The Government Goes After Wall Street Over the Financial Crisis, Morgan Stanley Now Under Investigation for "Dead President" Deals

 As reported in the Wall Street Journal and virtually everywhere else, Morgan Stanley has joined Goldman Sachs as the latest target of the federal government's criminal investigation of financial firms relating to the financial crisis which began in 2007, under the government's theory of criminality of failing to disclose to investors that the firms were "betting" on the failure of certain collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs. According to Federal prosecutors, Morgan Stanley designed CDOs, while at the same time Morgan Stanley's trading desk allegedly placed bets that their value would decrease. Similar to the government's investigation of Goldman Sachs, the investigation, headed by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, is focusing on whether Morgan Stanley made proper representations to investors about its role.

The investigation has focused in particular on two investments created in 2006, named after former U.S. Presidents James Buchanan and Andrew Jackson, known as the "Dead Presidents" deals by traders. Each deal issued approximately $200 million in bonds. Morgan Stanley did not market the deals to customers--the Jackson deal was underwritten and marketed by Citigroup and the Buchanan deal was underwritten and marketed by UBS AG. Citigroup has stated that it is cooperating with the government in the investigation.

However, as in the investigation of Goldman, prosecutors face an uphill climb against numerous obstacles and defenses. Morgan Stanley did make money on its "Dead Presidents" deals, however it lost $9 billion overall on mortgage-backed securities in 2007. Morgan Stanley has informed the media that it did not mislead investors, and that it has examined the "Dead Presidents" transactions and that it does not believe that the investigation has any substance. The allegations are based on documents which Morgan Stanley voluntarily provided to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in response to a subpoena. 

Both the Goldman and Morgan Stanley criminal investigations were the result of a civil fraud investigation of a dozen Wall Street firms begun by the SEC in 2009. Analysts have stated that all Wall Street investment banks have been receiving subpoenas about CDOs and CDO marketing. The SEC has been inquiring with firms regarding whether any of their clients were betting against CDOs.

Senate Permanent Subcomittee on Investigations Grills Goldman Sachs Execs

Goldman Sachs alleged securities fraud and role in the financial collapse has dominated the news this week, as reported by ABC News, NBC news and Bloomberg. It is difficult to evaluate the evidence against or supporting Goldman at this stage, but Goldman's fortunes were not helped by an inquisitorial and highly publicized hearing by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The Subcommittee scheduled the hearing less than two weeks after the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed a complaint against Goldman alleging that the firm committed securities fraud.

Goldman officers and employees testified that Goldman was managing its risk on individual transactions, and not betting against the future of the housing market. Six Goldman officers and employees, including its Chief Executive, Lloyd Blankfein, were summoned to testify. Senators asked the witnesses to look through binders of evidence containing internal e-mails and communications.

Goldman defended that the Subcommittee had reached its conclusions before the hearing. The firm also released documents showing that any gains it made from short sales of mortgage backed securities in 2007 were entirely erased by its losses when higher quality mortgages failed in 2008. Goldman's representatives pointed out that the firm had no special advance knowledge that the market would collapse.

The Senators asked Mr. Blankfein if it was morally correct to sell securities to clients while betting against the securities at the same time. Mr. Blankfein promised Goldman would "tighten up" the practices subject to criticism. Michigan Democratic Senator Carl Levin scolded Mr. Blankfein for Goldman selling securities, allegedly described by Goldman's own employees as "crap," and betting against them. Mr. Blankfein told the Committee that it was not Goldman's responsibility to tell its clients how to trade or invest. Blankfein had testified in January before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission led by former California Treasurer Phil Angelides.

 

In an e-mail from November 18, 2007, Blankfein allegedly stated to a colleague that Goldman was making more money from short bets on mortgages than it had lost on its investments in home loans. However, Blankfein also states in the same e-mail that Goldman did not dodge the mortgage crisis, and noted that the crisis was not over. Another document discussed during the hearing was an e-mail between Goldman's Chief Financial Officer, David Viniar, and its President and Chief Operating Officer, Gary Cohn, regarding a profit and loss statement from July 2007 and short sales of stock by Goldman.

Goldman's mortgage chief Dan Sparks admitted in his testimony that Goldman made poor decisions in hindsight.

 

The Senators frequently interrupted witnesses. Their questioning was also not confined to the allegations of the SEC's complaint. Senator Levin seized on an e-mail between the head of Goldman's mortgage desk, Thomas Montag, and Sparks, in which Montag called a set of mortgage linked investments "one shitty deal." Republican Senator Tom Coburn criticized Goldman for making Goldman bond trader Fabrice Tourre a "whipping boy" and releasing his personal e-mails. In response to Goldman's contention that the Committee had cherry picked its evidence, Senator Levin retorted that the evidence was the "whole bowl of cherries," and reflected the history of what happened.

Tourre also tesfied and asserted his innocence, claiming that he did not mislead any parties in dealings relating to a collateralized debt obligation which he helped to develop. He told the panel that he would defend himself in court against the "false" allegations.

Protestors attending the hearing wore striped prison uniforms and held signs stating "shame" and "Goldman banksters," recalling a term coined by Ferdinand Pecora, an Assistant District Attorney appointed by the Senate to head the Pecora Commission which investigated the causes of the 1929 stock market crash.

Goldman received $10 billion in stimulus money from the federal government following the financial collapse. It repaid the monies with interest eight months later.

It will be interesting to see if the SEC or the Subcommittee--coincidentally the same panel led by Wisconsin Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s--has any more damning evidence up its sleeve. In the meantime, in happier news for Goldman, shares in the company have risen from a low of $152 per share on April 26, to $160 in current trading.

SEC Goes After Goldman Sachs in Financial Crisis Fallout

The story of the week is the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filing a complaint against international investment firm Goldman Sachs ("Goldman") on April 15 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that Goldman and a Goldman employee, Fabrice Tourre, a former Vice President of Goldman in New York and current Executive Director of Goldman Sachs International in London, allegedly made materially false statements to investors regarding a synthetic collateralized debt obligation, or CDO, which Goldman marketed to investors. A CDO is an asset-backed security which derives its value from underlying assets. The CDO in question was called Abacus 2007-CD1 ("Abacus 2007" or "CDO"), was backed by subprime residential home mortgages. Goldman issued a press release following the filing of the complaint stating that "The SEC’s charges are completely unfounded in law and fact and we will vigorously contest them and defend the firm and its reputation."

The SEC complaint alleges that Goldman used marketing materials for Abacus 2007 which falsely represented that the portfolio of mortgage-backed securities which formed the CDO were selected by ACA Management LLC ("ACA"), a firm with experience in analyzing mortgage-backed securities. However, the complaint contends that Paulson & Co., Inc. ("Paulson"), allegedly participated in the selection of the portfolio in the Spring of 2007 without any mention in Goldman's marketing materials and without the knowledge of Goldman's investors. Paulson also allegedly entered into "credit default swap" ("CDS") agreements with Goldman. Under a CDS agreement, in its basic form, an entity or person purchases "protection" against a potential default or "credit event" involving a credit instrument such as a bond or loan. The purchaser of the protection makes quarterly or premium payments to the seller of the protection. In the event that the instrument goes into default,  the seller pays the purchaser the par value of the bond or other fixed amount. CDS agreements may be used for speculative purposes, such as betting on a default in credit or loan obligations. The SEC alleges that Paulson, in selecting the securities which made up Abacus 2007, had a financial incentive to select securities which would experience credit events.

Paulson allegedly was under the belief since 2006 that certain "Triple B" rated subprime mortgage loans would experience "credit events," a/k/a significant losses. Paulson then allegedly approached Goldman and asked it to create a CDO composed of the mortgage-backed securities it believed would experience credit events. Paulson and Goldman would then allegedly "short" the CDO by entering into a CDS agreement.

The complaint alleges that Tourre designed the Abacus 2007 transaction, prepared the marketing materials and communicated with investors. At the time they were structuring the transaction, Goldman, Paulson and Tourre knew that the market for mortgage-backed CDOs was declining. Tourre allegedly sent an e-mail to a friend in January of 2007 in which he stated ""More and more leverage in the system, The whole building is about to collapse anytime now...Only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab[rice Tourre] ... standing in the middle of all these complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all of the implications of those monstruosities!!!" The following month, Tourre allegedly received an e-mail from the head of Goldman's structured product correlation trading desk stating that "the cdo biz is dead we don't have a lot of time left."

The complaint also alleges that Goldman, Paulson and Tourre chose ACA Management as the portfolio selection agent because they knew they could not attract investors if the investors knew that Paulson had selected the CDO in order to short it. Paulson then allegedly identified over 100 Triple B bonds which it expected to experience credit events, including mortgage-backed securities with a high concentration of subprime adjustable rate mortgages and buyers with low FICO scores.

Tourre and representatives of Goldman, Paulson and ACA met in January and February of 2007 to select the portfolio for Abacus 2007. ACA allegedly had no knowledge that Paulson intended to short the CDO and the complaint alleges that Goldman allegedly mislead ACA into believing that Paulson was investing in the equity of the CDO and had a "long position" in the CDO's success, as opposed to taking a short position adverse to the interests of Goldman investors. ACA allegedly only permitted Paulson to participate in the portfolio selection process because it was led to believe that Paulson was a large equity investor. Tourre allegedly sent an email to a co-worker during these meetings stating "I am at this aca paulson meeting. this is surreal."

By the end of January, 2009, 99% the Abacus 2007 portfolio had been downgraded and investors in the CDO had lost $1 billion. Conversely, Paulson allegedly received $1 billion in profit. Investors in Abacus 2007 included IKB, a commercial bank in Germany, which lost almost all of the $150 million which it invested; and ACA's parent company, ACA Capital Holdings, the largest investor which invested some $951 million.

The SEC alleges that Goldman and Tourre violated Section 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. s 77q(a) and Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. s 78j(b). It seeks civil penalties and fines against the defendants.

Goldman, by all appearances, intends to fight back against the allegations. In a second press release, it contends that the accusations are unfounded in law and fact. Goldman maintains that it would not structure a portfolio that was designed to lose money, that it retained substantial risk in the transaction, and points out that it lost more than $90 million itself. It contends that its large investors were provided with extensive information relating to the underlying mortgage securities and the risks, and provided input on the underlying mortgage securities. Furthermore, Goldman points out that ACA was the largest investor and had every incentive to select securities which would not experience credit events. Goldman also claims that it never represented to ACA that Paulson would be a long investor, and that the industry practice is not to disclose the identities of buyers to sellers.

The complaint against Goldman is the largest action thus far to emerge out of the financial collapse which began in 2007, and which has angered the public and has lawmakers, law enforcement and the SEC itself feeling the heat. Former Bear Stearns hedge fund managers Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin were acquitted on fraud charges last November relating to a failed hedge fund.