestone in the evolution of SIGTARP and of TARP oversight generally.”

“Today, SIGTARP, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Tennessee, the SEC, and the FBI, along with our state and local partners, serve notice on all who might try to profit criminally from the current national crisis that the United States Government stands ready to detect, investigate and punish any and all who use the TARP program to commit fraud.  This is true irrespective of whether the victim is the United States Government itself, unsuspecting investors, or struggling home owners.”

 

 With hundreds of billions in TARP funds already disbursed and hundreds of billions remaining to be disbursed, and great public concern over how such staggering amounts of money are being spent and used, TARP-related criminal investigations and prosecutions can only increase. Recipients of TARP funds must be especially careful in using the funds for their intended purposes and in scrupulously accounting for all uses of the funds. It is furthermore of utmost importance that recipients exercise extreme caution and thoroughness in responding to audit inquiries from SIGTARP, including through the retention of competent and proactive legal counsel.