SUPREME COURT HOLDS VEHICLE GPS TRACKING CONSTITUTES A SEARCH

We have mentioned the case of U.S. v. Jones which was pending before the United States Supreme Court, and  the issue of whether placement of a gobal positioning satellite (GPS)  device on a vehicle by law enforcement constitutes a search. Late last month, the Court issued an opinion holding that the government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle constituted a search.  Justice Scalia authored the opinion of the plurality, which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Sotomayor. Two concurring opinions were issued, the first by Justice Sotomayor and the second by Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan.

The main opinion begins with the premise that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution "protects people, not places." Katz v.  U.S., 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967).  The Court also observed that the Fourth Amendment was historically viewed as embodying a concern for governmental trespass to a person's person, property, papers and "effects."

The government's primary argument was that the device was placed on the vehicle in an area which was accessible to the public and regarding which the petitioner lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore the placement did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. The main opinion, however, rejected this argument, concluding that the officers encroached on a protected area in attaching the GPS device.

Justice Alito's concurrence took issue with the approach in the main opinion, claiming that the Court concluded that the affixing of the GPS device constituted a search based upon the tort law of trespass to chattels.

 

Government Opposes Clemens' Request for Legal Fees and Costs Relating to Mistrial

As reported in the Wall Street Journal Law Blog, the government has opposed former MLB pitcher Roger Clemens' request for reimbursement of the legal fees and costs incurred by him in the government's prosecution of Clemens for perjury, false statements and obstruction of justice. Clemens' trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ended in a mistrial in July after  the prosecution played a video to the jury which referenced statements by fellow Yankees pitcher Andy Pettitte that Clemens allegedly admitted to using human growth hormone, evidence which the Court had ruled was excluded from trial. Clemens is currently scheduled to be retried in April 2012.

Following the mistrial, Clemens filed a Motion for the Award of Fees and Costs Associated with Mistrial. The government has filed a response in opposition, arguing that Clemens' request is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

In criminal cases, the sole mechanism for recovering fees and costs is under the Hyde Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A Note. The Hyde Amendment imposes considerable hurdles to reimbursement, however. It provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he court, in any criminal case... may award to a prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation expenses, where the court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special circumstances make such an award unjust." Therefore, a defendant must first prevail against all charges. Second, he or she must demonstrate that the government's position in the prosecution was "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith"--that is, lacking any reasonable grounds or from an improper motive. Lastly, the Amendment permits the government to argue that any award would be unjust. Clemens' lawyers did not invoke the Hyde Amendment, as the government's response points out, and could not do so in any event since he faces re-trial and has not yet prevailed.

Despite having been in effect for nearly 14 years, Courts have rarely awarded defendants fees pursuant to the Hyde Amendment. See United States v. Aisenberg, 358 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2004) (reducing award of $2,680,602.22 in attorney’s fees to $1,298,980.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of $195,670.32, where the appellees were prosecuted for alleged false statements in relation to the disappearance of their daughter, and the government dismissed the indictment against the appellees after the district court found that investigating county detectives made false statements, statements in reckless disregard for the truth, and omitted material facts in wiretap applications; failed to inform the state circuit court that they had not yet interviewed several witnesses and that they were still waiting for the crime lab to process evidence and for a financial analysis of the appelleees; reported and quoted alleged telephone conversations in their wiretap applications which were either not present or not intelligible on the tapes and “deliberately or with reckless disregard summarized conversations out of context,” intercepted communications which were unrelated to the offenses and failed to minimize the recordings of conversations not otherwise subject to the interception authorization); United States v. Sherburne, 249 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment to the defendants who had charges against them relating to alleged abuses in the construction of a housing development on an Indian reservation dismissed, observing that the government had “distorted the truth,” “ignored evidence,” and failed to present facts establishing any false representations); United States v. Braunstein, 281 F.3d 982, 996 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the government’s position that the defendant had engaged in wire fraud, interstate transportation of goods obtained by fraud, and money laundering in selling discounted computers to domestic distributors and resellers, despite evidence that computer company was aware of the defendant’s actions and had no agreement with the defendant, “was so obviously wrong as to be frivolous”); United States v. Claro, No. Crim. H-04-126-1 2007 WL 2220980, *6 (S.D.Tex. Jul 31, 2007) (Opinion on Defense Fees and Expenses) (unpublished), affirmed in part, vacated in part by, United States v. Claro, 579 F.3d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 2009) (awarding $391,292.29 in fees and expenses under the Hyde Amendment where court had dismissed indictment for conspiracy, mail fraud, and money laundering against the defendant, observing that the government had no evidence to support its allegations and that “[the defendant] defended himself for nearly sixteen months from fifty-four counts derived from shifting legal theories and inaccurate representations of the facts”).

 

Georgia Federal Court Judgeships Remain Vacant

A seat on the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and two judgeships with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia remain vacant, as reported in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. All of the three positions have been vacant for at least a year, with one of the District Court judgeship having been vacant for 31 months. The vacancies have been declared "judicial emergencies" by the U.S. Courts.

On January 26, 2011, President Obama nominated U.S. Magistrate Judge, Linda Walker, and Natasha Perdew Silas, a Federal public defender in Atlanta, for the District Court judgeships. If confirmed by the Senate, they would become the first African-American women District Court judges in the Northern District. Georgia's Senators, Saxby Chambliss and Johnny Isakson, have given blue slips of approval for Judge Walker, but have not for Ms. Silas. The failure to give Ms. Silas a blue slip effectively blocks the Senate from voting to confirm her. The failure has caused friction between the White House, which views Judge Walker and Silas as a package nomination, and Congressional Republicans.

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The Eleventh Circuit vacancy is the result of the retirement of Justice Stanley Birch, who was appointed by President George H.W. Bush in 1990, in August of 2010. The White House has not nominated any replacement for Justice Birch.

U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Arguments in Warrantless GPS Surveillance and Tracking Case on November 8

The U.S. Supreme Court's 2011-2012 term begins on Monday. Among several issues prominent in the public eye at the moment--i.e. healthcare, immigration--the Court will hear argument on warrantless surveillance. According to a press release yesterday by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), on November 8, 2011, the Court will hear arguments in United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259, a case from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Jones involved an investigation by D.C. police of drug activity in 2005. The police obtained a warrant authorizing placement of a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) device on a vehicle belonging to defendant Antoine Jone's wife, although the warrant was only good for 10 days. Officers placed the device on the vehicle while it was parked in a parking lot in Maryland. The officers monitored Jones using the device for four weeks, and never returned to the court to extend or renew the warrant.

The D.C. Circuit held the "search" of Jones to be unreasonable. Defense and civil liberties groups have filed amicus briefs arguing that warrantless GPS surveillance and tracking places an unacceptable burden on both Fourth Amendment and First Amendment privacy rights, and are urging the Court to condition installation and monitoring upon judicial issuance of a warrant. The case has been touted by experts as the most important privacy case in decades. The NACDL's amicus brief may be read here.

Image source: http://www.fieldtechnologies.com/more-employers-using-gps-tracking-system-to-manage-workers/

Los Angeles Doctor Acquitted on Charges of Conspiracy and Falsification of Records Relating to 2003 Liver Transplant

According to the Los Angeles Times, Dr. Richard R. Lopez, Jr., head of the liver transplant program at St. Vincent Medical Center in Los Angeles, was acquitted by a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on Friday, on charges conspiracy, concealment of material fact and falsification of records. The charges related to a liver transplant in 2003. Dr. Lopez acknowledged that he was involved in a decision to give a liver intended for a patient to another patient more than 50 places down the transplant waiting list, which constituted a violation of transplant rules. The government charged Dr. Lopez with orchestrating a cover up of the violation. The liver was intended for a patient residing in Saudi Arabia, and was given to another patient residing in Saudi Arabia. Under the transplant rules, the organ should have been given to the next person on the list--a patient at the University of California, Los Angeles, Medical Center.

Image source: www.ehow.com/about_5673429_private-grants-liver_transplant-patients.html

St. Vincent initially reported the actual recipient of the liver to the United Network for Organ Sharing, a private, non-group contracted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services which oversees transplantation nationwide. Later the same day, the hospital's staff retracted the notification and incorrectly reported that the liver had gone to the individual which it had been offered to. The government alleged that St. Vincent continued to file false documents concerning the liver. The defense argued that Dr. Lopez had no knowledge of the falsification of the documents, and that Dr. Lopez was being made “a scapegoat for everything that was wrong at St. Vincent’s.”

St. Vincent has subsequently shut down its liver transplant program.

 

For serious criminal matters, contact the offices of Gillen Withers & Lake LLC in Savannah or Atlanta.

Georgia Resident and DOD Employee Charged with Bribery

As reported by Reuters, Desi Deandre Wade, of Climax, Georgia, was a chief of fire and emergency services for U.S. Department of Defense, based in Kabul, Afghanistan. Wade has been charged with allegedly accepting a $95,000 bribe from a contractor in exchange for providing the contractor with quotes from competing bidders.

Wade was arrested last week in Atlanta while attending a Fire Rescue International Conference.

Former CEO of Kansas Utility Westar Energy Receives $36 Million Settlement, Plus $3.1 Million in Legal Fees for Dismissed Criminal Prosecution

Westar Energy, the largest electrical utility in the State of Kansas, announced last week that it will pay former Chief Executive Officer, President and Chairman of the Board, David Wittig $36 million as an arbitration settlement relating to Wittig's compensation contract, as well as $3.1 million in attorney's fees and $2.7 million in stock compensation, according to the Topeka Capital-Journal. Westar's settlement with Wittig follows its settlement in the Spring with its former Vice President of Corporate Strategy, Douglas Lake for $21 million in unpaid compensation and $5.3 million in legal fees. Wittig and Lake claimed Westar violated their employment contracts by terminating them prematurely.

Image source: aggregateresearch.com

The compensation for legal fees was for Wittig's and Lake's defense of a criminal prosecution. In 2003, the men were charged in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas with conspiracy, circumventing internal accounting controls and falsifying books and records, honest services fraud, wire fraud, submitting false statements and engaging in monetary transactions derived from an unlawful activity. Their first trial ended in a mistrial in 2004 after the jury could not reach a verdict. They were convicted at their second trial in 2005, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed their convictions last year following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision regarding honest services fraud in U.S. v. Skilling.

Harris County, Texas, Commissioner Faces Second Trial on Bribery and Other Charges Following Mistrial

Jerry Eversole, a Harris County (Houston), Texas, Commissioner, was charged in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas with conspiracy, accepting bribes and filing false income tax returns in 2003 and 2004. Eversole was alleged to have accepted $100,000 in gifts from a developer, Michael Surface, in exchange for being awarded County contracts.

Eversole was tried on the charges back in March. The defense put up no evidence of its own at trial. Nevertheless, the jury, during deliberations, raised questions about Eversole's friendship with Surface and the line between friendship and criminal conspiracy. On March 30, 2011, the Court declared a mistrial after jurors deadlocked on the charges. Eversole has spent $1.1 million on his defense. His second trial is scheduled to commence on October 24. He has just $51,000 remaining in legal defense funds.

Image source: examiner.com

Mistrial in First Trial Following Massive Foreign Corrupt Practices Bribery Sting

As reported by Reuters, last week, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia declared a mistrial in the trial of four arms salesmen for alleged bribes under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The defendants,  Andrew Bigelow, Pankesh Patel, Lee Tolleson and John Wier, were accused of attempting to bribe two individuals who were posing as representatives of the defense ministry of the African nation of Gabon in order to win a $15 million deal to provide guns, body armor and other equipment. The defendants were alleged to have told the informants that they would add a 20 percent commission to any prices quoted as bribes. The mistrial was declared following a six week trial in which the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict after six different votes.

The sting operation, which involved a staggering 250 FBI agents, resulted in 22 individuals being charged, including a former U.S. Secret Service agent and an executive for U.S. firearm manufacturer Smith & Wesson Holding Co. Department of Justice officials have informed the media that the Department intends to retry the case. Three of the 22 individuals charged as a result of the sting have pled guilty. Trials have been scheduled for the remaining defendants.

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Supreme Court Reaffirms Tenth Amendment/Federalism Limitations on Federal Criminal Statutes in Bond v. U.S.

Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the Tenth Amendment and Federalism as a limitation on Federal statutes, in particular Federal criminal statutes, in the first significant case since U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995), Bond v. U.S., No. 09–1227, which may be read here. Bond is an encouraging development given the overwhelmingly predominant trend to presume Federal criminal statutes and their application to be ipso facto within Congress' authority.

Carol Anne Bond discovered that her close friend was pregnant by Bond's husband. Bond engaged in a campaign of harassment against the woman, which included placing caustic chemicals on objects which the woman was likely to touch. The woman received burns from the substances, and Bond was charged in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 18 U.S.C. s 229, the Federal chemical weapon statute. She entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment. She reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on appeal, and appealed, arguing that the Section 229 exceeded Congress' authority to enact under the Tenth Amendment which provides that "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. Amend. X.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied Bond's claims, holding that Bond lacked "standing" to object to the statute based upon the Tenth Amendment or Federalism (the division of powers between the Federal government and the States) because no State was involved in Bond's Federal prosecution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Kennedy,  held that where there is an otherwise justiciable case or controversy, a party may object that his or her injury results from violation of the Federal system of government. The Court held that although the States are also beneficiaries of Federalism, Federalism also serves to enhance individual freedom by “‘secur[ing] to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power,’” (Quoting New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 181 (1992); quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). The doctrine  protects the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that law enacted in excess of delegated governmental power cannot direct or control their actions. (Citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 458 (1991)). Action exceeding the Federal government’s enumerated powers undermines the States’ sovereign interests. The Court remanded Bond's Tenth Amendment arguments for consideration on the merits. 

Supreme Court Declines to Hear Conrad Black's Appeal of His Two Remaining Convictions

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied the petition for certiorari by former international media mogul, Canadian citizen and British Lord, Conrad Moffat Black, as reported in the Washington Post.

Mr. Black was the CEO of Hollinger International, Inc., which owned newspapers worldwide. He was indicted (in an indictment made available by FindLaw which may be viewed here) with other officers and employees of Hollinger in the Northern District of Illinois in November of 2005 on 11 counts, in an original indictment which charged mail fraud conspiracy, wire fraud conspiracy and substantive counts of mail and wire fraud. The counts all referenced the "honest services" fraud statute, 18 United States Code section 1346. Testifying to the vigorousness of his defense, on July of 2007, a jury acquitted Mr. Black on 9 counts but convicted him on three others.

Mr. Black then challenged his convictions on appeal. In June of last year, the Supreme Court handed down its three "honest services" decisions, Skilling v. U.S., Black v. U.S., and Weyrauch v. U.S. In Skilling, the main decision involving former Enron President Jeffrey Skilling, the Court rejected the old "intangible right" to an employee's honest services theory and held that, in order to avoid being unconstitutionally vague, section 1346 applies to bribery or kickback schemes, and not to mere self-dealing by an employee. In Mr. Black's case, the Court unanimously held that the jury had not been properly instructed on honest services fraud at trial, and vacated his convictions and remanded. Then in October of last year, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored by distinguished Judge Richard Posner, struck two of the three remaining counts against Mr. Black, leaving him convicted on a single fraud count and a count for obstruction of justice. Mr. Black again appealed these two remaining convictions to the Seventh Circuit, which upheld them last December, and then to the Supreme Court, which has now declined to review them. Mr. Black is scheduled to be resentenced on June 24.

Source: McLean's.ca

Kentucky v. King, or The Police Know Exigent Circumstances When They Hear Them

 

Police officers set up a controlled buy of crack cocaine at an apartment complex in Kentucky and observed the deal take place. The officers then moved to intercept the suspect before he re-entered his apartment. The officers heard a door shut and detected an alleged strong odor of marijuana outside of two apartment doors, although they did not know which door the suspect had entered. The officers banged on the door of the apartment to the left and announced themselves. The officers then allegedly heard the sound of items being moved in the apartment. The officers announced that they were going to enter the apartment and kicked the door in, where they found Hollis King, his girlfriend and a guest who was smoking marijuana. The officers conducted a protective sweep of the apartment, discovering marijuana and powder cocaine in plain view. In a subsequent search, the officers discovered crack cocaine.

The police later entered the apartment to the right, which was the actual apartment which the suspect had entered.

King was charged with trafficking controlled substances and filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his apartment without a warrant. The Kentucky Circuit Court denied the motion and King entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. King appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to suppress, holding that the officers’ warrantless entry into the apartment was justified based upon “exigent circumstances” because the officers believed that evidence would be destroyed. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, questioning whether the mere sound of people moving inside an apartment was sufficient to support a conclusion that evidence was being destroyed. It then held that the search was not justified by exigent circumstances because it was reasonably foreseeable that the occupants of the apartment would destroy evidence when the police knocked on the door and announced themselves. The Commonwealth of Kentucky then took its turn to appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In Kentucky v. King, which may be read here, in an opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the majority noted the long-established exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches and seizures without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable where “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)). “Exigent circumstances” can arise where there is a need to prevent the “imminent destruction of evidence.”

However, the Court also recognized that an exception to the exception had developed—the police cannot rely on the need to prevent the destruction of evidence where the exigent circumstances were created or manufactured by the police themselves. (Citing United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2004)). The majority held that this exception unreasonably shrinks the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, since the presence of law enforcement always “create” exigent circumstances where persons are engaged in illegal conduct.

The Court then ruled that where the conduct of the police is reasonable and they do not violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the exigent circumstances arising, a warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is allowed. The majority noted that “When law enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen might do. And whether the person who knocks on the door and requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to speak.” (Citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983)). The Court proceeded to reversed the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court.

The Court’s actual holding in King, which has been discussed on NPR, is actually understandable—police do not “create” or “manufacture” exigent circumstances where they act reasonably, which understandably includes knocking on a door to in pursuit of a fleeing suspect. However, the concerns over the implications of King are also understandable. The decision suggests that sufficient exigent circumstances exist to search a premises where they knock and announce their presence, although hopefully lower courts will require something more when applying the decision.

The particular facts of the case itself are also troubling. The police in King searched the wrong apartment. In addition, is the mere sound of things being moved in an apartment sufficient to support a conclusion that evidence is allegedly being destroyed and to create exigent circumstances to search, especially where police are not certain who the occupants of the apartment are?

 

Perjury and Obstruction Trial Against Former San Francisco Giant Barry Bonds Commences in San Francisco; Trial to Begin With Hearing on Bonds' Former Weight Trainer--Possible Contempt

 

The trial of former San Francisco Giants outfielder Barry Bonds on four counts of perjury and one count of obstruction of justice commenced yesterday in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California according to the San Francisco Chronicle. The charges against Bonds arise from his statements to a grand jury in 2003 in relating to an investigation into the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO) in Burlingame, California, and steriods. Bonds told the grand jury that he never knowingly used banned drugs. The transcript of his December 4, 2003, testimony may be read in full here. Jury selection took place yesterday.

The jurors' names will be kept secret until the conclusion of the trial (however, the jury includes at least one Oakland Athletics fan). Opening statements are expected to take place today, followed by a hearing concerning Bonds' former weight trainer, Greg Anderson. Anderson pled guilty in the BALCO case and has served a year in prison for refusing to cooperate in the investigation of Bonds. The prosecution has subpoenaed him as a witness at trial, however Anderson has stated his intention not to testify against Bonds. The Court has stated that it will rule Anderson in contempt if he refuses to testify and hold him in prison for the duration of the trial.

Bonds, who played as a left fielder for the Pittsburgh Pirates from 1986 to 1993, and for the Giants from 1993 to 2007, holds Major League Baseball records for home runs in a single season, is an all-time leader in walks and intentional walks, and is also the recipient of 14 All-Star awards, 8 Golden Glove awards and 7 Most Valuable Player awards.

Associate of Former Arizona Representative Rick Renzi Sentenced to 3 Years' Probation for Conspiracy and Embezzlement; Follows Acquittal of Mr. Andrew Beardall on All Charges

Yesterday, Dwayne Lequire, a former accountant at an insurance firm run by former Republican U.S. Representative for Arizona Rick Renzi was sentenced to three years probation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, according to KTAR.com.

Representative Renzi represented Arizona's 1st Congressional District until declining to seek re-election in 2008. He is alleged to have siphoned off approximately $400,000 from his family insurance business based in Sierra Vista, Arizona, to finance his Congressional campaign. He was indicted in a 47 count indictment relating to the insurance conduct and to a land swap which was unsealed in February of 2008. Last year, the trial court suppressed the wiretap evidence gathered against Representative Renzi, holding that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents and federal prosecutors ``conducted an unreasonable wholesale interception of calls they knew to be attorney-client communications.'' Representative Renzi has challenged the indictment in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the criminal proceedings are on hold pending the appeal.

Lequire was convicted in July on eight counts of embezzlement. He was alleged to have diverted customers' insurance premiums to Representative Renzi. Lequire did not benefit from the activity, however.

Another associate of Representative Renzi, Andrew Beardall of Rockville, Maryland, was charged with conspiracy and two counts of insurance fraud for allegedly helping Representative Renzi cover up the transfer, however Mr. Beardall was subsequently acquitted on all charges.

(Postscript: It is the Blog's understanding that Mr. Beardall has filed a Hyde Amendment petition following his acquittal and we wish him and his counsel success in their pursuit).

Georgia Minister Receives 5 Years for Burning and Defrauding Church

Donny Ray Horton of Hoschton, Georgia, a minister at Gardendale First Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama, was sentenced to five years imprisonment yesterday in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on  charges of arson and mail fraud, according to KARE11.com. Horton allegedly set two fires at the church last year. He was also charged with defrauding the church of  $78,769 for church pews, which he received in his role as a sales representative for Sauder Manufacturing, which makes seats and pews for churches.

Utah Man and Canadian Citizen Indicted In Georgia for Conspiracy, Mail and Wire Fraud, May Have Been Conned by Their European Contacts

As reported in the Salt Lake Tribune, Thomas Repke of Holladay, Nevada, has been indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia on 22 counts of conspiracy, mail fraud and wire fraud. The charges are based on allegations that Mr. Repke, through the companies Coadum Capital and Mansell Acquisition Co., allegedly defrauded more than 100 investors of more than $30 million. Mr. Repke and James Jeffrey, a Canadian citizen, are alleged to have promised investors monthly returns of 5 percent on their investments. The indictment charges that Mr. Repke and Mr. Jeffrey promised investors that their money would be kept safe in escrow accounts, but allegedly transferred $20 million in investor funds to accounts in Switzerland and Malta, as well as allegedly diverting substantial funds to themselves, companies which they controlled and investments of family members. The defendants are alleged to have made false statements to investors about their monthly gains and account balances and to have used funds from investors to pay off other investors in what a Ponzi scheme.

Mr. Repke's and Mr. Jeffrey's uses of investor funds do not appear to have been totally selfish, however. Coadum is alleged to have used $425,000 of the funds to commission a 40-foot bronze statue of New York City firefighters for the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation for a memorial to September 11, 2001. Furthermore, in a novel twist, comments by Pat Huddleston, a receiver appointed to oversee companies operated by Mr. Repke and Mr. Jeffries, indicates that the two men might have been victims themselves, deceived by individuals in Europe who they dealt with. "My investigation shows they were conned out of that money," Huddleston stated. "They might have believed they were making legitimate investments over there, but the person was essentially conning them."

Mr. Repke pleaded not guilty to the charges yesterday and was released on a $250,000 bond. The U.S.Securities and Exchange Commission has also sued Mr. Repke and Mr. Jeffrey.

Federal Prosecutors Observe "No Touch" Ruling on Possible Retrial of San Diego Councilman for Alleged Honest Services Fraud; Former Alaska Chief of Staff to Have Honest Services Conviction Dismissed

Last week was a good one for public officials charged with Federal crimes. First, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of California announced that it would not seek a second trial of former San Diego Councilman Michael Zucchet on alleged honest services fraud charges pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1346, relating to political contributions from the owner of a strip club, as reported by the Los Angeles Times. Mr. Zucchet was indicted with two other City Council members and an aide in 2003. The government alleged that the Council members had a meeting with a lobbyist for the strip club owner for the alleged purpose of changing the City's "no touch" ordinances relating to strip clubs. The Council members, however, argued that they reported the contributions on their financial disclosure forms. The government's decision was prompted by the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in U.S. v. Skilling, No. 08-2349, in which, as we have noted,  the Court held that the "honest services" mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §1346, applies to bribery and kickback schemes, and not to mere "undisclosed self-dealing by a public official or private employee," alone.

Councilman Charles Lewis died before trial. Mr. Zucchet and Councilman Ralph Inzunza were convicted by a jury following trial in July of 2005. However, U.S. District Judge Jeffrey Miller dismissed the jury's guilty verdict on seven counts against Mr. Zucchet. The Judge permitted the government to retry Mr. Zucchet on the two remaining counts. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's ruling on appeal. Mr. Inzunza has also appealed his convictions. Mr. Zucchet resigned from the Council soon after his conviction, and is currently General Manager of the San Diego Municipal Employees Association.

Then, according to the Achorage Daily News, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Alaska announced that it would agree to the dismissal of the honest services fraud conviction of Jim Clark. Mr. Clark was the former Chief of Staff to Alaska Governor Frank Murkowski, a lobbyist and attorney, and was once viewed as the most powerful unelected official in Alaska. The U.S. Attorney's Office announced that Mr. Clark's 2008 guilty plea was to a felony that no longer exists, pursuant to the Supreme Court's Skilling decision. Mr. Clark pled guilty to alleged conspiring with former officials of the defunct oil-field services company Veco Corp. to channel $68,550 in illegal contributions to Governor Murkowski's political campaign -- without the Governor's knowledge. He is expected to be a witness for the government in a possible upcoming trial of State Representative Bruce Weyhrauch on bribery, extortion and conspiracy charges. Mr. Clark's law license, which was suspended following his guilty plea, is expected to be reinstated by the Alaska Supreme Court.

USA Today on Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors; AUSA in Senator Ted Stevens Prosecution Takes Life;

USA Today ran a lengthy piece on prosecutorial misconduct on September 22. The article states that, since 1997, federal courts have determined that Department of Justice attorneys violated laws or ethical rules in some 201 cases, including the duty expressed by Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland over 70 years ago in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935);

The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all, and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor -- indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.

Most of the cases of misconduct involved concealment of favorable or impeaching evidence from the defendant and presenting false testimony to the jury. In the cases found by the reporters as part of a six month investigation, the misconduct by the prosecution was so egregious that courts dismissed the charges against the defendants or overturned the defendants' convictions. The story states that investigations of prosecutorial misconduct by the Department of Justice prompted by complaints from judges rose to 61 last year, from 42 in 2001. The Department's Office of Professional Responsibility has reported that it has completed more than 750 investigations over the past decade, and that it has found intentional violations in 68 cases. Reporters found that only one prosecutor had been barred from practicing law, even temporarily, in the past 12 years. In one rare exception, in 2007 the Department prosecuted Richard Convertino, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, for allegedly obstructing justice in his handling of a Detroit terrorism case. Convertino was acquitted.

The story cites the case of Nino Lyons, who was alleged to have been a drug trafficker, and allegations that prosecutors concealed evidence which would have discredited the witnesses against him, many of whom were incarcerated convicted felons. The prosecution was alleged to have withheld from Mr. Lyons' defense promises made to the witnesses to reduce their prison time, and the failure of one key witness to even identify Mr. Lyons. The concealed evidence came to light only after it was suggested in a government filing after Mr. Lyons had already been incarcerated for three years. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of Florida overturned Mr. Lyons' conviction and declared him innocent.  The ordeal also cost Mr. Lyons his home and his business. U.S. District Judge Gregory Presnell wrote in his order that prosecutors engaged in "a concerted campaign of prosecutorial abuse" including covering up evidence and letting felons lie to the jury. Judge Presnell further said that prosecutors "brazenly" defied court orders and presented witnesses who were "allowed, if not encouraged, to lie under oath." As small compensation, the Justice Department paid $150,000 of Mr. Lyons' legal bills in a confidential settlement. The story states that the Department of Justice has paid nearly $5.3 million in legal bills for wrongly accused defendants.

The article noted the heavy caseload and lack of supervision of many federal prosecutors as a possible causes of misconduct. In response to the article, Acting Deputy Attorney General Gary Grinder wrote a letter to the editor, which may be read here, in which he defended that the number of cases of prosecutorial misconduct is actually "minuscule," given the fact that the Department of Justice prosecuted more than 720,000 cases and more than 1 million defendants in the time period covered by the study, suggesting that serious prosecutorial misconduct only occurs in approximately 1 in 3,600 cases.

In related news, following the dismissal of the prosecution of late Alaska Senator Ted Stevens, the Department of Justice commenced an investigation of several Department attorneys for potential prosecutorial misconduct. Senator Stevens was killed in a plane crash on August 9, 2010. One of the attorneys under investigation was Assistant U.S. Attorney Nicholas A. Marsh. Marsh, aged 37, committed suicide late last month, as reported in the Louisville Courier-Journal.

U.S. District Judge Emmet Sullivan appointed a special prosecutor to investigate what he called the worst misconduct he had seen in nearly 25 years on the bench. Marsh's attorney issued statements to the media following his death that Marsh was fearful of the investigation preventing him from continuing to work at the Department of Justice, and indicated that Marsh and investigators were actually "on the verge of a successful resolution." The Department has expressed its condolences to Marsh's family, as does the Blog.

 

 

Conrad Black on the Problems of the U.S. Justice and Prison System: Prisoners are "An Ostracized, Voiceless Legion of the Walking Dead"

 

Canadian citizen Conrad Black, former head of Hollinger International, Inc., and once the third biggest newspaper magnate in the world, was charged in the Northern District of Illinois with diverting corporate funds for his own use and was convicted in July of 2007for "honest services" mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1846, and obstruction of justice, following a jury trial. On June 24, 2010, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Black v. U.S., case # 08-876, vacating Black's honest services convictions and remanding his case on the ground that the district court's instruction to the jury on honest services was incorrect. Black was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Center in Coleman, Florida, and was released on bail two weeks ago after spending two years and four months in prison. He remains in the U.S. pending an appeal to return to Canada.

Lord Black's (he was made a member of the House of Lords of the United Kingdom by Queen Elizabeth II and Prime Minister Tony Blair) legal odyssey aside, he has become an observer and critic of the U.S. criminal justice system. Black has kept a diary, which may be viewed here, regarding his experience in prison. Most recently, on July 31, Black published a letter in Canada's National Post entitled "Conrad Black: My Prison Education." Black does pause to criticize his conviction in passing, citing the "fallibility of American justice." However, Black's letter provides a glimpse into life at the end of the tunnel of the federal criminal justice system. Black discusses his daily calls to his wife and his difficulties in getting updates on his application for bail in prison. He recounts the interest of his fellow inmates in the developments and media attention in his case, and rather poignantly describes the lengthy goodbyes from his friends:

"The Mafiosi, the Colombian drug dealers, (including a senator with whom I had a special greeting as a fellow member of a parliamentary upper house), the American drug dealers, high and low, black, white, and Hispanic; the alleged swindlers, hackers, pornographers, credit card fraudsters, bank robbers, and even an accomplished airplane thief; the rehabilitated and unregenerate, the innocent and the guilty, and in almost all cases the grossly over-sentenced, streamed in steadily for hours, to make their farewells."

"Most goodbyes were brief and jovial, some were emotional, and a few were quite heart-rending. Many of the 150 students that my very able fellow tutors and I had helped to graduate from high school, came by, some of them now enrolled in university by cyber-correspondence."

 

Black goes on to criticize harsh federal sentencing policies, especially for drug offenders, citing in particular the disparities in the crack cocaine sentencing Guidelines and their disproportionate impact on African-Americans. He also takes the public defender system to task for being subservient to the will of prosecutors, and laments the United Sates' massive prison population and prison industry in comparison with other Western democracies. Black concludes that "America’s 2.4 million prisoners, and millions more awaiting trial or on supervised release, are an ostracized, voiceless legion of the walking dead; they are no one’s constituency."

 

CTV.ca

 

Chairman of Nation's Largest Mortgage Company Indicted for Bank Fraud and TARP Fraud in Relation to Scheme Against Colonial Bank, SEC Charges Filed

The U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission have brought criminal charges and civil claims against Lee B. Farkas, former Chairman of Taylor, Bean and Whitaker Mortgage Corp. (“Taylor Bean”) for allegedly selling at least $1.5 billion in fictitious and impaired residential mortgage loans to Colonial Bank and its parent company, The Colonial BancGroup, Inc. (“CBG”), according to press releases by the Department of Justice and the SEC, and the SEC’s complaint. Mr. Farkas, a resident of Ocala, Florida, is also charged with attempting to defraud the U.S. Department of Treasury through its Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) by allegedly representing to CBG and the public that Taylor Bean had secured a $300 million equity investment in CBG which would allow CBG and Colonial Bank to qualify for $550 million in TARP funds. The government contends that the investment and prospective TARP grant was a sham.

Taylor Bean was the largest non-depository mortgage lender in the United States by 2008, originating more than $30 billion in mortgage loans. Taylor Bean engaged in the the origination, acquisition, sale and servicing of residential mortgages through a network of local banks and mortgage brokers. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in August of 2009. 
 

Colonial Bank, one of the fifty largest banks in the U.S., has had its own problems. In August of last year, the Alabama State Banking Department seized the bank and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. as receiver. CBG subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and a financial holding company purchased Colonial Bank’s assets and assumed its deposits.

Taylor Bean had a financing arrangement with Colonial Bank to fund the mortgage loans which it originated. Under the agreement, Taylor Bean would represent that the loans were of a certain quality and that there was a commitment from a third-party investor to ultimately purchase the loan. When the investor purchased the loan, Colonial Bank would receive the proceeds to reimburse it for advancing the loan funds.

Colonial Bank and Taylor Bean also had another financing agreement, called an assignment of trade agreement, under which Colonial Bank would purchase a 99 percent interest in a bundled group of mortgage loans, or mortgage-backed securities, which Taylor Bean would issue, market and sell to third parties. Under the agreement, Taylor Bean was required to provide evidence of a binding commitment from a third party investor to purchase the securities.

The government alleges that Taylor Bean began experiencing liquidity problems in 2002. It alleges that Farkas and an unnamed officer of Colonial devised a pattern of “kiting” in which certain debits to Taylor Bean’s warehouse line of credit were not entered until after credits for the following day were entered. As a result of this kiting, Taylor Bean was supposedly overdrawing its accounts with Colonial Bank by approximately $150 million a day.

Farkas and the bank officer, in order to conceal the kiting activity, allegedly devised a scheme in which Taylor Bean would create and submit fictitious loan information to Colonial Bank. In December of 2003, Farkas allegedly directed Taylor Bean to submit approximately $150 million in non-existent loans, which Farkas allegedly referred to as “Plan B,” and impaired loans, which Farkas is alleged to have referred to as the “Crap,” to Colonial Bank for funding.

In 2004, as the loans began to age, in order to conceal them, Farkas and the officer allegedly bundled the loans in fictitious trades to Colonial Bank. Following the trades, Colonial Bank was unable to identify individual loans, or the age of the loans, within the trade. Farkas and the officer then caused information to be submitted to Colonial Bank which would reset the commitment dates on the loans and make the loans appear as if they had only recently been purchased. Farkas also caused Ocala Funding, L.L.C., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Taylor Bean, to divert funds which it received from Freddie Mac and other third parties for purchases of mortgages to Taylor Bean in order to pay down Taylor Bean’s debt to Colonial Bank.

By the close of 2007, Colonial Bank allegedly held $1 billion in impaired loans and $500 million in wholly fictitious, unsecured loans, as a result of Farkas’ and the officer’s conduct. The impaired and fictitious loans caused Colonial Bank to misstate its assets to the SEC and investors.

Finally, in November of 2008, Colonial Bank applied for TARP funds from the U.S. Treasury. The Department of Treasury approved Colonial Bank to receive $550 million in TARP funds on the condition that Colonial Bank increase its equity by $300 million. In 2009, Farkas allegedly approached Colonial Bank to raise the $300 million captial infusion through an investment group. Farkas falsely represented to Colonial Bank that it had found investors to participate in the capital infusion, and created a false stock purchase agreement. Farkas diverted $50 million in funds from an Ocala Investors Account to an escrow account in a move which he allegedly referred to as “Project Squirrel” in order to convince Colonial Bank that Taylor Bean had obtained investors. Colonial Bank entered the stock purchase agreement with Taylor Bean, however both companies subsequently terminated the agreement.

The indictment against Farkas in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia charges him with one count of conspiracy to commit bank, wire and securities fraud; six counts of bank fraud; six counts of wire fraud; and three counts of securities fraud. The SEC complaint alleges violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.
 

Elena Kagan on Criminal Law

President Obama is expected to announce today his nomination of Solicitor General Elena Kagan to succeed Justice John Paul Stevens. Solicitor General Kagan has been one of the presumptive leading choices to replace Justice Stevens ever since the Justice announced that he was stepping down. Ms. Kagan has drawn criticism from both the right and the left of the political spectrum, and the Senate confirmation process is expected to involve some controversy--as it invariably does.

Ms. Kagan's distinguished background is well known. She graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law School in 1986, clerked for Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, worked at the Washington, D.C., law firm of Williams & Connolly, was a professor at the University of Chicago, worked as Associate Counsel and Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy during the Clinton Administration before returning to Harvard as Dean of the Law School in 2001. In March 2009, President Obama named Ms. Kagan as Solicitor General for the United States.

Less well known is Solicitor General Kagan's views on criminal law. As Professor Douglas Berman of Ohio State University School of Law observes on his blog, Ms. Kagan lacks much of a record on criminal law issues which routinely come before the court.

There are indeed very few reported criminal cases which Ms. Kagan has been involved with during her career. Interestingly, many of the cases that do exist have gone against Ms. Kagan or against the government. While at Williams & Connolly, Ms. Kagan represented the defendant-appellant in the appeal of  U.S. v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1990) before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in which the Court held that the defendant, who was both a bank officer and attorney, possessed no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank documents which were not found in his office, since banking is a closely-regulated business and the documents were subject to routine inspection by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Much later, in Kucana v. Holder,130 S.Ct. 827 (2010), the Supreme Court held, contrary to the position of the Solicitor General, that motions to reopen immigration proceedings before the Board of Immigration Appeals were subject to judicial review. Next, in Johnson v. U.S., 130 S.Ct. 1265 (2010), the Court reversed the petitioner's conviction for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon under 18 United States Code Section 922(g)(1), holding that the petitioner's conviction for simple battery under Florida was not a "violent felony" which could be used to enhance the petitioner's sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act in 18 United States Code Section 924. In addition, as we have noted, the Court also ruled against the Administration in Bloate v. U.S., 130 S.Ct. 1345 (2010) in holding that time spent preparing pretrial motions is not automatically excludable from the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161 et seq. And most recently, in U.S. v. Stevens, --- S.Ct. ----, 2010 WL 1540082 (April 20, 2010), the Court found against Solicitor General Kagan in holding that 18 United States Code Section 4, which criminalized  the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty, was substantially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.

The lack of an extensive background in criminal issues is certainly no barrier to a potential distinguished and exceptional service as a Supreme Court justice. Indeed, it is hoped that the contrary results and setbacks which Solicitor General Kagan has experienced in her few forays into the field have encouraged a more nuanced and open minded view on criminal issues, or at least one that is not a mere rubber stamp of law enforcement and government actions.

Federal District Courts Taking Increasing Advantage of Sentencing Discretion in Wake of U.S. v. Booker; 41.2% of Sentences Nationwide in 2009 Were Below Recommended Sentencing Guidelines Ranges

The New Jersey Law Journal contains an article concerning the continuing struggles of federal district courts to come to terms with the discretion which the Supreme Court granted to them in sentencing in U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The article notes that the courts continue to follow the Guidelines, but that there has been a trend away from strict adherence to the Guidelines.

Statistics show that in 2009, slightly more than one half--56.8 percent--of federal sentences were within the sentencing ranges recommended by the Guidelines--down from 61.7 percent in 2006. However, the percentage of sentences within the recommended Guidelines range varies from district to district--from a low of 27.8 percent for the District of Arizona and 30.8 percent for the District of Vermont to a high of 80.7 percent for the Southern District of Mississippi and 92.3 percent for the District for the Northern Mariana Islands. Nationwide, courts varied downward from the recommended Guidelines ranges in 41.2 percent of cases. Statistics also show that courts were most likely to adhere to advisory Guidelines ranges in drug and burglary cases, and least likely in kidnapping or bribery cases.

The article quotes Professor Douglas Berman of Ohio State University and the author of the influential Sentencing Law and Policy blog, who notes that the Supreme Court has consistently upheld district judges' exercise of their post-Booker sentencing discretion.

Justice John Paul Stevens on Criminal Law

Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, who notified President Barack Obama last week that he will be stepping down from the Court when its current term is over in June or July, has written nearly 400 opinions over his nearly 35 year tenure on the Court. Justice Stevens has weighed in on many occasions on criminal law issues over the past three and a half decades. Contrary to the label commonly applied to Justice Stevens as a "liberal," like all Supreme Court Justices, he has sided with the government in criminal cases more often than not. However, Justice Stevens has been the originator of many opinions which have upheld and furthered the rights of the individual in criminal cases, some of the more notable of which are outlined below.

On sentencing issues, Justice Stevens authored the opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the forerunner of the Court's landmark decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 295 (2004) andUnited States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), in which the Court first famously held, in regard to New Jersey's "hate crimes" statute, that "[t]he Constitution requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."

Justice Stevens also issued the Court's opinion in Gall v. U.S., 552 U.S. 38 (2007), which sets forth the definitive current process for federal criminal sentencing. The Court in Gall held that district courts cannot consider the ranges recommended by the  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as presumptively reasonable, must consider the extent of any departure or variance from the sentencing range recommended by the Guidelines, and must explain the appropriateness of any unusual variance, and that appellate courts review all sentences imposed by a district court under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, reviewing for any significant procedural errors and for substantive reasonableness of the sentence. To calculate a defendant's sentence, a district court must first correctly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, then should consider all of the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and if the court determines to sentence the defendant outside the advisory Guidelines range, it must consider the extent of the deviation and adequately explain the sentence.
 
In regard to searches under the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stevens held that a search of a vehicle incident to a defendant's arrest could not be justified under circumstances where the defendant no longer had access to the vehicle in In Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009). And while he upheld the police search in Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (1987), Justice Stevens wrote legal dicta which has formed the basis for many challenges to the scope of a search of areas which are not specified in a search warrant. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Court affirmed that a man's home is truly his castle, and that the police may not make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to effectuate an arrest.

Justice Stevens has been an ardent opponent of capital punishment throughout most of his term on the Court and has been the author of numerous opinions limiting the application of the death penalty. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Court held that execution of "mentally retarded" offenders constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), ruled that juveniles under the age of 16 cannot possess the requisite culpability for imposition of the death penalty. And in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) the court mandated that, in capital cases, the jury must be instructed on, and permitted to consider, a verdict of guilt on a lesser included offense.

 In other cases, Justice Steven held in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), that a State could not impose the burden on a defendant claiming a racially discriminatory striking of a juror pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, to show that the striking was "more likely than not" the product of purposeful discrimination. He also held, in Hubbard v. U.S., 514 U.S. 695 (1995), that a federal court is not a department or agency of the United States for the purposes of making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

 The Blog wishes Justice Stevens a happy retirement and looks forward to the appointment of his successor.

Eleventh Circuit Hears Arguments From NFL and Retired Players in Appeal Over Suit Arising From $11 Million Ponzi Scheme

Today's Fulton County Daily Report contains a story concerning Tuesday's oral arguments before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in an appeal by retired professional football players against the National Football League and the NFL Players Association. The former players are seeking to reverse a ruling last year dismissing the players' suit against the NFL and the Player's Association regarding a Ponzi scheme by an alleged broker and financial advisor, Kirk S. Wright, with whom the players had invested millions of dollars.

The plaintiffs allege the Player's Association allowed Wright to be placed on a list of approved financial advisors. The plaintiffs allege that a background check would have revealed multiple liens against Wright and his business partner, Nelson "Keith" Bond, and that neither Wright or Bond were licensed financial advisors in any state. Wright was convicted for fraud and money laundering in 2006. He is alleged to have defrauded investors, including professional athletes, entrepreneurs and his very own mother, of approximately $150 million.

The plaintiffs invested a total of $11 million with Wright and Bond and their partnership, IMA. Wright committed suicide in a jail in Union City, Georgia, three days after he was convicted. IMA is in bankruptcy. A staggering 170 lawsuits have been filed seeking restitution as a result of Wright's activities, including by investment firms Lehman Brothers Inc., Oppenheimer & Co. Inc., J.B. Oxford & Co., Banc of America Securities LLD and TD Ameritrade Inc., and law firm Gambrell & Russell.

The plaintiffs include retired players Steve Atwater, Blaine Bishop, Carlos Emmons, Clyde Simmons and Al Smith. Atwater was a free safety for the Denver Broncos and New York Jets from 1989 to 1999; Bishop was a safety for the Houston Oilers, Tennessee Titans and Philadelphia Eagles from 1993 to 2002; Emmons was a linebacker for the Pittsburgh Steelers, the Eagles and the New York Giants from 1996 to 2006;Simmons was a defensive end for the Eagles, the Arizona Cardinals, the Jacksonville Jaguars, the Cincinnati Bengals and the Chicago Bears from 1986 to 2000;  and Smith was a linebacker for the Oilers from 1987 to 1996. "Assassin" Atwater in particular is a two time Superbowl winner with the Broncos, an eight-time Pro Bowl selectee, a two-time First Team All-Pro Selectee who has been considered for the Pro Football Hall of Fame. The players' filed suit against the NFL and the Players' Association in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. However, in March of 2009, District Judge Julie E. Carnes dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.

Image may be subject to copyright

The plaintiffs' attorneys argued to the panel, which included Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat and Judge David M. Ebel, a visiting Senior Judge from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, that the District Court's order deprived the players of any remedy and effectively gave the NFL and the Player's Association immunity. The panel pointed out that the players' collective bargaining agreement appeared to pre-empt the players from filing suit. Counsel for the players' union countered that the plaintiff's failed to inquire with the Players' Association regarding Wright prior to investing millions of dollars with him. The case turns on whether the retired players are still governed by the collective bargaining agreement, which would bar their suit against the NFL and the Players' Association since it provides that players are solely responsible for their own finances.

 

It's April First

April Fool's Day is not listed among the "legal holidays" in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)(6). The courts do not close when April 1 falls on a weekday. It cannot be excluded in calculating the amount of time one has to file a response to a motion (even a frivolous one). In general, the law takes little or no notice of this occasion for hoaxes and practical jokes and when it does, it is typically not amused.

Furthermore, few noteworthy April 1 pranks surface in caselaw, especially criminal caselaw. The exact origin of the occasion is lost in history, but there are 16th century references to Dutch noblemen sending servants on "fool's errands" on the first day of April, and 17th century English writer John Aubrey referred to April 1 as the "Fooles holy day."

There is, however, one criminal law development on April 1, which should be more widely known than it likely is. On that date, a former Army Corporal received five year court sentence for treason. He ended up serving only eight months, however.

The defendant, perhaps the most infamous defendant to ever answer in a court of law, was Adolph Hitler, leader of the National Socialist German Worker's Party, or Nazi Party, who had been arrested for organizing the "Beer Hall Putsch," or coup d'etat, in Munich, Bavaria, in an effort to overthrow the German Weimar government. The coup was so named because Hitler and members of the SA, or "brownshirts,"  the paramilitary wing of the Nazi Party, initiated it when the conspirators stormed a Munich beer hall where the Bavarian Commissioner and other officials were making speeches to a crowd of about 3,000. Hitler proclaimed a revolution and called on various officials, the police and the Army to rally to his side. The police and the military were unmoved, and 16 SA members were killed by soldiers in a conflict at the Odeonplatz the following day. The SA members were led by General Erich Ludendorff, a hero of the First World War, who had allied himself with Hitler in order to overthrow the Weimar government. General Ludendorff had marched directly into hostile fire while Hitler fled the conflagration, gaining him a reputation as a coward.

Hitler was arrested two days after the putsch. Hitler, Ludendorff, Ernst Rohm, leader of the SA, and other leaders were arrested and charged with high treason to be tried by a panel of judges. Coincidentally, the presiding Judge, Georg Neithardt, had seen defendant Hitler before--having sentenced Hitler to a three month sentence in 1921 for disrupting a meeting of the Bavarian legislature with members of the SA (Hitler only served one month). The trial began on February 26, 1924, and lasted a month. Hitler used the trial as a vehicle to deliver incendiary speeches which were reported in the papers. Judge Neihardt allowed Hitler to run the trial, and showed sympathy for the defendants. Ludendorff was acquitted and Rohm was convicted but released. Hitler served less than a year at Landsberg am Lech prison in Bavaria, where he and Ruldolph Hess composed Hitler's manifesto, Mein Kampf.

Hitler's experience during the putsch and the subsequent trial caused him to realize that legal methods were the way to seizing power, as opposed to violent revolution. He would become Chancellor and dictator of Germany through political alliances and machinations less than ten years after his release, and would become the catalyst for history's costliest war and the mastermind of its most unspeakable genocide six years later. Much of history would have been different and many lives spared had those Bavarian judges sentenced the defendant thug and agitator--who had a previous criminal history--to the sentence recommended by the German statute for "high treason"--ten years to life imprisonment. It was the last time history's most notorious mass murderer would ever be subject to the rule of law.

 

 

 

Oral Arguments in Skilling Case Focus on Jury Selection Issues, Less Emphasis on Honest Services Fraud

According to Lyle Denniston at SCOTUSblog,  Ashby Jones at the Wall Street Journal Law Blog, and Professor Ellen S. Podgor of Stetson University College of Law and the White Collar Crime Prof Blog, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed more interested in the jury selection/fair trial issues in yesterday's oral arguments in the case of former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling, Skilling v. U.S., Case No. 08-1394 then it did in the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 1346, the federal honest services fraud statute. The transcript of the oral argument may be read here. After lengthy questioning regarding the jury selection at Skilling's trial by Justice Stephen G. Breyer and others, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., raised the question of honest services. Skilling's counsel, Sri Srinivasan, appeared to have adopted the strategy of arguing for a new trial based upon juror bias relating to the Enron scandal rather than a reversal of Skilling's convictions for honest services fraud. Srinivasan argued that the Department of Justice was interpreting the law broadly enough to reach virtually any falsehood told by an employee.

Deputy Solicitor General Michael R. Dreeben argued for the government. Dreeben argued ways in which the Court could interpret the honest services fraud statute in order to avoid holding it unconstitutionally vague. Justice Anthony Kennedy stated to Dreeben that it was Congress' job to rewrite the statute and Justice Antonin Scalia remarked on the excessive scope of the statute.

The Court's decision in the case is expected this spring or summer. The parties' arguments regarding honest services fraud largely mirrored the arguments in the two other challenges to 1346 which the Court had heard this term. Commentators have opined that 1346 may not survive without being sent to Congress for reshaping.

Rothstein Enters Guilty Plea

Of course we knew it was coming, but disbarred Fort Lauderdale attorney Scott Rothstein, architect of a $1.2 billion Ponzi scheme selling phony interests in settlements in employment and civil cases, pled guilty today in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida to charges of racketeering, fraud and money laundering,

as reported by the Miami Herald

and various other sources. Rothstein was also charged with taking monies from client trust accounts and making unlawful campaign contributions to politicians. Former attorneys and employees of Rothstein's former law firm, Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, are currently being investigated for illegal campaign contributions.


Following his surrender to authorities last fall, Rothstein assisted authorities in locating assets. His sentencing hearing has been set for May 6.


 

Defendant in Stock Option Backdating Case Requests Hearing Based on Prosecutorial Misconduct/Interference with Witnesses

As reported by Law.com, Bruce Karatz, Chief Executive Officers of KB Home, a home construction corporation based in Los Angeles, California, was indicted in the action of U.S. v. Nicholas, 2:09-cr-00203-ODW (C.D.Ca. 2009), on 20 counts of fraud for defrauding the company and its shareholders of millions of dollars in undisclosed backdated stock option over a period of seven years, and concealing the fraud from KB Home's  directors, compensation committee and shareholders. Karatz's trial in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California is scheduled to begin on February 23.

Karatz's attorneys have requested a hearing regarding whether prosecutorial misconduct has tainted the government's case against Karatz. Karatz contends that two witnesses for the government--James Johnson, former Chairman of the Board of Directors' Compensation Committee for KB Home, and Gary Ray, former Vice President of Human Resources--initially believed that the stock options grant practice was lawful, but changed their position following contacts with the prosecution. Karatz's lawyers want to examine Johnson regarding why he denied allegedly defending KB Home's option granting process during an internal investigation by the company's outside counsel in his statements to prosecutors. 

The defense also wants to question Ray, who has pled guilty to obstruction of justice and is cooperating with the government, regarding why he had allegedly previously maintained that the process was "lawful and proper." Following is a link to

Karatz's Motion for Evidentiary Hearing Regarding Testimony of Crucial Witnesses

.


Karatz's motion is based on an order in December by U.S. District Judge Cormac Carney in the action of U.S. v. Nicholas, SACR 08-00139 CJC (C.D.Ca. 2008), another backdating case, in which the Court dismissed the government's indictment against co-founder of Broadcom Corp., Henry Nicholas, and former Broadcom Chief Financial Officer William Ruehle, blasting the prosecution for "distorting the truth-finding process" by intimidating and improperly influencing key witnesses. Karatz also relies on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' overturning last August of the conviction of former Chief Executive Officer for Brocade Communication Systems, Inc., Gregory Reyes, for backdating based on false statements by the prosecution in closing arguments that Brocade's finance department didn't know about backdating. A hearing on Karatz's motion has been scheduled for February 8.

Chief Justice John Roberts Issues Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary; Judiciary "Operating Soundly"; New Criminal Cases at Highest Levels Since 1932

As the final hours of 2009 were running out on New Years' Eve, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts issued the Chief Justice's Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, available here, a tradition begun by Chief Justice Warren Burger in 1970 to address the most critical needs of the federal judiciary. The Chief Justice has used the Year-End Report in the past to call for salary increases for federal judges. However, this year, the Report merely states that the federal courts are operating soundly, citing the hardships experienced by the nation in 2009.

The Appendix to the Report surveys the workload of the federal courts in 2009. It notes that the total number of cases filed in the Supreme Court decreased by about 6.1% from 2007 to 2008, however the Court hear more cases argued and issued more signed opinions in 2008 than 2007. Filings in the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals also declined 6% to 57,740, mostly due to a drop in appeals from the Board of Immigration Appeals.

The Year-End Report notes, however, that criminal case filings in federal district courts rose 8% to 76,655, and the number of defendants climbed 6% to 97,982, surpassing the previous record for the number of defendants, 92,714, set in 2003, and reached its highest level since 1932. Filings relating to immigration, fraud, marijuana trafficking, and sex offenses increased. The number of mmigration cases and defendants reached record levels, as a result of illegal re-entries and visa or entry permit fraud. Most of the increase was in five federal districts near the southwestern border. The Report also observes that, as of September 30, 2009, the number of persons under post-conviction supervision was 124,183, an increase of 3% from the previous year. Supervised release cases and pretrial services cases also rose by several percent.

Professor Podgor on Judge Sotomayor on White Collar Criminal Law

Professor Ellen S. Podgor of Stetson University College of Law made an excellent post yesterday on the White Collar Crime Prof Blog surveying Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge and Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor's white collar criminal opinions. Professor Podgor perused some 100 cases involving Judge Sotomayor and the term "fraud." She came to the conclusion that, at least as far as the sphere of criminal law goes, Judge Sotomayor is hardly a "liberal" or "activist" judge, siding with the government the vast majority of the time. Professor Podgor notes that in cases where Judge Sotomayor has shown favor towards the defense, it has been because of obvious errors.

Justice Souter on Criminal Law

 

            Supreme Court Justice David Hackett Souter has announced his intention to retire at the end of the Court’s term in June. In his 19 years on the Court, Justice Souter has been a key vote in many cases and has written over 150 majority, plurality, concurring and dissenting opinions, including in many criminal cases. In the area of criminal law, Justice Souter has issued numerous opinions fairly consistently advancing the rights of defendants at all stages of criminal proceedings. Federal Criminal Defense Blog salutes Justice Souter and his highly distinguished tenure on the Court by listing some of his significant opinions in the criminal arena, beginning today with majority and plurality opinions.

            Criminal defense attorneys everywhere will be familiar with Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) in which the Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Souter, reversed the defendant’s conviction and held that a state prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police, and has a duty to turn over all exculpatory evidence to the defense, pursuant to  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). And in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), Justice Souter authored a majority opinion holding that warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) given to a defendant in the middle of an interrogation are ineffective and any statements given during the interrogation are inadmissible. And in Corley v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 1558 (2009) discussed on this Blog, Justice Souter delivered the majority’s opinion that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 does not alter the rule that confessions made during periods of detention which violate the prompt presentment requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) are inadmissible pursuant to the rule of McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).

            Justice Souter had Georgia on his mind early in his career on the Court when he delivered the unanimous opinion for the Court in Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991), in which the majority held that the Georgia Supreme Court erred in concluding that the petitioner’s claim pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which prohibits racially-based exercise of peremptory challenges by the prosecution, was untimely pursuant to State v. Sparks, 257 Ga. 97, 98, 355 S.E.2d 658, 659 (1987), in which the Georgia Supreme Court held that a Batson objection must be made within the period of the jurors’ selection and the administration of their oaths, because the Sparks rule was not “firmly established and regularly followed” at the time of the petitioner’s trial. In Wade v. U.S., 504 U.S. 181 (1992), Justice Souter, again writing for a unanimous Court, held that federal district courts have the authority to review the government’s refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion and to grant a remedy if they find that the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive. Justice Souter authored the majority opinion in Old Chief v. U.S., 519 U.S. 172 (1997), in which the Court reversed the petitioner’s conviction for  possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), holding that a district court abuses its discretion where it refuses a defendant’s offer to concede a prior judgment under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and admits the full judgment over the defendant’s objection. In Shepard v. U.S., 544 U.S. 13 (2005) he wrote a majority opinion holding that in applying the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e), a sentencing courtcannot look to police reports or complaint applications to determine whether an earlier guilty plea necessarily admits, and supports a conviction for, generic burglary. Justice Souter wrote the majority’s holding in Watson v. U.S., 128 S.Ct. 579 (2007) that a person who trades drugs for a gun does not receive the gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which provides for a mandatory minimum sentence where a defendant uses a firearm during a drug trafficking crime.

            Less pro-defense, Justice Souter authored the majority opinion in U.S. v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997) which held that material of falsehood was not an element of making false statements to a federally insured bank under 18 U.S.C. § 1014. And he rejected the petitioner’s arguments that 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), which proscribes bribery of State and local officials of entities, was unconstitutional because of a lack of any jurisdictional requirement of a connection to federal money in Sabri v. U.S., 541 U.S. 600 (2004), holding that the statute was an instance of necessary and proper legislation.

 

Supreme Court Curtails Money Laundering

I apologize for being away from the blogging world for the past 2 weeks, but the press of business has kept me too busy. There are many noteworthy developments in the blogosphere, but none more important to the criminal practitioner than the Supreme Court's decision yesterday on the landscape of money laundering.

The Supreme Court in United States v. Santos, -- S.Ct. --, 2008 WL 2229212, (available here) affirmed the Seventh Circuit in holding that the term “proceeds” in 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1) means “profits,” not “receipts.” Efrain Santos was found guilty of running an illegal lottery business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955, and money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (h). He was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment for the illegal gambling charges and 210 months on the money laundering charges. Following affirmance on direct appeal, Santos filed a section 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, ultimately alleging in part, that that his payments to customers and collectors of his illegal operation did not constitute money laundering. United States v. Santos, 342 F.Supp.2d 781 (N.D. Ind. 2004). The district court granted Santos’ 2255 motion finding that Judge Easterbrook’s decision in United States v. Scialabba, 282 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2002), controlled, and that the “proceeds” of an illegal gambling business under 1956 means “net” proceeds, not the ongoing monies used to conduct the illegal business in the first place. That decision was affirmed on appeal. Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d 886 (7th Circuit 2006), and the government appealed to the Supreme Court.

            Justice Scalia writing for the majority held that “proceeds” under section 1956 means “profits,” not the ongoing “receipts” of the illegal business. Justice Scalia adds “a word concerning the stare decisis effect of JUSTICE STEVENS’ [concurring] opinion.” 2008 WL 2229212, * 10. Because Justice Stevens’ vote was necessary to the Court’s judgment, but since it rested on a narrower ground, the Santos opinion is, accordingly, limited. Therefore, so that there will be no mistake as to the meaning of his opinion, Justice Scalia stakes out the exact contours – “that ‘proceeds’ means ‘profits’ when there is no legislative history to the contrary.” Id.

            So, why is this opinion so important to us – because the government routinely uses money laundering to jack up a defendants’ sentence, if the defendant chooses to go to trial. Look at the effect on Santos – 60 months for gambling, but 210 months for money laundering. This decision  effects many former and current cases. We should be looking through our inventory of cases to see what meritorious 2255 motions lie therein.

Overview of Georgia's Military Criminal Justice System

     Except for the United States Coast Guard, every branch of the United States military possesses personnel and bases within the State of Georgia: Fort Benning, Fort Gillem, Fort Gordon, Fort McPherson, Fort Stewart, Hunter Army Airfield, and Lawson Army Airfield for the United States Army; the Atlanta Naval Air Station and King's Bay Naval Submarine Base for the United States Navy; the Albany Marine Corps Logistics Base for the United States Marine Corps; and Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Moody Air Force Base and Robins Air Force Base for the United States Air Force. Although the vast majority of servicemen and women serve their country dutifully, honorably and without any mark whatsoever on their record, occasionally military personnel do become involved in criminal activity, and the United States armed services have a well established justice system to deal with such activity.

     Firstly, each armed services branch has its own military police force, the Military Police Corps for the Army, the Master-at-Arms for the Navy, the Provost Marshal’s Office for the Marines and the Air Force Security Forces (there also are separate United States Department of Defense police forces for each branch, which are concerned with security). Each service further has its own department for criminal investigations: the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID), the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI). The Army CID 3rd MP Group and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory are based at Fort Gillem, and Air Force OSI maintains units at all Georgia Air Force bases.

     If an investigation indicates criminal conduct by a serviceman or woman, a court martial is convened by a commanding authority at the facility where the serviceman or woman is located. Court martial proceedings are adversarial proceedings, similar to federal criminal cases, and a serviceman or woman may be represented by counsel, present evidence and confront witnesses. Courts martial are Article I, or legislative, as opposed to Article III, courts.

     There are three types of courts martial: summary court martial, for minor charges, in which a member of the Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) Corps for the particular military branch acts as both prosecutor and defense counsel; special court martial, for offenses not resulting in a sentence of confinement of more than 1 year, which involves a military judge, prosecutor and a panel of at least three officers or enlisted personnel who serve as a jury; and general court martial for serious crimes carrying severe punishment, including the death penalty, with a judge, prosecutor and panel (military servicemen and women are not included within the Sixth Amendment’s right to jury trial by longstanding practice). A serviceman or woman is entitled to be represented by counsel in any court martial proceeding, and can obtain free appointed counsel, or may retain civilian counsel. The defense may further challenge the makeup of a court martial panel, and request that up to one-third of the panel be composed of enlisted personnel, as opposed to officers. Court martial proceedings are governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); the Manual for Courts-Martial, which expands upon the UCMJ, and the Military Rules of Evidence.

     A serviceman or woman may appeal an adjudication of guilt or sentence to an intermediate military appellate court, including the Army Court of Criminal Appeals, Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeal and the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals. Adverse decisions from these intermediate appellate courts may be further appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in Washington, and the United States Supreme Court. Subjects of courts martial proceedings have also increasingly sought relief from United States district courts.

Medellin v. Texas: The Effect on International Law on Domestic Criminal Law and Procedure

            Defense counsel with foreign clients will not be pleased with the latest offering from the United States Supreme Court and its take on international law. José Ernesto Medellín, a Mexican national, was convicted and sentenced in a Texas state court for the capital murder of two girls. Fortunately, Mexico brought an action in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague against the United States on behalf of Medellin’s and 51 other Mexican nationals in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.), 2004 I. C. J. 12 (Judgment of Mar. 31) (Avena). The ICJ held that, based on violations of the Vienna Convention, the nationals were entitled to review and reconsideration of their convictions and sentences in state courts in the United States, regardless of whether the defendants had waived their rights to raise challenges under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention or Convention) for failure to comply with generally-applicable state rules governing challenges to criminal convictions. President George W. Bush even showed his support for the international tribunal by issuing a Memorandum to the Attorney General in which he directed that the United States discharge its international obligations by having State courts give effect to Avena. Medellin did not raise any Vienna Convention claims prior to his conviction. After the state court dismissed Medellin’s petition for writ of habeas corpus to raise his Vienna Convention claims, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Medellin v. Texas.

            Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, recognized that the Vienna Convention, which had been ratified by the United States, guarantees that a person detained by a foreign country may require authorities of the detaining country to inform consular authorities of the detainee’s home country, and that the detainee may request assistance from the consul of his country. Furthermore, “Optional Protocol” of the Convention provides that disputes arising out of an interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.

            The majority acknowledged that the ICJ’s decision in Avena constituted an international law obligation on the United States. However, it held that “not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law enforceable in United States courts.” It noted that there was a distinction between treaties which automatically have effect as domestic law and those which do not and that treaties do not become domestic law “‘unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.’” (Citing Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F. 3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005)). The majority concluded that “[b]ecause none of these treaty sources creates binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists… the Avena judgment is not automatically binding domestic law.”

            The Court held that the Convention’s Optional Protocal was a “bare grant of jurisdiction,” which said nothing about the effect of ICJ decisions and did not require signatories to comply with ICJ judgments. It noted that the Convention itself merely represented a “commitment” by member nations to comply with an ICJ decision, and that there was no indication that Congress, in ratifying the United Nations Charter, ever intended to vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in U.S. courts. Also, the fact that the ICJ was required to enforce its judgments through the U.N. Security Council, on which the United States possesses a veto, indicated that its decisions were not immediately and directly binding in the U.S. Finally, the majority held that the President could not convert a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one by merely issuing a Memorandum. Justices Breyer, Souter and Ginsburg, naturally, dissented.