Director of BOEMRE Announces Investigations and Review Unit and More Agressive Tactics to Investigate Companies Engaged in Offshore Drilling

In response to the massive oil spill (over 19,000 square miles in area--or larger than the state of Maryland) in the Gulf of Mexico, on June 18, 2010, U.S. Department of the Interior Secretary Ken Salazar issued an order renaming the Minerals Management Service (MMS) the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE). MMS/BOEMRE manages the nation's natural gas, oil and other mineral resources on the outer continental shelf. On June 15, President Barack Obama appointed Michael Bromwich to head the reorganized MMS and overhaul regulations governing offshore oil drilling.

The appointment of Bromwich--a former prosecutor--as Director of BOEMRE reflects the no-nonsense response of the Administration to the environmental disaster and growing public dissatisfaction. Bromwich was an Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Justice. Prior to that, he was an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. Bromwich was an Associate Counsel for the Office of the Independent Counsel for Iran-Contra, and headed an Investigation into the Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory. He has been appointed as an independent monitor to investigate the Metropolitan Police Department for the District of Columbia, and the crime lab for the Houston Police Department. Prior to his appointment as head of BOEMRE, Bromwich was a partner with Fried Frank in New York and Washington. Bromwich has developed a reputation for helping to turn around troubled federal agencies.

Director Bromwich has written a column today in Newsweek which confirms the Adminstration's tough approach. In the column, Bromwich discusses his acceptance of the appointment by President Obama and Secretary Salazar. He emphasizes that his career has been defined by law enforcement, and that his experience in monitoring agencies will guide his reform of BOEMRE. Bromwich cites the alleged "coziness" of MMS with oil companies. On the subject of the Deepwater Horizon oil leak, he comments that the evidence suggests that British Petroleum (BP) and other companies "cut corners or made grave errors that led to the explosion."

Bromwich cites a need for "aggressive" investigators and states that BOEMRE has announced an "Investigations and Review Unit" (IRU), composed of prosecutors, investigators, scientists and other experts, to investigate allegations of misconduct by companies regulated by BOEMRE. The column states that companies that fail to cooperate may have their drilling permits suspended. "Serious wrongdoing" will be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution.

Bromwich further states that BOEMRE and the IRU will investigate potential conflicts of interest, will conduct more thorough reviews of applications for drilling permits and more thorough environmental analyses, and will increase research of spill control. Bromwich concludes with the caveat that his efforts "while potentially aggressive, will not be hasty."

Bromwich's statements are certainly not comforting to BP, TransOcean or the other companies with ties to the Deepwater Horizon disaster. However, only time will tell if Bromwich's and BOEMRE's efforts are successful in bringing about any reform to the offshore drilling industry, especially in the face of a risk of increased energy prices. On June 30, 2010, Secretary Salazar issued a press release announcing that the Department of the Interior is postponing public scope meetings on the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the 2012–2017 Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Oil and Gas Leasing Program until later this year. The release states that, while the Department is committed to "strong" reforms in the oil and gas industry, "[o]ffshore oil and gas production will remain an important component of our nation’s energy portfolio as we transition to a clean energy economy." With a "clean energy economy" being a distant dream at this point, it is uncertain how much increased regulation the Adminstration is willing to heap upon the industry.

Image from The Canadian

Report Alleges Bush Administration DOJ Shielded BP and Executives from Criminal Prosecution over Alaska Spill

As the oil spill from the Deepwater Horizon well in the Gulf of Mexico turns two months old, an article in Digital Journal details how the government considered bringing criminal charges against British Petroleum and its executives during the Bush Administration. The article quotes Scott West, a former Special Agent in Charge for the Environmental Protection Agency. West was in charge of investigating the rupture of a pipeline at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, which occurred in March 2006. The rupture went undetected for nearly a week due to malfunctions in monitoring equipment, and spilled more than a quarter of a million gallons of crude oil. The rupture was reportedly the size of a pencil eraser and was caused by corrosion. BP shut down five oil processing centers for nearly two weeks, causing a rise in gas prices.

EPA's criminal division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice spent thousands of hours investigating the rupture, and supposedly was considering criminal charges against BP and certain of its executives for ignoring warnings from employees about the condition of pipeline and the monitoring equipment.

However, the article claims that the DOJ allegedly "killed" the investigation in August of 2007. BP pled guilty to a misdemeanor violation of the Clean Water Act and paid a $20 million fine. BP also entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the government in relation to an explosion at a refinery in Texas City which resulted in 15 deaths.  

Department of Justice Targets Gulf Oil Spill Disaster and British Petroleum

U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder informed the media yesterday that the federal government has opened criminal and civil investigations into the 44 day-old oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, as reported in the L.A. Daily News and elsewhere. Last month, U.S. President Barack Obama appointed an independent commission to investigate the causes of the disaster and to recommend measures to prevent a recurrence in the future. The commission is co-chaired by former Florida Governor Bob Graham and former head of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, William K. Reilly.

The lack of procedures to handle the possibility of a deep undersea spill and the seeming lack of haste in staunching the spill by United Kingdom-based British Petroleum, which leases the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, and Switzerland-based Transocean, Ltd., which owns the rig, have justly opened the companies to public criticism and condemnation, civil suits and likely civil penalties and fines. The disaster is the largest offshore oil spill in U.S. history, and is on its way to becoming the largest spill in world history as the leak continues (the largest was the willful discharge of oil by the Iraqi military from the Sea Island Terminal in Iraq in January of 1991 during the Gulf War, which discharged 462 million gallons of oil into the Persian Gulf).

Some challenges facing any potential criminal investigation or prosecution include the fact that the spill is allegedly accidental, and that its source was some 52 miles southeast of Louisiana--outside U.S. territorial waters. However, some theories of prosecution may be available. For instance, Title 33 United States Code Section 1321, entitled "Oil and hazardous substance liability," applies to discharges from "offshore facilities." The statute provides, in part, that:

(3) The discharge of oil or hazardous substances (i) into or upon the navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of the contiguous zone, or (ii) in connection with activities under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act [43 U.S.C.A. § 1331 et seq.] or the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 [33 U.S.C.A. § 1501 et seq.], or which may affect natural resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under the exclusive management authority of the United States (including resources under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act [16 U.S.C.A. § 1801 et seq.] ), in such quantities as may be harmful as determined by the President under paragraph (4) of this subsection, is prohibited...

33 U.S.C. 1321(b)(3). Persons in charge of a vessel or offshore facility and having knowledge of a discharge of oil must immediately notify the appropriate U.S. agency. Failure to do so can result in a fine and up to 5 years' imprisonment. The statute also provides for administrative and civil penalties for owners, operators or persons in charge of vessels or facilities from which there is a discharge, or who fail or refuse to comply with relevant regulations issued by the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection agency, as well as any recovery costs by the government.

Undoubtedly, grounds for charges might be found in the U.S.' extensive environmental laws and regulations. One thing is certain--now that the Department of Justice has been mobilized to respond to the disaster, the corporate actors in relation to the spill will almost certainly not emerge without paying a steep criminal and civil settlement.

 

 

Cap and Trade/H.R. 2454 New Criminal Provision: "Fraud and false statements in connection with regulated allowances" (Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1041)

New legislation typically means new criminal laws, and the White House's and Congress' recent ‘‘American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,’’ H.R. 2454, better known as the "Waxman-Markey Bill" or "Cap and Trade Bill," is certainly no exception. The bill is over 1,000 pages long and, for those with copious amounts of time, may be viewed in its entirety here. H.R. 2454 was introduced on May 15, 2009, and narrowly passed in the House of Representatives on June 26, 2009, by a vote of 219 to 212. The Senate is expected to vote on the bill sometime this Fall.

FCDB seeks to keep readers and practitioners alike abreast of changes in criminal law posed by such new legislation. Somewhat surprisingly, a search of H.R. 2454 reveals just one criminal provision, Section 1041, page 1045, in Part IV of the bill entitled "Carbon Market Assurance," which provides:

§ 1041. Fraud and false statements in connection with regulated allowances
        Whoever in connection with a transaction involving a regulated allowance (as defined in section 401(a) of the Federal Power Act, as added by section 341 of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009), knowingly—
        (1) makes or uses a materially false or misleading statement, writing, representation, scheme,
or device; or
        (2) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device any material fact, shall be fined not more than $5,000,000 (or $25,000,000 in the case of an organization) or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
        (2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
‘‘1041. Fraud and false statements in connection with regulated allowances.’’

A "regulated allowance" is defined in Section 401 of H.R. 2454 as "any emission allowance, compensatory allowance, offset credit, or Federal renewable electricity credit established or issued under the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009." The proposed changes would be to 18 U.S.C. § 1041, which currently prohibits fraud in connection with a major disaster or emergency benefits.

The Waxman-Markey/Cap and Trade legislation amends the Federal Power Act to require corporations which emit pollutants such as carbon to hold the allowances, which represent the right to emit a certain amount of pollutant. It also would create “regulated allowance derivatives,” which are financial instruments derived from the allowances. The derivative instruments would be purchased and traded by corporations, financial institutions and funds. The proposed change to 18 U.S.C. § 1041 represents a typical fraud/false statement criminal provision for new legislation, albeit with stiff penalties.

Constructive Amendments to the Indictment in the Eleventh Circuit

 

The government’s case in many instances will evolve or shift to some extent over the course of a criminal prosecution. It may be a long time between indictment and trial, and the prosecution may come into possession of new evidence before trial, or may not have thoroughly reviewed the evidence which it does possess until after the return of the indictment. In addition, the prosecution may adjust its arguments or evidence in reaction to the defense. Whatever the reason, the prosecution in many criminal cases may determine to argue or present evidence at trial regarding a theory of criminality which differs to some degree from the crimes alleged in its original indictment. A thorough prosecutor will sometimes seek to provide for such a shifting theory by obtaining a superseding indictment from the grand jury, but in other cases the prosecution may not notice any need to do so or may simply neglect to do so. In any event, attorneys should carefully evaluate the prosecution’s arguments and proof at trial, as well as the trial court’s instructions to the jury, in order to determine whether a variance or amendment of the indictment has occurred. Following is a brief survey of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ current position on amendments to or variances with the indictment.

“A constructive amendment occurs when the essential elements of the offense as alleged in the indictment are altered to broaden the potential bases for conviction beyond what the indictment contains.” United States v. Tampas, 493 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Narog, 372 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Keller, 916 F.2d 628, 634 (11th Cir. 1990)); see also United States v. Ward, 486 F.3d 1212, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007). A constructive amendment of the indictment constitutes per se reversible error because it violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to be tried on charges presented to the grand jury. See United States v. Tampas, 493 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111, 1114 (11th Cir. 1990)). Under the Fifth Amendment, “a defendant can only be convicted for a crime charged in the indictment. It would be fundamentally unfair to convict a defendant on charges of which he had no notice.” Ward, at 1227 (citing Keller, at 632-33). The mere presentation of evidence not referenced in the indictment, such as pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), does not constitute an amendment or variance. See United States v. Lavigne, 282 Fed.Appx. 790, 793 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).

In contrast, “a variance occurs when the facts proved at trial deviate from the facts contained in the indictment but the essential elements of the offense are the same.” Ward, 486 F.3d at 1227 (citing Keller, at 634; United States v. Flynt, 15 F.3d 1002, 1005-06 (11th Cir. 1994)). A variance only requires reversal where the defendant can establish that his or her rights were substantially prejudiced. Id. (citing Keller, at 633).

The Court has found no constructive amendment where an indictment charged the defendant with distributing crack cocaine and the trial court instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty if he had distributed either cocaine or crack cocaine, based upon the fact that the type of drug is not an element under the controlled substance statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841, United States v. Porter, 293 Fed.Appx. 700, 703, 04 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished); where the government argued in its closing arguments that it need not prove that all of the defendants named in the indictment were members of the scheme, but the indictment charged the defendant with conspiring with two named co-defendants as well as “other persons” United States v. Nunnally, 249 Fed.Appx. 776, 778 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); where the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it had to find that the defendant embezzled a specific amount, but the indictment alleged that the defendant embezzled property having a value in excess of $5,000, Tampas, at 1291; where the trial court instructed the jury that it could still convict the defendant on the substantive mail and wire fraud counts of the indictment if it was unable to reach agreement on the conspiracy charge did, despite the fact that the government had referenced the conspiracy in the substantive counts of the indictment, Ward, at 1227, 28; where, despite the fact that the indictment alleged that the defendant possessed “more than 20 kilograms of cocaine,” the trial court instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty if it found that he possessed “a measurable amount” of a controlled substance, United States v. Knight, 213 Fed.Appx. 835, 838, 39 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); where the government alleged in its indictment that the defendant committed an act “on or about” a particular date, but the proof at trial showed that the act was committed on a different date, United States v. Strevell, 185 Fed.Appx. 841 (11th Cir. 2006) (unpublished); where the indictment charged the defendant with an offense involving cocaine, but the proof at trial and the trial court’s jury instructions referred to crack cocaine, United States v. Rutherford, 175 F.3d 899, 906 (11th Cir. 1999); where the government’s indictment alleged that a certain person was the victim of the defendant’s extortion, but the proof at trial demonstrated that the person had no connection with the money obtained, United States v. Flynt, 15 F.3d 1002, 1006 (11th Cir. 1994); where the district court deviated in its instructions to the jury from the allegations in the indictment concerning a non-essential element of the crime, United States v. Lignarolo, 770 F.2d 971, 981 (11th Cir. 1985); where the government proved events of a conspiracy at trial which were not listed in the overt acts section of the indictment, United States v. Gold, No. 83-3231, 83-3230, 83-3267, 83-3239, 1984 WL 48339 (11th Cir. 1984); and where the government dropped two alleged co-conspirators from its conspiracy allegations at trial, United States v. Davis, 679 F.2d 845, (11th Cir. 1982).

However the Eleventh Circuit has found constructive amendments of indictments and improper broadening of the potential bases for conviction where the indictment charged the defendants with knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, but the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendants if it found that they knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the pseudoephedrine would be used to make “any controlled substance,” Narog, at 1249; where the government charged that the defendant knowingly and “willfully” committed money laundering, but the court redacted the term “willful” from its charge on the definition of “intentional,” United States v. Cancelliere, 69 F.3d 1116, 1121 (11th Cir. 1995); where the indictment alleged that the defendant conspired with a particular person and the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant if it found he conspired with “any” person, Keller, at 636; where the RICO charges in the indictment charged that the “enterprise” was a particular organized crime family but the court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendants if it found a different enterprise, United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 1990); and where the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant if it found the elements of an offense which had not been charged in the indictment, United States v. Peel, 837 F.2d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 1988).

 

Supreme Court Overrules Michigan v. Jackson and Presumption that Waivers of Right to Counsel After the Right to Counsel Has Been Invoked Are Invalid

In an opinion issued on Tuesday, Montejo v. Louisiana, --- S.Ct. ----, 2009 WL 1443049 (2009), the Supreme Court removed a layer of protection of criminal defendants against coercive and badgering police interrogations by overruling, Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404 (1986), in which the Court had held that “if police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.”

The petitioner in Montejo was arrested in connection with a robbery and murder and waived his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), while being interrogated by police detectives. A preliminary hearing was then held in which the court ordered an indigent defender to represent the petitioner. After the hearing, two detectives visited the petitioner and requested that the petitioner lead them to the murder weapon. The detectives read the petitioner his Miranda rights, and the petitioner proceeded to go along with the detectives, writing an inculpatory letter of apology to the widow of the victim in the process. Only following this excursion did the petitioner meet his court-appointed attorney and consult with him. The State admitted the petitioner's letter of apology against him at trial, and the petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death.

The petitioner appealed, arguing that the State's admission of the letter was error pursuant to Jackson. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that Jackson is not triggered unless and until a defendant has actually requested a lawyer or has otherwise asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. It held that because the court had appointed the petitioner counsel while the petitioner stood mute, the petitioner had not sufficiently asserted his right to counsel. The Courtaffirmed his conviction and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that some States require an indigent defendant to affirmatively request counsel before an appointment is made, while other States automatically appoint counsel upon a finding of indigency. Justice Scalia recognized the problem that "Defendants in States that automatically appoint counsel would have no opportunity to invoke their rights and trigger Jackson, while those in other States, effectively instructed by the court to request counsel, would be lucky winners." The majority rejected the petitioner's position that, once a defendant is represented by counsel, police may not initiate any further interrogation.

The majority proceeded to overrule Jackson and its holding that waivers of a defendant's right to counsel after the right to counsel is asserted are presumed invalid. The Court noted that it had created the presumption in Jackson by making an analogy to a similar prophylactic rule which the Court had established in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981), for the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation under Miranda. The majority held that where a defendant does not invoke his right to counsel, such as where a court appoints counsel in the absence of any request by the defendant,there is no initial election "that must be preserved through a prophylactic rule against later waivers." It noted that the benefits of the prophylactic rule of Jackson were outweighed by its costs in "hindering “society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law." The majority observed that, even without the rule of Jackson, defendants are still entitled to the protections of Miranda, Edwards and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990). It held that "Jackson not only 'operates to invalidate a confession given by the free choice of suspects who have received proper advice of their Miranda rights but waived them nonetheless,' ... but also deters law enforcement officers from even trying to obtain voluntary confessions."

Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer all dissented.

 

The Rise and Fall of Marc Dreier: A Guide

 

We have tried to sum up for readers the labyrinthine facts and developments in the shocking and fascinating case of Marc Dreier, drawing upon excellent and thorough articles on the subject by Roger Parloff in Fortune Magazine and by Robert Kolker in New York Magazine.

I. The Rise

Marc Stuart Dreier grew up on the South Shore of Long Island, the son of a Polish refugee who built a chain of movie theaters. He graduated from Lawrence High School in the Five Towns.

Dreier attended Yale and then Harvard Law School. On graduation, he became an associate with Rosenman & Colin in New York, and later became a partner.

In 1987, Dreier married Elisa Peters, an associate at Rosenman & Colin. The couple had a son, Spencer, in 1989, and a daughter, Jackie, in 1992. He moved to Houston-based Fulbright & Jaworski’s New York litigation office in 1989. In 1995, Dreier left Fulbright & Jaworski and briefly worked at Duker & Barrett.

In 1996, Dreier started his own firm, Dreier & Baritz, with securities lawyer Neil Baritz. He developed a business practice whereby he entered into agreements with other lawyers and law firms, promising to handle the collection of their gross revenue and payment of their office expenses in exchange for paying guaranteed salaries and incentive bonuses.

II. Sheldon Solow and Kosta Kovachev

It is rumored that Dreier received money to start the firm from New York real estate developer Sheldon Solow, owner of Solow Realty, a billionaire son of a bricklayer turned developer.

               Dreier represented Solow in several matters. One such matter was a dispute over a mansion in East Hampton with Peter Morton, founder of the Hard Rock Cafe, with each man staking a claim to the same multimillion-dollar East Hampton beach house. Another case involved a dispute between Solow and Peter Kalikow, another real estate developer and former owner of the New York Post, over $7 million loaned by Solow to Kalikow while Kalikow’s company was in bankruptcy. Dreier, at the request of Solow, took out full page ads in the Post and the New York Times which looked like legal notices, inviting creditors of Kalikow to call a company called Evergence Capital Advisors.

Evergence Capital Advisors was actually the name of a dissolved Florida corporation formerly owned by a friend of Dreier’s, Kosta Kovachev. Kovachev was a Serbian who attended Columbia University and Harvard Business School and became a banker and securities broker. He was sued by the Securities and Exchange Commission for his involvement in a Ponzi scheme selling time-shares in Florida which defrauded approximately 600 investors in 30 states out of $28 million. Dreier represented Kovachev in the proceeding.

The telephone numbers in the newspaper ads led to Dreier’s offices. More than 50 creditors called the numbers, but never received a response. The U.S. bankruptcy judge sanctioned Solow and Dreier $335,000 over the ads. Solow and Dreier are still appealing the sanctions.

Acquaintances describe Dreier as incredibly charming, but a ruthless litigator. In 2002, Dreier’s wife sued him for divorce. That same year, Baritz severed his ties with Dreier, and in 2003 the firm became Dreier LLP, with about 60 attorneys.

III. The Scheme

Beginning in November 2004, Dreier began to sell promissory notes to hedge funds. Dreier claimed that the notes were issued by Solow Realty, and represented to the funds that he was marketing agent for Solow. In reality, Solow and Solow Realty had no knowledge of the notes, and the notes were forged by Dreier along with fraudulent audit reports on the letterhead of one of Solow Realty’s accounting and firms, Berdon LLP. Dreier would tell fund representatives that Solow was trying to raise $500 million to purchase properties, and that Solow did not want to borrow money from banks for reasons of secrecy and because Solow did not want to be accountable to anyone. He claimed that the notes would return 11% interest a year.

Dreier and his co-conspirators, including Kovachev and a man named Armando Ruiz, would host meetings and conference calls with fund representatives. They would give fund representatives telephone numbers purportedly for Solow Realty’s CEO or Controller, but which actually went to Dreier and his accomplices. Dreier created fake e-mail addresses and obtained no-contract cell phones for the scheme.

The phony notes were purchased by nearly 40 investment funds, including Fortress Investment Group, GSO Capital Partners LP, Elliott Associates, Eton Park, Westford Global Asset Management, Perella Weinberg Partners, Verition and Blackstone Group.

In order to come up with the funds to make quarterly interest payments on the phony notes, Dreier expanded Dreier LLP. The firm eventually employed approximately 260 attorneys and approximately 300 staff and had offices in New York City, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, Santa Monica, Stamford and Albany, New York. The firm’s New York City office leased 11 floors in a building designed by architect I.M. Pei at 499 Park Avenue.

Dreier lured new attorneys to the firm by guaranteeing them $1 million in salary before bonuses. He financed the expansion by factoring receivables. Although the firm had “partners,” Dreier remained the sole equity partner, which limited oversight.

Dreier amassed a large quantity of luxury property, including a $10 million condominium in Manhattan; two mansions in the Hamptons; properties in the Caribbean; an art collection worth $40 million, including works by Henri Matisse, AndyWarhol and David Hockney; and a 120-foot yacht. Dreier threw lavish parties with private performances by Diana Ross, Bon Jovi or Alicia Keys, and hosted a celebrity golf tournament.

 

IV. The Fall

By 2008, however, Dreier had a total of $180 million in debt to hedge funds, as well as annual interest payments of $20 million. He began selling a new form of phony note, allegedly issued by the Ontario Teachers Pension Plan (OTPP) and backed by BCE, the parent company of Bell Canada.

In September of 2008, Dreier failed to meet his obligations to one of the funds, likely GSO Capital Partners LP, and the fund demanded to meet with representatives of Solow Realty at Solow Realty’s offices. On October 15, 2008, Dreier, Kovachev and the fund representatives arrived at Solow Realty’s offices, and Dreier, without Solow’s knowledge, proceeded to hold a meeting in Solow Realty’s conference room in which Kovachev pretended to be Solow Realty’s Controller.

 

Finally, in late October 2008, a prospective buyer of the phony notes finally contacted the Solow Realty’s audit firm, Berdon LLP, whose name had been forged on the notes, and discovered the scheme. Berdon notified Solow, and Tom Manisero, a lawyer for Berdon, telephoned Dreier.

 

Dreier lied to Manisero, stating that he had only attempted to sell the notes once. He had several other telephone calls with Manisero, which were recorded by the U.S. Attorney’s Office. During the calls, Dreier admitted that the audit reports were fake, and that he was ashamed. On the final call, Dreier attempted to offer Manisero a “settlement.” Meanwhile, the Verition hedge fund discovered the irregularities with the phony notes.

 

On December 1, a bankruptcy attorney with the firm Norman Kinel sent Dreier an e-mail asking for $38.5 million out of the firm’s escrow account for one of the firm’s clients to pay its creditors. However, less than half of the money remained in the escrow account.

 

While Dreier was under investigation, he offered Fortress Investment Group $33 million of the phony OTPP notes. A Fortress representative, Howard Steinberg, asked to meet with the OTPP representative in person, and Dreier arranged for a meeting with OTPP’s general counsel in Toronto. On December 2, Dreier flew to Toronto met with the general counsel, Michael Padfield, himself to discuss alleged business opportunities and got his business card. He then proceeded to meet with Steinberg at OTTP’s offices, posing as the general counsel. Steinberg became suspicious and asked the receptionist if Dreier was actually the general counsel, and was told he was not. The police were contacted, and Dreier was arrested for criminal impersonation.

 

            Prosecutors allege that, after the initial call from Manisero, Dreier attempted to move funds to a personal account Dreier used for his Caribbean properties. On December 3, Dreier’s 19-year-old son, Spencer, attempted to deliver a message from Dreier to about 40 partners of Dreier LLP, but was shouted out of the conference room. Furthermore, at around this time, Dreier succeeded in having the firm’s bank transfer $10 million in escrow monies to one of his personal accounts. At this time also, Kovachev also went to the firm’s offices and took two paintings.

 

            Dreier posted bail in Canada, and arrived back on New York on December 7, where he was arrested upon arrival. Kovachev was also arrested. Authorities have also subpoenaed all documents from Dreier LLP relating to Armando Ruiz.

On January 29, Dreier was charged with seven counts wire fraud, securities fraud, and money-laundering. He initially pled not guilty, but filed affidavits admitting large portions of the allegations against him. Drier was placed under house arrest in his condominium in Manhattan. He is represented by attorney Gerald Shargel, who has formerly represented members of the Mafia. Dreier’s friend, Erinch Ozada, a Turkish hedge fund manager, is reported to be cooperating with the government.

In the meantime, Dreier LLP has ceased to exist. Attorneys and employees of Dreier LLP have unpaid salaries and unreimbursed expenses.

In all, Dreier is alleged to have committed $700 million in fraud against 13 hedge funds and three individuals, resulting in $400 million in losses, and to have taken $40 million from his clients’ escrow accounts. On Monday, May 11, 2009, Dreier pled guilty to all charges before U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. He faces a potential 20 years on some counts.

Over 200 creditors have already filed more than $450 million in claims against Dreier LLP. Investigators report that any monies are mostly gone. The government has seized Dreier’s luxury property in order to forfeit the property or distribute it among creditors. There has been some interest in the movie or book rights to Dreier’s saga, however New York’s Son of Sam laws prevent such exploitation.

 

Justice Souter on Criminal Law, Part II

 

Our summary retrospective of Justice Souter’s contributions to the Supreme Court’s criminal law jurisprudence continues. In addition to writing for the majority in many important criminal decisions, Justice Souter has authored concurring decisions in many cases, including criminal cases. While the Justice’s concurrences in criminal cases have typically been brief, Justice Souter has frequently raised important alternative views on issues on which he disagrees with the majority, or raises issues which the majority has overlooked.

Most recently, in Gall v. U.S., 128 S.Ct. 586 (2007) Justice Souter authored a concurring opinion in which he expressed his view that the best resolution of the tension between the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and consistency in sentencing was for Congress to enact a new statutory system of mandatory sentencing guidelines which provide for jury findings on all facts necessary to set the upper range of sentencing discretion. Justice Souter also concurred with the majority in U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), in which the majority held that no more than reasonable suspicion was required to support a warrantless search of a probationer’s apartment, reserving the question of whether the Court’s holding in Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996) that the subjective intentions of investigating officers play no role in searches based upon probable cause should also extend to searches based upon reasonable suspicion. In Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001), the majority of the Court held that police officers preventing the petitioner from entering his home unaccompanied by an officer for about two hours while the officers obtained a warrant to search the home constituted a reasonable seizure of the premises pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. Justice Souter joined the majority in a concurring opinion in which the Justice observed that the exigent circumstances created by the risk that the defendant would have destroyed the illegal drugs stashed on the property would have justified a warrantless search of the premises by the police. In his concurrence in Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999), which involved the warrantless seizure of an automobile from a public place by police as contraband under Florida’s contraband forfeiture law, Justice Souter took issue with the majority’s holdings to the extent that they endorsed the warrantless seizure of anything alleged to be “contraband,” holding that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not concede any talismanic significance to use of the term ‘contraband’ whenever a legislature may resort to a novel forfeiture sanction in the interest of law enforcement, as legislatures are evincing increasing ingenuity in doing…” (citing Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443-446, 458 (1996); U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 81-82 & n. 1 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). And in Carlisle v. U.S., 517 U.S. 416 (1996), Justice Souter disagreed with the majority opinion that a district court possesses inherent authority to grant a motion for a judgment of acquittal, observing that Congress might possess the power to abrogate courts’ inherent authority legislatively, citing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c).

 

Spam-a-Lot! Brothers Indicted for Spamming Conspiracy Affecting 2,000 Colleges and Universities

Spam e-mail is nearly universally despised. However, recipients of spam may not fully appreciate the inventiveness and intricateness of some spammers' methods, however dubious or illegal, before considering the charges against Missouri residents Amir Ahmad Shah, age 28, and Osmaan Ahmad Shah, age 25, who operated a company I2O. As reported by IDG News Service, the brothers, along with Paul Zucker of New Jersey and Liu Guang Ming, a citizen of China, were indicted today by a federal grand jury for an e-mail spamming scheme which targeted more than 2,000 U.S. colleges and universities and sold more than $4.1 million worth of products to students. The scheme involved e-mail extracting programs which illegally harvested more than 8 million student e-mail addresses. The defendants then sent targeted spam e-mails to students in at least 31 campaign selling a variety of products and services, including digital cameras, MP3 players, teeth whiteners, pepper spray, magazine subscriptions and spring break travel offers. They developed programs to falsify header information and rotate URLs, subject lines, content, reply addresses and other information to avoid spam filters. The defendants would include false and misleading information in the e-mails suggesting an association with the college or university, using fictitious names, claiming to be "campus representatives," and that the businesses selling the products were "alumni owned." They also created dozens of identical websites for each e-mail campaign to conceal the source of the e-mails and to keep the e-mails from being blocked by spam filters, and initially set up the hosting for the websites in China. The defendants made money through referral fees for sending spam for products and services sold by others, and by buying products in bulk and reselling them. They also offered "offshore hosting" services for other spammers.

Federal investigators began investigating the Shah brothers in 2005, after University of Missouri officials identified them as the source of the spamming. The brothers proceeded to remove all Missouri students' e-mails from their lists, but continued to spam other colleges and universities. The defendants are charged in the indictment with 26 counts of aiding and abetting each other to access a protected computer without authorization and transmit commercial e-mails with the intent to deceive or mislead the recipients about the origin of the messages, and the indictment seeks $4.1 million in forfeiture and other property. Colleges and universities have spent large amounts repairing the damage from the hacking and spamming and in implementing protective measures.

Spamming is regulated by the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, codified at 15 U.S.C. s 7704, which prohibits false, misleading or deceptive information in spam, as well as for sexually explicit spam without sufficient warnings, and carries a maximum sentence of 5 years imprisonment. Some sources estimate that spam now comprises 95% of the e-mails in the world.

Commentary on the Fifth Circuit Questions In Minor

In follow up to the post earlier today on the Fifth Circuit's letter to counsel in the Minor case, it seems that the Fifth Circuit is obviously troubled by the proof, if any, between the agency receiving federal funds, the Administrative Office of the Mississippi Courts, and the allegedly corrupt activity of Minor and the judges (Whitfield and Teel) that he sought to influence. First, the limiting cases on 666 violations have generally interpreted that statute very broadly, but a reasonable reading of the Court’s questions indicates a concern for the level of proof of the “nexus” between the Administrative Office of the Mississippi Courts and any agent, or activity of a particular matter before the judges.

Secondly, if such a nexus is required, it seems the Court is concerned whether the issue has been properly preserved both at trial and on appeal.

Thirdly, and most surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit, obviously knows what effect a reversal of those counts would have on the other counts of conviction, “even if the convictions on those other counts were not to be reversed?” The posing of that question by the Fifth Circuit seems almost gratuitous. Counts of conviction are routinely reversed that either don’t effect the sentence imposed, or that require re-sentencing consistent with the Court’s opinion. One has to look no further that Governor Siegelman’s recent case in front of the Eleventh Circuit. Quite frankly, re-sentencings happen all of the time after the reversal of some counts of conviction. Just odd that the Fifth Circuit would pose that question publicly.

As for Paul Minor’s quest for vindication before the Fifth Circuit, sadly, the court's letter indicates that they are going to affirm the other counts of conviction.

Fifth Circuit Requests Additional Briefing in Minor

Yesterday, the Fifth Circuit in a letter to counsel, requested additional briefing regarding Counts 11, 12, 13, and 14, which allege a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (what I've always referred to as the devil statute). In Minor the government charged that the agency receiving government funds was the administrative office of the courts of Mississippi. Generally you see a Section 666 violation when someone has stolen monies from say, a local transit authority, which receives in excess of $5,000 in a given year (thereby conferring federal jurisdiction). And, we all know that almost any program receives that amount from the federal government now.

The Fifth Circuit requested additional briefing on the following questions:

1) What evidence shows that the Mississippi judges were influenced or rewarded in connection with matters related to the Administrative Office of the Courts of Mississippi?

2) Describe the nexus that the “in connection with” clause of 666 requires between the Administrative Office of the Courts of Mississippi and the particular matters in front of the judges supposedly influenced by Minor’s actions.

3) What was the proof of that nexus?

4) Did the appellants adequately preserve the issue in the district court and did they adequately raise the issue on appeal?

5) If the Fifth Circuit reverses any of the Counts 11-14, what effect would that have on any of the other counts of conviction, “even if the convictions on those other counts were not to be reversed?”

The Court gave the parties until May 15 to file briefs of less than 15 pages.

More commentary on this later.
 

Swiss Seek End to Disclosure of UBS Client Names

As previously reported here, the Department of Justice and UBS entered into a deferred prosecution agreement wherein UBS is to pay a fine and disclose to DOJ the names of its some 52,000 clients that have used UBS to park income in violation of U.S. tax laws. The New York Times reports today that the President of Switzerland has asked Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner, to drop what the Times inexactly reports to be a lawsuit to disclose the names of the UBS clients. In fact, under the deferred prosecution agreement, UBS has to cooperate with DOJ by providing the client’s names. My guess, Mr. Geithner, who had his own tax issues, isn’t going to touch this one. DOJ has already prosecuted two folks whose names UBS disclosed and, inevitably, many more such prosecutions will follow.

Reasonable Suspicion Justifies Search of Probationer's Home

Today the Eleventh Circuit held in United States v. Carter, No. 08-14460, that a search of the home of a probationer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, if supported by reasonable suspicion. Carter was on probation in 2007, however, his probation did not contain a Fourth Amendment waiver provision. His probation officer though, was suspicious that his lifestyle could not be supported by the unskilled labor he performed and he, along with other probation officers, searched Carter’s town home, which lead to him being charged with possession with intent to distribute crack and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Carter moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the warrantless search. Relying on the balancing test set forth in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), Judge Carnes writing for the Court, noted that the Knights case first addressed the probationer’s individual privacy interests - in short - not much. Then Judge Carnes addresses the “governmental interests at stake” - in short - for a guy like Carter - prior violent crime and drug conviction - “the government’s interest in monitoring the probationer is particularly high.” This may be a common sense conclusion, but Judge Carnes draws this conclusion virtually out of thin air, citing only U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a)(providing enhanced penalties for criminals with a history of drug felonies or crimes of violence). However, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 says nothing about probationers, or the government’s interest in monitoring them more closely. 

Judge Carnes ultimately holds that “the search in this case need only be supported by reasonable suspicion to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment” and that the search of Carter’s home was permissible.

Guilty Plea in Bank Fraud Case

In a case of remarkable chutzpah, Mark Anthony McBride, plead guilty in Atlanta on Friday to a two count information charging him with one count of conspiring to obtain million of dollars in fraudulent mortgages and other loans and one count of bankruptcy fraud.

McBride plead to a scheme he started in 2001 after being released from prison and continued until he reported back to prison in 2002. As soon as he was released from prison in 2006 he was back at making a living in the only, apparent. fashion he knew, being a con artist by completing fraudulent mortgage loans, car loans, lines of credit and continued his scheme until his arrest in September of 2008 for violating his federal probation.

Showing exceptional criminal ingenuity, McBride was able to retain the proceeds of his fraud by filing 8 bankruptcies in Georgia, Alabama and South Carolina.

Methinks McBride's schemes have come to an end. He faces up to 35 years in prison at his sentencing, which is scheduled for July 9, 2009.

More Charges in Fulton County Jail Case

U.S. Attorney David Nahmias said on Thursday that more charges are expected in the continuing investigation of inmate abuse at the Fulton County Jail. On Thursday, two lieutenants, Lt. Earl Glenn and Lt. Robert Hill, pleaded innocent to federal charges of using excessive force and lying to FBI agents investigating the case.

Nahmias has taken an unusual interest in this case, announcing last month the initial arrest of Curtis Jerome Brown, on civil rights, obstruction and false statement charges.

Last week Nahmias said that more charges were expected in the investigation of inmate abuse.

Judge Shoob has monitored conditions at the jail following a lawsuit filed on behalf of inmates accusing the jail of overcrowding and dangerous conditions.

"Significant Nexus" to "Navigable Waters" Necessary in Clean Water Prosecutions

            Abraham Lincoln, following the Union victory at Vicksburg, referred to the Mississippi again flowing “unvexed to the sea.” In Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006), the United States Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia, elaborated the definition of “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act (CWA), which is defined under  33 U.S.C. § 1362, as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,” as “relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features' that are described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams... oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,’” id. at 2225. The plurality further held that “navigable waters” are “continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily dry channels th1rough which water occasionally or intermittently flows.” Id. at 2221.

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