Posted on May 1, 2008 by Anthony Lake

United States v. Livesay: Sentencing Courts Have Some Explaining to Do

     Despite the substantial deference granted to sentencing courts pursuant to Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. ----, 128 S.Ct. 586 (2007), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals will still expect unusual sentences to be supported by good reasons in the record. Kenneth K. Livesay was the Assistant Controller and Chief Information Officer of HealthSouth Corporation, who was involved in a conspiracy to inflate HealthSouth's revenues by making false statements on HealthSouth's books and in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which resulted in losses of $1.4 billion to investors after the fraud was discovered and HealthSouth's stock plummeted. Livesay pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud and falsification of financial information, and the government filed a motion for downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, based on Livesay's cooperation and substantial assistance.
     Livesay's recommended sentencing level was 28 and the government recommended a three level departure in its 5K1.1 motion to level 25 and a sentence of 60 months imprisonment. The sentencing court, however, apparently harbored considerably more lenient views towards Livesay, and granted the government's motion and departed downward 18 levels to a level 10, and sentenced Livesay to 60 months probation with the first six months to be served on home detention.
     The government appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. See United States v. Livesay, 484 F.3d 1324, 1325-26 (11th Cir.2007). On resentencing, the government again filed a 5K1.1 motion, but in light of Livesay's continued substantial assistance since the first sentencing, recommended 20 months' imprisonment. The sentencing court again granted the government's motion and again imposed a sentence of 60 months probation with 6 months home detention, finding that Livesays assistance was extraordinary and warranted an extraordinary departure. The Court further stated that, even without the downward departure, it would have made the same variance under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) based upon the factors under 18 U.S.C. s 3553(a). Another appeal followed, and the United States Supremen Court eventually remanded to the Eleventh Circuit for reconsideration pursuant to Gall. See Livesay v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 128 S.Ct. 872, 872-73 (2008).
     The Eleventh Circuit noted that a “‘sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’” United State v. Livesay, No. 06-11303, 2008 WL 1810195 (11th Cir., April 23, 2008) (quoting United States v. Agbai, 497 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th Cir.2007); quoting Rita v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 127 S.Ct. 2456 (2007)). held that the sentencing court committed procedural  error pursuant to Gall by considering Livesay's repudiation or withdrawal from the conspiracy in determining the extent of the departure pursuant to 5K1.1, since withdrawal is not one of the factors enumerated under 5K1.1. Id. at *9. The Court further held that the sentencing court also committed Gall procedural error by failing to adequately explain its variance from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range in a way which would allow for meaningful appellate review, noting that the lower court had offered:

[N]o explanation or reasoning of how a sentence of 60 months’ probation (with 6 months' home detention) for an individual who pled guilty to knowingly playing an active and crucial supervisory role in a massive $1.4 billion fraud for at least five years reflected the seriousness of the offense or the nature and circumstances of the crime. The district court did not state or explain in any way why it rejected the government's argument that, notwithstanding Livesay's timely assistance, Livesay should receive “some sentence of significance” in this $1.4 billion fraud scheme because he was a “key player, a significant cog, in the operation of this fraud at HealthSouth for a number of years.”

Id. at *11.


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Posted on March 14, 2008 by Thomas Withers

More on Crack v. Powder from the Eleventh Circuit

Continuing to troll the waters post-Kimbrough, the Eleventh Circuit reconsidered its earlier rejection of the defendant’s crack v. powder claim in U.S. v. Stratton, No.06-10080 (Eleventh Cir. Mar. 13, 2008). The Eleventh Circuit stated that it was reconsidering its earlier rejection of Stratton’s claim that the crack/powder sentencing disparity may be a factor in determining reasonableness. The case was remanded to the district court for the limited purpose of permitting the district court to consider the 3553 factors in light of Kimbrough. There is some hope for sentencing sanity in crack cases.

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Posted on March 6, 2008 by Thomas Withers

United States v. Pugh: Limiting Sentencing Courts' Deference and Discretion Under Gall v. United States

 

In United States v. Pugh, No. 07-10183, 2008 WL 253040, *9, *12 (11th Cir., January 31, 2008), the Eleventh Circuit in a careful analysis ruled that a child pornographer would not get a probationary sentence.  This decision could be summed up as follows: this guy is not getting probation.

Relying on its decisions in United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir.2006) and United States v. McBride, No. 06-16544, 2007 WL 4555205, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec.28, 2007) and the Supreme Court’s instruction in Booker and Gall to consider the § 3553(a) factors and the “totality of the circumstances,” has greatly reduced the discretion granted to sentencing courts by holding that a sentence may be “substantively unreasonable” where it is (1) grounded on one of the § 3553(a) factors, (2) relies on “impermissible” factors, or (3) fails to consider other “relevant” or “pertinent” § 3553(a) factors. Most importantly, “the district court must give some weight to the factors in a manner that is at least loosely commensurate with their importance to the case, and in a way that “achieve[s] the purposes of sentencing stated in § 3553(a).” Id. *21. Ergo—appellate courts can still second-guess a sentencing court and reverse where they disagree with the lower court regarding the factors or grounds considered in imposing sentence, or the weight given to any particular factor or ground. The Court rephrased the standard of review set forth in Gall, holding that remand is appropriate where the Court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at *9. It referred to the failure to consider particular grounds or factors, or to give such grounds or factors the appropriate weight, as determined by the appellate court, as “symptoms” of an unreasonable sentence. Id. at *12.

Admittedly, Pugh was extremely bad case for examining reasonable variances from the Guidelines range under Gall—Pugh plead guilty to possessing extremely graphic images of child pornography, and the sentencing court varied downward from an advisory Guidelines range of 97 to 120 months to a non-custodial sentence based on the fact that Pugh had no significant criminal history, that his possession of child pornography was “passive,” that he had reported his receipt of child pornography, that he was not a pedophile, that he was addicted to adult pornography and not child pornography, and that he had entered into treatment. Id. at *5. However, the Eleventh Circuit, in reversing the sentence imposed by the district court as substantively unreasonable, further took the opportunity to minimize the importance of § 3553(a) factors heavily relied upon by defendants, namely “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), while critiquing the failure of the sentence imposed by the district court to account for other § 3553(a) factors which would support a sentence within the range recommended by the Guidelines and by the government. Id. at *12-*18.

A warning in the wake of Pugh: failure to consider sentencing factors which the Court of Appeals would consider important, or to give those factors the weight which the Court of Appeals would, could be “symptoms” of a Pugh reversal.

Finally, for an excellent discussion of the effect of Gall and Kimbrough in future sentencings check out this new blog from Ohio State University.

 

 

 

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Posted on March 4, 2008 by Anthony Lake

McBride & Other Post-Gall Eleventh Circuit Decisions

 

 

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Pugh, No. 07-10183, 2008 WL 253040 (11th Cir., January 31, 2008) is interestingly at odds with the result in its decision in United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007), decided about a month before Pugh.

In McBride, in which the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s downward departure from a recommended Sentencing Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months to impose an 84-month sentence on the defendant, who pled guilty to distributing child pornography, because the defendant’s father had been murdered, the defendant had been physically and sexually abused as a child, suffered from various health problems and had enrolled in a sexual treatment program.

Although the Court did not cite Gall, it rejected the government’s argument on appeal that “although the district court discussed many of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, it failed to give proper weight to some while overemphasizing others,” id. at 1297, holding that the Court:

[W]ill only reverse a procedurally proper sentence if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case,”

id. Similarly, a string of post-Gall, unpublished, decisions of the Court of Appeals prior to Pugh accorded substantial deference to sentencing courts’ decisions as to which factors under § 3553(a) to base a sentence upon, and the weight to be given a particular factor. See United States v. Mole, No. 07-12266, 2008 WL 216082, *2 (11th Cir., January 28, 2008) (unpublished) (“[N]othing in Bookeror elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors”); United States v. Kivett, No. 07-10202, 2008 WL 185502, *6 (11th Cir., January 23, 2008) (unpublished) (“The district court need not recite a laundry list of the § 3553(a) factors; rather, some indication in the record that the court adequately and properly considered the applicable advisory Guidelines range and the § 3533(a) sentencing factors is sufficient”); United States v. Ramirez, No. 07-13060, 2008 WL 185509, *2 (11th Cir., January 23, 2008) (unpublished) (“‘The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court[,]’ and we ‘will not substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant factors because ‘our review is not de novo’”); United States v. Arneto-Anaya, No. 07-12427, 2008 WL 142022, *2 (11th Cir., January 16, 2008) (unpublished) (same); United States v. Caisano-Guapi, No. 07-13520, 2008 WL 114878, (11th Cir., January 14, 2008) (unpublished). However, unlike McBride or Pugh, these cases involved sentences within the recommended Guidelines ranges, or upward departures or variances.
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Posted on March 3, 2008 by Anthony Lake

Probationary Sentence Affirmed in United States v. Anderson

Despite the apparent limitation in Pugh, No. 07-10183 (11th Cir. Jan. 31, 2008) of a sentencing courts' discretion to grant downward variances from the ranges recommended by the United States Sentencing Guidelines, we are happy to note that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals continues to affirm downward variances in deference to sentencing courts’ determinations (albeit if only through unpublished opinions).

  • In United States v. Anderson, the defendant pled guilty to one count of insider trading from which the defendant profited approximately $135,000. No. 07-11848, 2008 WL 525669, *1 (11th Cir., Feb. 28, 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished). Anderson promptly repaid the monies he had earned, and the sentencing court sentenced him to 3 years probation, despite the Guidelines’ and the government’s recommendation of a sentence from 18 to 24 months. Id. The government appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit vacated Anderson’s sentence, concluding that the sentence was unsupported by “extraordinary circumstances.” Id.
  • Then, in the wake of Gall v. U.S., 128 S.Ct. 586 (2007), the Court granted Anderson’s petition for rehearing, reversed itself, and affirmed the probationary sentence imposed by the district court, which was based not only upon Anderson’s disgorgement of the profits of his trading, but also, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), “[i]n recognition of the limitations on Anderson’s marketability and employment, the district court reasonably imposed a probationary sentence and home confinement to ‘allow [him] to continue working.’” Id. at *3.
  • Anderson is an encouraging sign from the Court of Appeals for practitioners with clients with relatively less severe charges but with persuasive facts and circumstances on the 3553(a) side.

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