Summary of Eleventh Circuit Criminal Opinions, Week of March 17, 2009

Our apologies for playing catch-up, but our summary of the primary, meaningful criminal opinions by the Eleventh Circuit will continue this week. Following is a summary of the decisions for the week of March 17, 2009.

In Salazar v. U.S., No. 07-13715, 2009 WL 684772 (11th Cir., Mar. 17, 2009), the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence for possessing with the intent to distribute crack cocaine based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, where defendant’s counsel failed to call as witnesses at trial two persons who could have corroborated that the defendant denied possessing any cocaine at the time of his arrest, id. at *2.

The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of a reduction under the safety-valve provision pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 for a defendant convicted of conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to distribute marijuana plants in U.S. v. Cruz, No. 08-11625, 2009 WL 684789 (11th Cir., Mar. 17, 2009), observing that the defendant’s refusal to testify at sentencing left the district court with little ability to access his credibility and the defendant had failed to carry his burden, id. at *2.

In U.S. v. Valdex, No. 07-14721, 2009 WL 684751 (11th Cir., Mar. 17, 2009), the Court held that the defendant in a prosecution for health care fraud “invited” any error in calculating the amount of loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 by urging the trial court to adopt the amount of loss contained in the presentence report, id. at 1. It also held that the trial court did not clearly err in applying a sophisticated means enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) where the defendant “recruited beneficiaries and sought out doctors so as to aid in hiding the illegality of his Medicare claims, and converted [a corporation] into a pharmacy through which he continued to defraud Medicare…” Id. The Court also held that the defendant’s sentence was within the Sentencing Guidelines range and therefore substantively reasonable, pursuant to U.S. v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005), and that “relevant uncharged or acquitted conduct may be taken into account in sentencing, as long as such conduct is proven by a preponderance of the evidence and the court clearly applied the Guidelines as advisory.” Id. (citing U.S. v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342, 1347-48 (11th Cir. 2006)).

The Court affirmed the defendant’s above-Guidelines sentence for travel with intent to engage in a sexual act with a juvenile in U.S. v. Smith, No. 08-11665, 2009 WL 693342 (11th Cir., March 18, 2009), noting that the district court could upwardly depart in sentencing the defendant based upon violations of the defendant’s supervised release, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, comment. (n.3), id. at *2.

            In U.S. v. Whitehead, No. 08-13201, 2009 WL 691184 (11th Cir., Mar. 18, 2009), the Court affirmed the denial of the motion for a sentencing reduction, brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) of the defendant, who was convicted of various drug and crack cocaine offenses, holding that the Sentencing Commission’s Amendment 706 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) in November 2007, which provided a two-level reduction in base offense levels for certain crack-cocaine offenses, did not affect the guideline ranges of defendants who were sentenced as career offenders under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, id. at *3 (citing U.S. v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008)). The Court also held that the defendant was ineligible for the reduction despite the fact that he had been granted a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, observing that “[t]he critical fact… is that the district court used the offense level from the career offender guideline to calculate [the defendant’s] applicable guideline range,” rather than § 2D1.1. Id. at *4.

The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion for reduction pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) by a defendant convicted of  conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base in U.S. v. Val Saint, No. 08-12726, 2009 WL 693341 (11th Cir., Mar. 18, 2009), noting that Amendment 711 reversed Amendment 706 on the issue of converting base offense level into a base offense level for marijuana, holding that the defendant’s base offense level would have remained the same, id. at *2.

In U.S. v. Traywick, NO. 08-14092, 2009 WL 693339 (11th Cir. Mar. 18, 2009), the Court affirmed the defendant’s sentence for crack cocaine offenses pursuant to its holding in U.S. v. Melvin, No. 08-13497, 2009 WL 236053 (11th Cir. Feb. 3, 2009) that, regardless of U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) and policy statements prevent a court from reducing a defendant’s term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(2) to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guidelines range determined under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1), id. at *2 (citing Melvin, at *5, *7, *9-*10). The Court also held that § 3582 does not include a notice or hearing provision. Id. The Court further held that the Supreme Court’s holding in Kimbrough v. U.S., 128 S.Ct. 558 (2007) that courts can deviate from the 100-to-1 equivalency ratio of cocaine base to powder cocaine in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 and Amendment 503 did not amount to an amendment of the Guidelines and was therefore inapplicable to a § 3582(c)(2) motion. Id.

The Court also followed its holding in Melvin in U.S. v. St. George, No. 08-12226, 2009 WL 707858 (11th Cir., Mar. 19, 2009), and further reemphasized that, in re-sentencing a defendant under § 3582(c)(2), a district court must leave intact all guideline application decisions made during the initial sentencing, does not have authority to revisit factual matters such as drug quantity, and cannot apply Booker, id. at *2 (citing U.S. v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780 (11th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Cothran, 106 F.3d 1560, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997)). And in U.S. v. Roberts,
NO. 08-13753, 2009 WL 714329 (11th Cir., Mar. 19, 2009) it again affirmed that Booker does not apply to resentencings under § 3582(c)(2) pursuant to § 1B1.10(b)(1), id. at *1.

The denial of the defendant’s proposed minor role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 was affirmed in U.S. v. Bataz Martinez, No. 04-15405, 2009 WL 707772 (11th Cir., Mar. 19, 2009), a drug prosecution, “because [the defendant] failed to demonstrate that he was less culpable than most of the other participants in the offense,” id. at *2. The defendant’s sentence was also affirmed under Booker based upon the defendant’s failure to point to any evidence of a reasonable probability that he would have received a lesser sentence had he been sentenced under advisory guidelines. Id. at *3.

In U.S. v. Massengill, No. 08-15207, 2009 WL 714259 (11th Cir., March 19, 2009), the Court denied the defendant’s attorney’s motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and remanded to the district court to amend its written judgment were the judgment failed to include any reasons for the court’s upward departure from the guidelines range, agreeing with the Second Circuit in U.S. v. Hall, 499 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2007) that the “better course” where a court omits the reasons for a departure in a written order is to affirm the substance of the judgment and remand to the district court for the sole purpose of amending the written judgment to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2), which requires a written statement of reasons for the sentence in the written order of judgment, id. at *4 (citing Hall, at 153).

 In U.S. v. Villegas-Tello, No. 08-13325, 2009 WL 714214 (11th Cir., Mar. 19, 2009), the Court held that Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents possessed probable cause to arrest the defendant for marijuana offenses based upon the totality of the circumstances, and that follow-up questions by arresting officials for the sake of clarification do not violate Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), id. at *4 (citing U.S. v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019, 1032 (4th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 939 (5th Cir. 1997); Andersen v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 532 (7th Cir.1990); Butzin v. Wood, 886 F.2d 1016, 1017-18 (8th Cir. 1989)). The Court also affirmed the denial of one of the defendants’ motion in limine pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), holding that an alleged statement by a co-defendant was not incriminating on its face to the defendant; that sufficient evidence supported the defendants’ convictions; and that because one of the defendants performed the same or similar role within the conspiracy as his codefendants, he was not less culpable than most other participants in his relative conduct, he was not entitled to a minor role reduction under § 3B1.2. Id. at *5, *6, *7 (citing U.S. v. DeVaron, 175 F.3d 930, 937 (11th Cir. 1999)).

The Court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to vacate his convictions for conspiracy to commit bank fraud and money laundering pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in Baughman v. U.S., No. 08-14279, 2009 WL 714212 (11th Cir., Mar. 19, 2009), concluding that record supported the finding of the district court that the defendant never instructed his attorney to file a notice of appeal, and consulted with him on his right to appeal, id. at *3, *4.

In U.S. v. Bohning, NO. 07-15549, 2009 WL 724036, (11th Cir., Mar. 20, 2009), a prosecution of the defendant for various sex offenses involving minors, the Court held that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and Fifth Amendment due process rights were not violated by the government placing a lis pendens on his home, which the defendant would have sold to pay legal fees, discussing its prior decision in United States v. Register, 182 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 1999), id. at *1, *2 (citing Register, at 834). The Court also held that the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was not unreasonable. Id. at *3 (citing United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006))

 

Courts Face Growing Challenges Over Jurors' Increasing Use of Internet, Computers, Cellphones, Etc.

 

            In this age of universal access to information through computers, cellphones and other devices, there is one group the courts are increasingly opposed to having access—the jury. A March 18 article in the New York Times relates how jurors in a large criminal case in South Florida were discovered to have done research on the case on the internet, in violation of the court’s instructions. The court ordered a mistrial. The article also mentions an Arkansas civil case in which a juror was found to have sent updates regarding the case using the internet social networking service Twitter, and the trial of former Pennsylvania state senator Vincent J. Fumo, in which the defense demanded a mistrial based on a juror’s posting updates on the trial on Facebook, another social networking site.

            As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed over a century ago, “[t]he theory of our [legal] system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.”Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). Accordingly, courts have held that “[w]hen jurors consider extrinsic evidence… a new trial [is required] if the evidence poses a reasonable possibility of prejudice to the defendant.” U.S. v. Rowe, 906 F.2d 654, 656 (11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1533 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.1975)). The extraordinary technological advances of the past 30 years means that today, most jurors possess the means to access to virtually any information and any person at their fingertips, which creates an exceedingly difficult challenge for courts in screening jurors from outside information and improper communication during trial or deliberations.

The problem posed by jurors’ use of new computer and internet technology to gather information or communicate during trial has been on the horizon for some time. In People v. Wadle, 77 P.3d 764 (Colo.App. 2003), a prosecution for child abuse resulting in death, the defendant testified that she was taking the anti-depressant drug Paxil at the time of the child’s death, id. at 769. During the jury’s deliberations, one of the jurors downloaded a description of Paxil from the internet and shared it with the other members of the jury, in direct violation of the trial court’s earlier denial of the jury’s request for such information, and the jury subsequently convicted the defendant. Id. at 770. The defendant moved for a mistrial, which was denied by the court. Id. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding “we discern a reasonable possibility that the introduction of extraneous information about Paxil… may well have influenced the verdict.” Id. at 771 (citing Wiser v. People, 732 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Colo.1987)). The Court of Appeals foresaw the problem posed by juror access to the internet, stating:

We… recognize the problems created by the widespread use and availability of the Internet. Although the Internet has made information more accessible for the average person, the information obtained thereby may be misleading, taken out of context, outdated, or simply inaccurate. Nor is this the first time a juror has looked to the Internet for information during deliberations. [Cit.] In view of the problems and dangers associated with the unsupervised use of the Internet, trial courts should emphasize that jurors should not consult the Internet, or any other extraneous materials, at any time during the trial, including during deliberations.

Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing People v. Kriho, 996 P.2d 158 (Colo.App.1999)).

During the jury deliberations in the defendant’s trial for possession with intent to distribute cocaine in U.S. v. Wheaton, 426 F.Supp.2d 666 (N.D.Ohio 2006), one of the jurors disclosed that he had used his personal computer to play audio of an exhibit admitted in the case and to research locations and distances between cities relevant to the case, id. at 668. The defendant filed a motion for new trial based upon juror misconduct, however, the district court denied the motion, holding that “Defendant failed to show bias or prejudice resulted from the extraneous information; thus, the interest of justice does not warrant a new trial.” Id. at 672.

In Commonwealth v. Guisti, 449 Mass. 1018, 867 N.E.2d 740 (2007), a trial of the defendant for aggravated rape and other crimes, it was discovered that a juror posted two messages regarding the case on an Internet mail service and received two responses from attorneys in other states, and the defendant moved for new trial, which was denied by the trial court, id. at 1018, 19. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that “the trial judge's conclusion that the jury were not exposed to extraneous influences was amply supported by the evidence and her findings.” Id. at 1019-1020.

The Court of Appeals and other courts in this Circuit have also had to deal with the growing problem of juror use of technology. In U.S. v. Siegelman, 467 F.Supp.2d 1253 (M.D.Ala. 2006), the prosecution of former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman and former HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy, the district court denied the defendants’ motion for new trial based upon, inter alia, emails sent by jurors to one another, holding that the e-mails were wholly unrelated to any evidence of jury exposure to extraneous information or outside influence, id. at 1279. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s findings on appeal. See U.S. v. Siegelman, No. 07-13163, 2009 WL 564659, *25 (11th Cir. Mar. 6, 2009).

It will be interesting to see how various courts deal with the problem of limiting juror access to information or communication available through technology in the future, and perhaps even more interesting to see how they deal with instances of the intrusion of technology into the jury’s function at trial. The only certain thing is that these problems will only continue to grow—and must be faced.

 

Gillen Withers & Lake LLC is a law firm with extensive experience in federal corporate and white collar criminal defense and appellate work, as well as complex civil and class action litigation, headed by eminent former federal prosecutors, with an outstanding track record and reputation throughout Georgia and nationwide. The attorneys of Gillen Withers & Lake LLC go to battle for their clients and vigorously represent them at all stages of proceeding. Contact Thomas Withers in Savannah at (912) 447-8400 or twithers@gwllawfirm.com or Craig Gillen in Atlanta at (404) 842-9700 or cgillen@gwllawfirm.com.

Prosecutor Gets "Dressing Down" from Judge Posner and Seventh Circuit

The defendant in U.S. v. Farinella, NO. 08-1839, 08-1860, 2009 WL 615408 (7th Cir., Mar. 12, 2009) purchased 1.6 million bottles of “Henri’s Salad Dressing” in 2003, id. at *1. The label on each bottle of dressing stated that the dressing was “best when purchased by” and then gave a date from January to June 2003. Id. With enough dressing to flavor a salad the size of Rhode Island, the defendant proceeded to change the dates on the bottles to May to July of 2004, and then resold the bottles to dollar stores, where they were sold to the public. Id.

The Department of Justice viewed the defendant’s change as fraudulent and misleading, and charged the defendant with wire fraud and introducing a misbranded food into interstate commerce with intent to defraud or mislead, and the defendant was convicted and sentenced to five year’s probation. Id. However, eminent Seventh Circuit Judge and legal commentator Richard Posner disagreed.

Judge Posner stated that the government’s characterization of the “best when purchased by” date as an “expiration date” was itself false and misleading, observing that “[s]alad dressing, however, or at least the type of salad dressing represented by Henri’s, is what is called ‘shelf stable’; it has no expiration date.” Id. The Court observed that neither the FDA nor the Federal Trade Commission had published any regulations defining or prohibiting the change of a “best when purchased by” date. Id. at *2. Judge Posner noted that there was no evidence that selling salad dressing after the “best when purchased by” date endangered human health, that any of the 1.6 million bottles had deteriorated, or that any purchaser of the dressing had ever complained about the taste—indeed the Henri’s evidenced no deterioration in flavor by the time of the defendant’s trial, some 4 years after the last “best when purchased by” date. Id. The Court also observed that the government had presented no evidence regarding either the industry’s or consumers’ understanding of the meaning of the “best when purchased by” date. Id. Judge Posner viewed the government’s persistent and self-serving equation of “best when purchased by” with “expires on” as disingenuous to say the least.

         Judge Posner next took the government to task for presenting an FDA expert at trial who testified that he had found no evidence in FDA databases that the defendant had inquired with the FDA regarding the relabeling of the salad dressing—thereby implying that changing the “best when purchased by” date on the label somehow required FDA approval or permission when there was no evidence that it did. Id. at *3. The Court cited the rule that “‘The idea of secret laws is repugnant. People cannot comply with laws the existence of which is concealed.’” Id. (quoting Torres v. INS, 144 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir.1998); citing George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Chao, 463 F.Supp.2d 184, 190-91 (D.Conn.2006); Oppenheimer Mendez v. Acevedo, 388 F.Supp. 326, 335 (D.Puerto Rico 1974)).

         The Court concluded that:

[T]o prove a person guilty of having made a fraudulent representation, a jury must be given evidence about the meaning (unless obvious) of the representation claimed to be fraudulent, and that was not done here. We remind that one possible meaning of “best when purchased by” is that it is a guarantee by the seller that if purchased by then (and, presumably, eaten within a reasonable time afterward) it will taste as good as when it was first sold; if this is the meaning that consumers attach to the phrase, there was no misrepresentation.

Id. at *4. It held that because the government had presented insufficient evidence that the defendant had engaged in misbranding, he was entitled to be acquitted. Id.

         Most significantly, the Court called out the prosecutor by name in its opinion, relating that the prosecutor, during rebuttal closing argument, had made statements to the jury to the effect that the defendant was “trying to buy his way out” by hiring a “high-paid lawyer” and that you “can’t buy justice.” Id. at *5. The Court also cited the prosecutor’s implying to the jury that changing the “best when purchased by” date prevented the manufacturer from tracing the product to prevent it from causing illness; her urging the jury that if the defendant’s actions were proper, that they should start “growing their own food;” her references to “truckfulls of nasty, expired salad dressing;” and numerous other references, despite the fact that there was no evidence of any health or safety issues with the dressing, or any problems with its taste or freshness. Id. The Court took a dim view of these repeated instances of misconduct and invited the district court to explore the issue of the proper sanction for such misconduct, concluding:

We are not permitted to reverse a judgment on the basis of a lawyer's misconduct that would not have caused a reasonable jury to acquit, United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505-06, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); United States. v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241-42 (7th Cir. 1995), but in this case, had the government presented enough evidence to sustain a conviction, we would have reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial on the basis of the prosecutor's misconduct. That sanction is not available only because the government presented so little evidence that the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. That does not detract from the gravity of the prosecutor's misconduct and the need for an appropriate sanction. The government's appellate lawyer told us that the prosecutor's superior would give her a talking-to. We are not impressed by the suggestion.

Id. at *6.

Gillen Withers & Lake LLC is a law firm with extensive experience in federal corporate and white collar criminal defense and appellate work, as well as complex civil and class action litigation, headed by eminent former federal prosecutors, with an outstanding track record and reputation throughout Georgia and nationwide. The attorneys of Gillen Withers & Lake LLC go to battle for their clients and vigorously represent them at all stages of proceeding. Contact Thomas Withers in Savannah at (912) 447-8400 or twithers@gwllawfirm.com or Craig Gillen in Atlanta at (404) 842-9700 or cgillen@gwllawfirm.com.