SUPREME COURT HOLDS VEHICLE GPS TRACKING CONSTITUTES A SEARCH

We have mentioned the case of U.S. v. Jones which was pending before the United States Supreme Court, and  the issue of whether placement of a gobal positioning satellite (GPS)  device on a vehicle by law enforcement constitutes a search. Late last month, the Court issued an opinion holding that the government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle constituted a search.  Justice Scalia authored the opinion of the plurality, which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Sotomayor. Two concurring opinions were issued, the first by Justice Sotomayor and the second by Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan.

The main opinion begins with the premise that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution "protects people, not places." Katz v.  U.S., 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967).  The Court also observed that the Fourth Amendment was historically viewed as embodying a concern for governmental trespass to a person's person, property, papers and "effects."

The government's primary argument was that the device was placed on the vehicle in an area which was accessible to the public and regarding which the petitioner lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore the placement did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. The main opinion, however, rejected this argument, concluding that the officers encroached on a protected area in attaching the GPS device.

Justice Alito's concurrence took issue with the approach in the main opinion, claiming that the Court concluded that the affixing of the GPS device constituted a search based upon the tort law of trespass to chattels.

 

U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Arguments in Warrantless GPS Surveillance and Tracking Case on November 8

The U.S. Supreme Court's 2011-2012 term begins on Monday. Among several issues prominent in the public eye at the moment--i.e. healthcare, immigration--the Court will hear argument on warrantless surveillance. According to a press release yesterday by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), on November 8, 2011, the Court will hear arguments in United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259, a case from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Jones involved an investigation by D.C. police of drug activity in 2005. The police obtained a warrant authorizing placement of a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) device on a vehicle belonging to defendant Antoine Jone's wife, although the warrant was only good for 10 days. Officers placed the device on the vehicle while it was parked in a parking lot in Maryland. The officers monitored Jones using the device for four weeks, and never returned to the court to extend or renew the warrant.

The D.C. Circuit held the "search" of Jones to be unreasonable. Defense and civil liberties groups have filed amicus briefs arguing that warrantless GPS surveillance and tracking places an unacceptable burden on both Fourth Amendment and First Amendment privacy rights, and are urging the Court to condition installation and monitoring upon judicial issuance of a warrant. The case has been touted by experts as the most important privacy case in decades. The NACDL's amicus brief may be read here.

Image source: http://www.fieldtechnologies.com/more-employers-using-gps-tracking-system-to-manage-workers/

Kentucky v. King, or The Police Know Exigent Circumstances When They Hear Them

 

Police officers set up a controlled buy of crack cocaine at an apartment complex in Kentucky and observed the deal take place. The officers then moved to intercept the suspect before he re-entered his apartment. The officers heard a door shut and detected an alleged strong odor of marijuana outside of two apartment doors, although they did not know which door the suspect had entered. The officers banged on the door of the apartment to the left and announced themselves. The officers then allegedly heard the sound of items being moved in the apartment. The officers announced that they were going to enter the apartment and kicked the door in, where they found Hollis King, his girlfriend and a guest who was smoking marijuana. The officers conducted a protective sweep of the apartment, discovering marijuana and powder cocaine in plain view. In a subsequent search, the officers discovered crack cocaine.

The police later entered the apartment to the right, which was the actual apartment which the suspect had entered.

King was charged with trafficking controlled substances and filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his apartment without a warrant. The Kentucky Circuit Court denied the motion and King entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. King appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to suppress, holding that the officers’ warrantless entry into the apartment was justified based upon “exigent circumstances” because the officers believed that evidence would be destroyed. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, questioning whether the mere sound of people moving inside an apartment was sufficient to support a conclusion that evidence was being destroyed. It then held that the search was not justified by exigent circumstances because it was reasonably foreseeable that the occupants of the apartment would destroy evidence when the police knocked on the door and announced themselves. The Commonwealth of Kentucky then took its turn to appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In Kentucky v. King, which may be read here, in an opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the majority noted the long-established exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches and seizures without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable where “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)). “Exigent circumstances” can arise where there is a need to prevent the “imminent destruction of evidence.”

However, the Court also recognized that an exception to the exception had developed—the police cannot rely on the need to prevent the destruction of evidence where the exigent circumstances were created or manufactured by the police themselves. (Citing United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2004)). The majority held that this exception unreasonably shrinks the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, since the presence of law enforcement always “create” exigent circumstances where persons are engaged in illegal conduct.

The Court then ruled that where the conduct of the police is reasonable and they do not violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the exigent circumstances arising, a warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is allowed. The majority noted that “When law enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen might do. And whether the person who knocks on the door and requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to speak.” (Citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983)). The Court proceeded to reversed the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court.

The Court’s actual holding in King, which has been discussed on NPR, is actually understandable—police do not “create” or “manufacture” exigent circumstances where they act reasonably, which understandably includes knocking on a door to in pursuit of a fleeing suspect. However, the concerns over the implications of King are also understandable. The decision suggests that sufficient exigent circumstances exist to search a premises where they knock and announce their presence, although hopefully lower courts will require something more when applying the decision.

The particular facts of the case itself are also troubling. The police in King searched the wrong apartment. In addition, is the mere sound of things being moved in an apartment sufficient to support a conclusion that evidence is allegedly being destroyed and to create exigent circumstances to search, especially where police are not certain who the occupants of the apartment are?

 

Ninth Circuit Upholds "Border" Searches of Electronic Devices Hundreds of Miles from Border

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals last week issued an opinion holding that Customs agents may seize electronic storage devices, including computers, hard drives, USB sticks, smart phones and digital cameras carried at the U.S. border and search the devices either at the port of entry or at an off-site forensic laboratory under the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. According to an article by Forbes magazine, the Court held that such searches must be reasonable, and the duration of the deprivation cannot be egregious. The opinion, U.S. v. Cotterman, may be viewed here.

The case arose from the prosecution of Howard Cotterman who crossed the U.S./Mexican border with his wife at Lukeville, Arizona, on April 6, 2007. U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents received a Treasury Enforcement Communications System alert to be on the lookout for child pornography, as a result of Cotterman's 1992 conviction for sex crimes involving children.

The agents screened Cotterman and his wife at the border and seized two laptop computers and three digital cameras. The agents conducted a search of the devices at the border, but were unable to find any alleged illicit material since much of the data on the computers was password-protected. The agents then returned the cameras to the Cottermans and allowed them to enter the U.S., but retained the computers and sent them to Tucson, Arizona, for forensic examination. A forensic examination discovered hundreds of images containing child pornography on Cotterman's laptop.

Cotterman was charged with possession of child pornography. The trial court granted his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his laptop as the result of an illegal search and seizure, and the government appealed. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's decision, holding that whatever an individual brings into the U.S. can be searched and that such searches may take place hundreds or thousands of miles from the physical border. Border searches are distinguishable from other types of searches in that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. Where a search is prolonged, however, the government must justify the search by showing a reasonable suspicion that the search may uncover contraband or evidence of criminal activity.
 

Justice John Paul Stevens on Criminal Law

Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, who notified President Barack Obama last week that he will be stepping down from the Court when its current term is over in June or July, has written nearly 400 opinions over his nearly 35 year tenure on the Court. Justice Stevens has weighed in on many occasions on criminal law issues over the past three and a half decades. Contrary to the label commonly applied to Justice Stevens as a "liberal," like all Supreme Court Justices, he has sided with the government in criminal cases more often than not. However, Justice Stevens has been the originator of many opinions which have upheld and furthered the rights of the individual in criminal cases, some of the more notable of which are outlined below.

On sentencing issues, Justice Stevens authored the opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the forerunner of the Court's landmark decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 295 (2004) andUnited States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), in which the Court first famously held, in regard to New Jersey's "hate crimes" statute, that "[t]he Constitution requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."

Justice Stevens also issued the Court's opinion in Gall v. U.S., 552 U.S. 38 (2007), which sets forth the definitive current process for federal criminal sentencing. The Court in Gall held that district courts cannot consider the ranges recommended by the  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as presumptively reasonable, must consider the extent of any departure or variance from the sentencing range recommended by the Guidelines, and must explain the appropriateness of any unusual variance, and that appellate courts review all sentences imposed by a district court under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, reviewing for any significant procedural errors and for substantive reasonableness of the sentence. To calculate a defendant's sentence, a district court must first correctly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, then should consider all of the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and if the court determines to sentence the defendant outside the advisory Guidelines range, it must consider the extent of the deviation and adequately explain the sentence.
 
In regard to searches under the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stevens held that a search of a vehicle incident to a defendant's arrest could not be justified under circumstances where the defendant no longer had access to the vehicle in In Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009). And while he upheld the police search in Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (1987), Justice Stevens wrote legal dicta which has formed the basis for many challenges to the scope of a search of areas which are not specified in a search warrant. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Court affirmed that a man's home is truly his castle, and that the police may not make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to effectuate an arrest.

Justice Stevens has been an ardent opponent of capital punishment throughout most of his term on the Court and has been the author of numerous opinions limiting the application of the death penalty. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Court held that execution of "mentally retarded" offenders constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), ruled that juveniles under the age of 16 cannot possess the requisite culpability for imposition of the death penalty. And in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) the court mandated that, in capital cases, the jury must be instructed on, and permitted to consider, a verdict of guilt on a lesser included offense.

 In other cases, Justice Steven held in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), that a State could not impose the burden on a defendant claiming a racially discriminatory striking of a juror pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, to show that the striking was "more likely than not" the product of purposeful discrimination. He also held, in Hubbard v. U.S., 514 U.S. 695 (1995), that a federal court is not a department or agency of the United States for the purposes of making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

 The Blog wishes Justice Stevens a happy retirement and looks forward to the appointment of his successor.