U.S. v. Corley: Supreme Court Upholds Exclusionary Rule for Confessions Based Upon Unreasonable Delay in Presentment Before a Judge
In McNabb v. U.S., 318 U. S. 332 (1943) and Mallory v. U.S., 354 U. S. 449 (1957), the Supreme Court set forth the rule that a confession by an arrested person, even if made voluntarily, is inadmissible if made after an unreasonable delay in bringing the person before a judge. The McNabb/Mallory rule was acknowledged in the framing of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5 in 1966, which provides, in part, that “[a] person making an arrest within the United States must take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge, or before a state or local judicial officer…” Fed.R.Crim.P. 5(a)(1)(A). However, in 1968, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, in reaction to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). § 3501 provided, in relevant part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment…
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate judge or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before such magistrate judge or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate judge or other officer.
18 U.S.C. § 3501.
In yesterday’s opinion in U.S. v. Corley, No. 07–10441 (S.Ct. Apr. 6, 2009), authored by Justice Souter, the Court finally considered the issue of whether Congress intended § 3501(a) to eliminate the McNabb/Mallory exclusionary rule, or whether it merely intended § 3501(c) to immunize confessions given within 6 hours of a person’s arrest. Id. at 6. Federal and state officers in Pennsylvania arrested Johnnie Corley on suspicion of bank robbery at 8 a.m. on September 17, 2003, following a struggle and chase. Id.FBI agents kept Corley at a police station while they questioned witnesses, and then took him to a hospital late that morning. Id.The agents then took Corley to the FBI office in Philadelphia and proceeded to question him, despite the fact that the office was in the same building as the chambers of the nearest magistrate judge. Id.At 5:27 p.m., nine-and-a-half hours after his arrest, Corley gave an oral confession to having robbed a bank. Id. at 7. The following day, Corley signed a written confession. He was not presented to a magistrate until 1:30 p.m. the following day—more than 29 hours after his arrest.Id.
Corley was charged with armed bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery and using a firearm in the commission of a crime, and moved to suppress his oral and written confessions under McNabb-Mallory and Rule 5(a). Id.The district court denied the motion, holding that Corley’s confession was made within 6 hours pursuant to § 3501(c) if the time he received medical treatment was excluded, and Corley was convicted. Id.The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted cert to resolve a division among the Circuits as to the reach of § 3501.Id. at 7-8.
The government argued that §3501(a), which provides that any confession “shall be admissible in evidence” in federal court “if it is voluntarily given,” meant that the unreasonable delay exclusionary rule of McNabb/Mallory was inapplicable if the confession was voluntary. Id. at 8. Corley argued that §3501(a) was meant to overrule Miranda, and that §3501(c) only limited the application of the exclusionary rule of McNabb/Mallory in cases of confessions within 6 hours of presentment to a magistrate. Id. at 8-9. The majority sided with Corley, holding that the government’s interpretation rendered §3501(c) “nonsensical and superfluous,” since any voluntary confession would be admissible regardless of whether presentment was delayed beyond 6 hours, relying on the canon of statutory construction that a statute should be construed in a manner which gives effect to all its provisions and renders none superfluous. Id. at 9 (citing Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88, 101 (2004); quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes and StatutoryConstruction §46.06, pp.181–186 (rev. 6th ed. 2000)). The majority further held that reading §3501(a) broadly to hold that any voluntary confessions are admissible would create a conflict not only with §3501(c), but with other provisions such as Federal Rules of Evidence relating to hearsay. Id. at 12. The Court also examined the legislative history to §3501 and confirmed that Congress intended for §3501(a) to overrule Miranda, and not McNabb/Mallory. Id. at 13-15. The majority also observed that the government’s interpretation would leave Rule 5 without any teeth.Id. at 15-16. It stated “In a world without McNabb-Mallory, federal agents would be free to question suspects for extended periods before bringing them out in the open, and we have always known what custodial secrecy leads to.” Id. at 16 (citing McNabb, 318 U. S. 332). The majority reversed Corley’s conviction and remanded, holding that:
§3501 modified McNabb-Mallory without supplanting it. Under the rule as revised by §3501(c), a district court with a suppression claim must find whether the defendant confessed within six hours of arrest (unless a longer delay was “reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available [magistrate]”). If the confession came within that period, it is admissible, subject to the other Rules of Evidence, so long as it was “made voluntarily and . . . the weight to be given [it] is left to the jury.” [Cit.]. If the confession occurred before presentment and beyond six hours, however, the court must decide whether delaying that long was unreasonable or unnecessary under the McNabb-Mallory cases, and if it was, the confession is to be suppressed.
Id. at 18.
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas and Justice Alito dissented in an opinion by Justice Alito, in which the dissenters argued that §3501(a) “unambiguously” provides that a voluntary confession by a suspect may not be suppressed regardless of delay.
The majority’s decision in Corley is a welcome reaffirmation of the McNabb/Mallory exclusionary rule and clarification of the scope of § 3501(a), which will hopefully serve to curb improper delay and pressure tactics by law enforcement.
