The Crack Cocaine Guidelines After the Fair Sentencing

The draconian disparities in the sentencing of defendants convicted of crack cocaine offenses compared with those convicted of powder cocaine offenses is an oft-decried area of criminal sentencing. Since the 1980s, the United States Sentencing Commission's  Sentencing Guidelines used a "100-to-1" ratio, meaning that a criminal defendant  who was convicted or pled guilty to an offense involving a quantity of crack cocaine--"or cocaine base"--was sentenced as harshly as a defendant possessing a quantity of powder cocaine, or  cocaine hydrochloride, 100 times greater. These results were particularly harsh considering that exponentially smaller amounts of crack cocaine were necessary to trigger the 5 and 10 year mandatory-minimum sentences than other drugs.

On August 3, 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 went into effect. The Act reduces the powder/crack ratio to 1:18. It eliminated the 5 year mandatory minimum sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine and raised it to 28 grams, and raised the quantity needed to trigger the 10 year mandatory minimum to 280 grams.

At least one federal case, U.S. v. Douglas (D. ME), has applied the changes retroactively to a pending case.

In the wake of the FSA, the Sentencing Commission has amended Section 2D1.1, revising the crack cocaine Guidelines downward by two offense levels, and also providing for capping the offense level of defendants with a minor role in the offense at 32.

Federal District Courts Taking Increasing Advantage of Sentencing Discretion in Wake of U.S. v. Booker; 41.2% of Sentences Nationwide in 2009 Were Below Recommended Sentencing Guidelines Ranges

The New Jersey Law Journal contains an article concerning the continuing struggles of federal district courts to come to terms with the discretion which the Supreme Court granted to them in sentencing in U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The article notes that the courts continue to follow the Guidelines, but that there has been a trend away from strict adherence to the Guidelines.

Statistics show that in 2009, slightly more than one half--56.8 percent--of federal sentences were within the sentencing ranges recommended by the Guidelines--down from 61.7 percent in 2006. However, the percentage of sentences within the recommended Guidelines range varies from district to district--from a low of 27.8 percent for the District of Arizona and 30.8 percent for the District of Vermont to a high of 80.7 percent for the Southern District of Mississippi and 92.3 percent for the District for the Northern Mariana Islands. Nationwide, courts varied downward from the recommended Guidelines ranges in 41.2 percent of cases. Statistics also show that courts were most likely to adhere to advisory Guidelines ranges in drug and burglary cases, and least likely in kidnapping or bribery cases.

The article quotes Professor Douglas Berman of Ohio State University and the author of the influential Sentencing Law and Policy blog, who notes that the Supreme Court has consistently upheld district judges' exercise of their post-Booker sentencing discretion.

Sentencing Considerations for Corporations and Organizations

            We received an excellent reader question regarding what factors do Federal courts consider in imposing punishment on corporations or organizations in criminal proceedings. Corporations of course, don’t “go to jail.” The Government does collect its $200 however, since the organization sentencing provisions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines are primarily fine-driven. And while there is a massive body of law concerning factors which must be considered in imposing sentence on individuals, caselaw relating to considerations in imposing punishment on corporations is relatively sparse.

However, areas which courts consider in sentencing corporations or organizations, and conversely areas which corporate criminal counsel may emphasize in order to attempt to mitigate the consequences to their corporate clients, may be discerned from the Guidelines themselves. In many cases, such as relating to acceptance of responsibility and role in the offense, these considerations closely parallel those for individual defendant. The questions facing a corporation at sentencing will boil down to how much will the corporation be made to pay in the form of fines and restitution, and what conditions will be imposed on the corporation.

The relevant portion of the Guidelines is Chapter Eight. Imposing a sentence on a corporation or organization in a Federal criminal case involves a complex determination by the sentencing court. In brief, the court must:

1. Determine whether any restitution, remedial orders or community service should be ordered;

2. Determine the amount of the fine, including determining the corporation’s or organization’s “culpability score”;

3. Determine whether any departures or probation is appropriate.

The Introductory Commentary to Chapter Eight states that it is designed “designed so that the sanctions imposed upon organizations and their agents, taken together, will provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G., Ch. 8, Pt. A, Introductory Commentary. The sentencing provisions of Chapter Eight are intended to reflect the general principles that:

First, the court must, whenever practicable, order the organization to remedy any harm caused by the offense. The resources expended to remedy the harm should not be viewed as punishment, but rather as a means of making victims whole for the harm caused.

Second, if the organization operated primarily for a criminal purpose or primarily by criminal means, the fine should be set sufficiently high to divest the organization of all its assets.

Third, the fine range for any other organization should be based on the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the organization. The seriousness of the offense generally will be reflected by the greatest of the pecuniary gain, the pecuniary loss, or the amount in a guideline offense level fine table. Culpability generally will be determined by six factors that the sentencing court must consider. The four factors that increase the ultimate punishment of an organization are: (i) the involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity; (ii) the prior history of the organization; (iii) the violation of an order; and (iv) the obstruction of justice. The two factors that mitigate the ultimate punishment of an organization are: (i) the existence of an effective compliance and ethics program; and (ii) self-reporting, cooperation, or acceptance of responsibility.

Fourth, probation is an appropriate sentence for an organizational defendant when needed to ensure that another sanction will be fully implemented, or to ensure that steps will be taken within the organization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct.

U.S.S.G., Ch. 8, Pt. A, Introductory Commentary. The provisions are designed to offer “incentives” to corporations or other organizations to police and eliminate criminal conduct through compliance and ethics programs. U.S.S.G., Ch. 8, Pt. A, Introductory Commentary.

The Introductory Commentary to Part B of Chapter Eight states:

As a general principle, the court should require that the organization take all appropriate steps to provide compensation to victims and otherwise remedy the harm caused or threatened by the offense. A restitution order or an order of probation requiring restitution can be used to compensate identifiable victims of the offense. A remedial order or an order of probation requiring community service can be used to reduce or eliminate the harm threatened, or to repair the harm caused by the offense, when that harm or threatened harm would otherwise not be remedied.

U.S.S.G., Ch. 8, Pt. B. Guideline Section 8B1.1 requires a court to enter a restitution order for the full amount of a victim’s loss if such an order is authorized. Section 8B1.3 authorizes a court to order community service as a condition of probation “where such community service is reasonably designed to repair the harm caused by the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 8B1.3. The commentary on Section 8B1.3 notes that the community service should be “related to the purposes of sentencing.” U.S.S.G. § 8B1.3, Cmt.

            Guidelines Section 8B2.1 describes an “effective compliance and ethics program.” It states that, in order to have an effective compliance and ethics program, a corporation or organization must:

1. Exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct and establish standards and procedures to prevent and

detect criminal conduct;

2. “[P]romote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law”;

3. Ensure that the corporation’s or organization’s governing authority is knowledgeable about the compliance and ethics program and that specific individuals have day-to-day responsibility for the program; and

4. Take reasonable steps to ensure that the compliance and ethics program is followed, enforced and evaluated.

            A critical provision is Guidelines Section 8C2.5, which governs determination of a corporation’s “culpability score.” That section provides for a base score of 5 points with increases or decreases to the level for:

1. Condoning, tolerating or “willful ignorance” of criminal activity by corporate governing authorities or high-level personnel;

2. Any prior history of misconduct;

3. Any violation of orders or obstruction of justice; and/or

4. Self-reporting, cooperation and acceptance of responsibility.

With regard to a decrease in culpability level for cooperation, the Application Notes state that:

[C]ooperation must be both timely and thorough. To be timely, the cooperation must begin essentially at the same time as the organization is officially notified of a criminal investigation. To be thorough, the cooperation should include the disclosure of all pertinent information known by the organization. A prime test of whether the organization has disclosed all pertinent information is whether the information is sufficient for law enforcement personnel to identify the nature and extent of the offense and the individual(s) responsible for the criminal conduct.

U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5, Note 12.

            Another vital provision is Guideline Section 8C2.8—the corporate equivalent of Code Section 3553(a) which courts must consider in sentencing individuals. Section 8C2.8 provides:

(a) In determining the amount of the fine within the applicable guideline range, the court should consider:

(1) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public from further crimes of the organization;

(2) the organization’s role in the offense;

(3) any collateral consequences of conviction, including civil obligations arising from the organization’s conduct;

(4) any nonpecuniary loss caused or threatened by the offense;

(5) whether the offense involved a vulnerable victim;

(6) any prior criminal record of an individual within high-level personnel of the organization or high-level personnel of a unit of the organization who participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the criminal conduct;

(7) any prior civil or criminal misconduct by the organization other than that counted under §8C2.5(c);

(8) any culpability score under §8C2.5 (Culpability Score) higher than 10 or lower than 0;

(9) partial but incomplete satisfaction of the conditions for one or more of the mitigating or aggravating factors set forth in §8C2.5 (Culpability Score);

(10) any factor listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a); and

(11) whether the organization failed to have, at the time of the instant offense, an effective compliance and ethics program within the meaning of §8B2.1 (Effective Compliance and Ethics Program).

(b) In addition, the court may consider the relative importance of any factor used to determine the range, including the pecuniary loss caused by the offense, the pecuniary gain from the offense, any specific offense characteristic used to determine the offense level, and any aggravating or mitigating factor used to determine the culpability score.

U.S.S.G. § 8C2.8. The Application Notes to Section 8C2.8 further state, in relevant part, “[i]f punitive collateral sanctions have been or will be imposed on the organization, this may provide a basis for a lower fine within the guideline fine range.” U.S.S.G. § 8C2.8, Note 2.

            Finally, Part C of Chapter Eight provides for departures from a sentence/fine if a court finds “that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.” U.S.S.G., Ch. 8, Pt. C, Introductory Commentary. The relevant potential grounds for upward or downward departures are:

1. Substantial assistance to authorities under Section 8C4.1;

2. Risk of death or bodily injury under Section 8C4.2;

3. Threat to the environment under Section 8C4.4;

4. Threat to a market under Section 8C4.5;

5. Public entity (ground for downward departure) under Section 8C4.7;

6. If members or beneficiaries of the corporation or organization are also victims (ground for downward departure) under Section 8C4.8;

7. Whether the remedial costs exceed the gain from the offense under Section 8C4.9; and

8. Mandatory programs to detect and prevent violations of the law under Section 8C4.10.

            From this maze of Guidelines, the following potential points can be derived for corporate criminal counsel to potentially argue in favor of a low or lesser punishment or fine, departure or for mitigation generally:

  1. Any compliance and ethics programs instituted or proposed by the corporation either before or following the alleged conduct;
  2. Any actions the corporation has taken to remedy any harm from the alleged conduct, including:
    1. Restitution to any victims;
    2. Institution or proposal of a compliance and ethics program;
    3. Any other efforts the corporation has made to detect or prevent criminal activity, or to detect or prevent any recurrence of the alleged conduct;
  3. The corporation’s service to the community before or following the alleged conduct;
  4. Whether the corporation reported the alleged conduct to law enforcement;
  5. Whether the corporation cooperated and/or rendered substantial assistance to the Government, and the degree of such cooperation and/or assistance;
  6. Whether the alleged conduct constituted a distinct, isolated instance, as opposed to demonstrating that the corporation had an alleged criminal purpose;
  7. The relative position of the individuals involved in, or having knowledge of, the alleged conduct—i.e. whether governing or high level officers or lower level personnel;
  8. Whether the corporation has any history of similar conducts;
  9. The seriousness of the alleged conduct, including whether it resulted in any physical harm, threat to any market, third party, etc.;
  10. The corporation’s role in the alleged conduct, including whether the corporation or its officers, members or employees were also victims of the alleged conduct;
  11. The lack of likelihood of recurrence of the alleged conduct;
  12. The corporation’s efforts to investigate the alleged conduct and actions against culpable individuals;
  13. Whether the alleged conduct resulted in collateral consequences to the corporation, including costs from investigation, civil lawsuits relating to the alleged conduct, etc.; and
  14. Whether the gains from the alleged conduct were outweighed by the costs incurred by the corporation in responding to and remedying the alleged conduct.

These points may also furnish useful guidelines or tips for corporate officers or members and counsel in attempting to devise appropriate responses in the event of notice of alleged wrongdoing and/or a criminal investigation.

Sentencing Commission Issues Proposed Amendments to Guidelines Relating to Corporations, Individuals; Increases Potential for Probationary Sentences; New Probation Options in Drug Cases; Hate Crimes Enhancement

Last month, the U.S. Sentencing Commission issued its 2010 Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which may be viewed here, which contain much of interest for both corporate and individual defendants.

In regard to corporations or “organizational" defendants, the Commission has proposed several changes to Chapter Eight of the Guidelines. The Proposed Amendments amend Guideline Section §8B2.1, governing compliance and ethics programs for corporations, by adding language in the Application Notes regarding personnel who must be aware of an organization’s document retention policies and conform to such policies and setting forth “reasonable steps that an organization should take after detection of criminal conduct.” The steps are:

First, the organization should respond appropriately to the criminal conduct. In the event the criminal conduct has an identifiable victim or victims the organization should take reasonable steps to provide restitution and otherwise remedy the harm resulting from the criminal conduct. Other appropriate responses may include self-reporting, cooperation with authorities, and other forms of remediation. Second, to prevent further similar criminal conduct, the organization should assess the compliance and ethics program and make modifications necessary to ensure the program is more effective. The organization may take the additional step of retaining an independent monitor to ensure adequate assessment and implementation of the modifications.

Section 8D1.4, governing conditions for probation for corporations or organizations, is also amended to provide, as conditions of probation, that an organization develop and submit a compliance and ethics program and retain an independent monitor. The amendment further provides that organizations must disclose any material adverse changes in its business or financial condition or prosepects, and any new criminal prosecutions, civil litigation, administrative proceedings, investigations or formal inquiries commenced against the organization.

Last September, the Commission had stated that one of its policy priorities would be to study alternatives to incarceration. Accordingly, the Proposed Amendments increase “Zone B” and “Zone C” of the Guidelines’ Sentencing Table by one level. Defendants with Guidelines calculations falling within Zone B are eligible, instead of a sentence of imprisonment, to have imposed “a sentence of probation that includes a condition or combination of conditions that substitute intermittent confinement, community confinement, or home detention for imprisonment…” pursuant to Section §5C1.1(b)(3).

The Commission has sought comments on its Proposed Amendments. It has also sought comments on potential revisions to certain specific offender characteristics as a basis for downward departure in sentence pursuant to the policy statements in Chapter 5 of the Guidelines, including age; mental and emotional condition; physical condition; military, civic, charitable, or public service, employment-related contributions and record of prior good works; and lack of guidance as a youth. The Commission has stated that it has considered eliminating these statements pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, which mandated that sentencing courts consider a defendant’s “history and characteristics” pursuant to Section 3553(a) in fashioning a reasonable sentence. Under the “old” Guidelines system, such factors were either prohibited or discouraged grounds for a downward departure in sentence.

The Proposed Amendments also take into account the Supreme Court’s landmark holding in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) that the Guidelines are advisory, rather than mandatory, by amending the instructions on applying the Guidelines in Section 1B1.1 to provide that, after a sentencing court has determined the proper sentencing range under the Guidelines and considered the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), “[t]he court shall then determine the sentence (i.e., a sentence within the guideline range, a departure, or a variance), considering the applicable factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) taken as a whole.”

The Proposed Amendments expand courts’ authority to impose probation as an alternative to incarceration in certain drug cases in a new proposed Guideline Section 5C1.3 provided that the defendant participates in a substance abuse treatment program and meets certain additional criteria. The Amendments furthermore suggest changes to determining a defendant’s criminal history in terms of the recency of prior offenses. Finally, the Proposed Amendments also recommend so-called “hate crimes” enhancements under Section 3A1.1 which provide for an increase of 3 or more levels to a defendant’s offense level where “the defendant intentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense of conviction because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, disability, or sexual orientation of any person…”
 

Summary of Eleventh Circuit Criminal Opinions, Week of March 9, 2009

            As part of a new, ongoing weekly feature, following are summaries of relevant criminal decisions by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for the previous week. Only substantive opinions by the Court discussing criminal law will be covered—summary opinions and orders will not be listed.

In U.S. v. Watley, NO. 08-11768, 2009 WL 635185 (11th Cir., Mar. 13, 2009), a prosecution of the defendant for drug and firearm offenses, the Court affirmed the trial court’s admission of evidence of prior controlled drug buys not charged in the indictment, relying on the rule that “‘[e]vidence of criminal activity other than the charged offense is not extrinsic under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 404(b) if it is... necessary to complete the story of the crime, or [ ] inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense,’” id. at *2 (quoting U.S. v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2004)). The Court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to compel disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant to the defense, finding that the CI was not involved in the events underlying the charges against the defendant, and that the CI’s proposed testimony would have harmed, rather than helped, the defendant. Id. at *3.

The Court in U.S. v. Strachan, No. 08-13949, 2009 WL 641225 (11th Cir., Mar. 13, 2009), held that it was not required to dismiss the defendant’s appeal of his sentence for various drug and firearms offenses despite a sentence appeal waiver in the defendant’s plea agreement where the record contained no transcript of the plea hearing and did not indicate that the defendant “clearly understood the consequences of his sentence appeal waiver,” id. at * 2. The Court proceeded to find that the district court did not discuss any of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) at sentencing and vacated the case and remanded for resentencing, observing that a sentencing court “‘need not make detailed findings with respect to each § 3553(a) factor, but the record must make it clear that it considered them.’” Id. at *2 (quoting U.S. v. Williams, No. 08-11361, at 5-7 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2009); U.S. v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1997)).

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            In U.S. v. Brye, No. 08-12578, 2009 WL 637553 (11th Cir., Mar. 13, 2009), a prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant’s arguments that the Second Amendment’s protection of an individual’s right to possess a firearm should apply to the defendant as a convicted felon and that the indictment should be dismissed, that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to strike the indictment’s reference to his five prior felonies as surplusage, that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to strike the jury panel based upon a venireperson’s prejudicial comments made in front of the other jurors, that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for mistrial based upon the government’s failure to provide all notes by a witness, that the trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding where the ammunition was found was erroneous, and that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to give the defendant’s requested jury instruction regarding guilt by mere proximity to contraband, id. at *2-*3.

In U.S. v. Grant, No. 08-13879, 2009 WL 637556 (11th Cir., Mar. 13, 2009); U.S. v. Hudson, No. 08-14176, 2009 WL 614785 (11th Cir., Mar. 12, 2009); U.S. v. Williams, No. 08-12360, 2009 WL 624073 (11th Cir., Mar. 12, 2009); U.S. v. Rochelle, No. 08-14868, 2009 WL 614779 (11th Cir., Mar. 12, 2009); U.S. v. Dean, NO. 08-13352, 2009 WL 585785 (11th Cir., Mar. 09, 2009), crack cocaine cases, the Court upheld its earlier holding that U.S. v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) does not apply to post-sentencing reductions of a defendant’s sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), id. at *1 (citing U.S. v. Melvin, No. 08-13497, 2009 WL 236053, *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 3, 2009)). Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines reduced the offense levels associated with certain crack cocaine offenses. Similarly, in U.S. v. Montgomery, No. 08-12233, 2009 WL 579276 (11 Cir., Mar. 09, 2009), the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to reduce his sentence for a crack cocaine offense pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), holding that “[b]ecause Montgomery was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, the crack cocaine base offense level played no ultimate role in his sentence, and therefore, the district court correctly determined that Montgomery was not eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to Amendment 706,” id. at *2.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s sentence in U.S. v. Jackson, Slip Copy, No. 08-12047, 2009 WL 641220 (11th Cir., Mar. 13, 2009), holding that “[m]itigating role adjustments are unavailable to career offenders sentenced under U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.1,” id. at *1 (citing United States v. Jeter, 329 F.3d 1229, 1230 (11th Cir. 2003)).

 

The Court in U.S. v. Lee, No. 08-12570, 2009 WL 595995 (11th Cir., Mar. 10, 2009), found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions for various drug offenses; that the defendant’s right to a fair trial was not violated where the government asked questions regarding a prior felony offense by the defendant in violation of a stipulation agreement, given the fact that the district court both sustained the defendant’s objection and instructed the jury about the limited purposes for considering a prior felony conviction; and that the defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to inadmissible hearsay by a confidential informant, failing to move for judgment of acquittal or failing to move for a mistrial in response to the government’s questioning regarding the prior felony conviction, id. at *1-3.

In U.S. v. Grady, No. 08-13876, 2009 WL 585784 (11th Cir., Mar. 09, 2009), the first indictment against the defendant for cocaine offenses was dismissed under the Speedy Trial Act based upon delays by the clerk’s office, and the defendant was re-indicted and found guilty, id. at *1. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court should have dismissed the original indictment with prejudice, and the Court rejected this argument, noting, pursuant to U.S. v. Brown, 183 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir.1999), that, in cases of speedy trial violations, there is no preference for one type of dismissal over the other and courts must consider several factors in determining whether to dismiss a case with or without prejudice. Id. at *2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1); Brown, at 1310).

Supreme Court - Defendants Not Entitled to Notice of Variance From Guideline Sentence

In Irizarry v. United States, (No. 06-7517), the Petitioner plead guilty in district court to making a threatening interstate communication to his ex-wife in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875. Although the presentence report recommended a Federal Sentencing Guidelines range of 41-to-51 months in prison, the district court imposed the statutory maximum sentence—60 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release— rejecting the petitioner’s objection that he was entitled to notice that the court was contemplating an upward departure.  The Supreme Court announced that defendants are not entitled to notice of a variance from the guideline sentence prior to sentencing.

The Eleventh Circuit had affirmed the sentence, reasoning that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h), which states that “[b]efore the court may depart from the applicable sentencing range on a ground not identified . . . either in the presentence report or in a party’s pre-hearing submission, the court must give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a departure,” did not apply because the sentence was a variance, not a Guidelines departure.

The Supreme Court affirmed finding that the notice requirement of Rule 32(h) does not extend to a "variance" from the recommended guidelines range. According to the Supreme Court, "The due process concerns that motivated the Court to require notice in a world of mandatory Guidelines no longer provide a basis for this Court to extend the rule set forth in [Burns v. United States, 501 U. S. 129 (1991)], either through an interpretation of Rule 32(h) itself or through Rule 32(i)(1)(C)."

The Court adopted the use of the Eleventh Circuit's term - "variance" - in finding that there is a difference between a mandatory guidelines departure and a variance pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. So, departures, the Supreme Courts says, were “a term of art under the Guidelines” and referred only to non-Guidelines sentences imposed under the framework set out in the Guidelines. A "variance" is any factor under section 3553 that may warrant a non-guideline sentence, and the defendant does not have a statutory, or constitutional right to be advised of every variance, although district court’s should be cautious in making certain that defendants have adequate notice.

So, departures are now a deceased creature of the guidelines era.