Justice Scalia Bemoans the Nickel and Dime Cases in Federal Court

I’ve often heard federal judge’s in our district court’s say that they tire of the “guns and drug” cases that predominate their dockets. Now, Justice Scalia, the AP reports, has added his voice to that concern. At the American Bar Association meeting in New Orleans Saturday afternoon, Justice Scalia worried that the Supreme Court is becoming a court of criminal appeals, commenting that “I think there’s too much routine criminal stuff that has been pouring into the federal courts that should have been left to the state courts.” Scalia attributed the trend to “nickel and dime” criminal cases clogging the dockets from the district courts to the Supreme Court.

Of course, we’ve seen an astonishing explosion of federal criminal laws in the last 30 years. Last summer the Wall Street Journal published an article detailing the sweeping breadth of the nation’s federal criminal laws, estimated to be somewhere in the range of 4,500 in number. Of course, I think I’ve mentioned a couple of my favorites in the past: the “Smokey the Bear” violation (18 U.S.C. 711 (seriously, look it up)), which makes it a federal crime to make unauthorized use of the Smokey the Bear character. And, of course, why wouldn’t that be a federal criminal violation for anyone to be so brazen to take those unlawful acts (by the way, I’d throw up a photo of the good bear here, but don’t want the Forest Service to track me down for prosecution). A distant second: interstate transportation of stolen dentures (18 U.S.C. 1821). So, at some point we reap the whirlwind of this ridiculousness, but for now, our federal courts have become too much like our state courts, prosecuting cases that are best left to the everyday grist of the state court mill.

Georgia Federal Court Judgeships Remain Vacant

A seat on the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and two judgeships with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia remain vacant, as reported in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. All of the three positions have been vacant for at least a year, with one of the District Court judgeship having been vacant for 31 months. The vacancies have been declared "judicial emergencies" by the U.S. Courts.

On January 26, 2011, President Obama nominated U.S. Magistrate Judge, Linda Walker, and Natasha Perdew Silas, a Federal public defender in Atlanta, for the District Court judgeships. If confirmed by the Senate, they would become the first African-American women District Court judges in the Northern District. Georgia's Senators, Saxby Chambliss and Johnny Isakson, have given blue slips of approval for Judge Walker, but have not for Ms. Silas. The failure to give Ms. Silas a blue slip effectively blocks the Senate from voting to confirm her. The failure has caused friction between the White House, which views Judge Walker and Silas as a package nomination, and Congressional Republicans.

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The Eleventh Circuit vacancy is the result of the retirement of Justice Stanley Birch, who was appointed by President George H.W. Bush in 1990, in August of 2010. The White House has not nominated any replacement for Justice Birch.

Investigations and Numerous Potential Challenges Grow Out of Case Against Former Judge Jack Camp

Many are familiar with the case of former Senior United States District Judge Jack T. Camp, who entered a plea of guilty on November 19, 2010, to  one count of aiding and abetting a felon's possession of cocaine, a painkiller and marijuana, as noted in an article in today's Atlanta Journal-Constitution. The charges arose from conduct involving an exotic dancer, cocaine,  marijuana and prescription narcotics.

U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia Sally Quillian Yates announced yesterday that the government is investigating cases Judge Camp presided over to determine whether or not the cases could have been influenced by drug use or an alleged bias against African Americans. Former Judge Camp has admitted to drug use, but has denied that his use interfered with court business. Ms. Yates stated that the government will not oppose requests by defendants for resentencing if the defendants were sentenced during the five month period in which former Judge Camp admitted to using drugs. Camp presided over 16 sentencings and one trial during this period.

The allegations of racial bias come from former Judge Camp's girlfriend, Sherry Ann Ramos, and Ramos' landlord. His attorney, Bill Morrison of Jones Morrison & Womack, has stated that former Judge Camp has assisted the government to the fullest extent possible, and acted free from alleged racial bias.

Investigators have found evidence that former Judge Camp sentenced women in certain cases well below their recommended sentencing ranges. Judge Camp's alleged biases could call into question cases dating back to 1988, when he was appointed to the bench.

Camp is scheduled to be sentenced on March 4, 2011, by Senior U.S. District Judge Thomas Hogan, a Washington judge assigned to the case by U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts. He faces a maximum sentence of four years in prison. Attorney Craig A. Gillen of Gillen Withers & Lake LLC observed that Mr. Morrison did a fantastic job in negotiating on behalf of Judge Camp. Mr. Gillen also noted that the deal was not negotiated with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Georgia, but directly with Washington.

High Crimes, Shrimp and Vodka: The Senate Trial of Judge Thomas Porteous

Very balanced pre-trial coverage and background of the U.S. Senate trial of Federal Judge Thomas Porteous can be found on Newsy.com, courtesy of a reader.

As reported at NOLA.com, during Judge Porteous' trial last week, the 12 member Senate committee heard testimony regarding allegations that a bonding company, Bail Bonds Unlimited, provided free vehicle repairs, buckets of shrimp and bottles of vodka to Judge Porteous while he was a State judge in Jefferson Parish Louisiana. Judge Porteous is alleged to have performed favors for the bonding company in return. Members of the House of Representatives serving as prosecutors also presented evidence that Judge Porteous allegedly omitted assets and gambling debts from bankruptcy filings, and used the false name "G.T. Ortous" in the filing.

There was also testimony that Judge Porteous asked Jefferson Parish attorney Jacob Amato in 1999 to help defray part of the cost of Judge Porteous' son's wedding at the same time that Judge Porteous was presiding over a multi-million dollar legal dispute between Lifemark Hospitals and Liljeberg Enterprises, in which Amato represented Liljeberg. Amato was alleged to have put $2,000 in an envelope for Judge Porteous' secretary.

Judge Porteous' attorneys argued that the bankruptcy false name was intended to prevent embarrassing publicity, and presented expert testimony that the omissions from the filings were not unusual. They also presented a Loyola University Law School Professor, who testified that, until last year, Louisiana's rules on gifts and meals for judges were fairly vague, and that State judges regularly received lunches and holiday gifts from lawyers practicing before them. Evidence was also presented that Lifemark retained attorney Donald Gardner in its dispute with Liljeberg for $100,000 solely based on Gardner's familiarity with the Judge. Gardner kicked back $30,000 of the fee to the attorney who recruited him. Judge Porteous' counsel argued to the committee that the allegations against Judge Porteous are not the sort of conduct which the Founding Fathers intended impeachment for--treason and high crimes and misdemeanors. Counsel emphasized that Judge Porteous was never charged with any crime relating to the alleged conduct, and that most of the conduct occurred before he was appointed to the Federal Bench.

The committee consists of six Democrats and six Republicans. The full Senate will determine whether Judge Porteous will be impeached during its lame duck session in November. If the Senate votes in favor of impeachment, Judge Porteous will become the eighth Federal judge to be removed from office in U.S. history.

Elena Kagan on Criminal Law

President Obama is expected to announce today his nomination of Solicitor General Elena Kagan to succeed Justice John Paul Stevens. Solicitor General Kagan has been one of the presumptive leading choices to replace Justice Stevens ever since the Justice announced that he was stepping down. Ms. Kagan has drawn criticism from both the right and the left of the political spectrum, and the Senate confirmation process is expected to involve some controversy--as it invariably does.

Ms. Kagan's distinguished background is well known. She graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law School in 1986, clerked for Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, worked at the Washington, D.C., law firm of Williams & Connolly, was a professor at the University of Chicago, worked as Associate Counsel and Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy during the Clinton Administration before returning to Harvard as Dean of the Law School in 2001. In March 2009, President Obama named Ms. Kagan as Solicitor General for the United States.

Less well known is Solicitor General Kagan's views on criminal law. As Professor Douglas Berman of Ohio State University School of Law observes on his blog, Ms. Kagan lacks much of a record on criminal law issues which routinely come before the court.

There are indeed very few reported criminal cases which Ms. Kagan has been involved with during her career. Interestingly, many of the cases that do exist have gone against Ms. Kagan or against the government. While at Williams & Connolly, Ms. Kagan represented the defendant-appellant in the appeal of  U.S. v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1990) before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in which the Court held that the defendant, who was both a bank officer and attorney, possessed no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank documents which were not found in his office, since banking is a closely-regulated business and the documents were subject to routine inspection by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Much later, in Kucana v. Holder,130 S.Ct. 827 (2010), the Supreme Court held, contrary to the position of the Solicitor General, that motions to reopen immigration proceedings before the Board of Immigration Appeals were subject to judicial review. Next, in Johnson v. U.S., 130 S.Ct. 1265 (2010), the Court reversed the petitioner's conviction for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon under 18 United States Code Section 922(g)(1), holding that the petitioner's conviction for simple battery under Florida was not a "violent felony" which could be used to enhance the petitioner's sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act in 18 United States Code Section 924. In addition, as we have noted, the Court also ruled against the Administration in Bloate v. U.S., 130 S.Ct. 1345 (2010) in holding that time spent preparing pretrial motions is not automatically excludable from the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161 et seq. And most recently, in U.S. v. Stevens, --- S.Ct. ----, 2010 WL 1540082 (April 20, 2010), the Court found against Solicitor General Kagan in holding that 18 United States Code Section 4, which criminalized  the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty, was substantially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.

The lack of an extensive background in criminal issues is certainly no barrier to a potential distinguished and exceptional service as a Supreme Court justice. Indeed, it is hoped that the contrary results and setbacks which Solicitor General Kagan has experienced in her few forays into the field have encouraged a more nuanced and open minded view on criminal issues, or at least one that is not a mere rubber stamp of law enforcement and government actions.

Justice John Paul Stevens on Criminal Law

Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, who notified President Barack Obama last week that he will be stepping down from the Court when its current term is over in June or July, has written nearly 400 opinions over his nearly 35 year tenure on the Court. Justice Stevens has weighed in on many occasions on criminal law issues over the past three and a half decades. Contrary to the label commonly applied to Justice Stevens as a "liberal," like all Supreme Court Justices, he has sided with the government in criminal cases more often than not. However, Justice Stevens has been the originator of many opinions which have upheld and furthered the rights of the individual in criminal cases, some of the more notable of which are outlined below.

On sentencing issues, Justice Stevens authored the opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the forerunner of the Court's landmark decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 295 (2004) andUnited States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), in which the Court first famously held, in regard to New Jersey's "hate crimes" statute, that "[t]he Constitution requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."

Justice Stevens also issued the Court's opinion in Gall v. U.S., 552 U.S. 38 (2007), which sets forth the definitive current process for federal criminal sentencing. The Court in Gall held that district courts cannot consider the ranges recommended by the  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as presumptively reasonable, must consider the extent of any departure or variance from the sentencing range recommended by the Guidelines, and must explain the appropriateness of any unusual variance, and that appellate courts review all sentences imposed by a district court under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, reviewing for any significant procedural errors and for substantive reasonableness of the sentence. To calculate a defendant's sentence, a district court must first correctly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, then should consider all of the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and if the court determines to sentence the defendant outside the advisory Guidelines range, it must consider the extent of the deviation and adequately explain the sentence.
 
In regard to searches under the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stevens held that a search of a vehicle incident to a defendant's arrest could not be justified under circumstances where the defendant no longer had access to the vehicle in In Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009). And while he upheld the police search in Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (1987), Justice Stevens wrote legal dicta which has formed the basis for many challenges to the scope of a search of areas which are not specified in a search warrant. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Court affirmed that a man's home is truly his castle, and that the police may not make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to effectuate an arrest.

Justice Stevens has been an ardent opponent of capital punishment throughout most of his term on the Court and has been the author of numerous opinions limiting the application of the death penalty. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Court held that execution of "mentally retarded" offenders constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), ruled that juveniles under the age of 16 cannot possess the requisite culpability for imposition of the death penalty. And in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) the court mandated that, in capital cases, the jury must be instructed on, and permitted to consider, a verdict of guilt on a lesser included offense.

 In other cases, Justice Steven held in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), that a State could not impose the burden on a defendant claiming a racially discriminatory striking of a juror pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, to show that the striking was "more likely than not" the product of purposeful discrimination. He also held, in Hubbard v. U.S., 514 U.S. 695 (1995), that a federal court is not a department or agency of the United States for the purposes of making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

 The Blog wishes Justice Stevens a happy retirement and looks forward to the appointment of his successor.